Bench and bar of Colorado (1917)/History of Bench and Bar of Colorado

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Bench and bar of Colorado (1917)
History of Bench and Bar of Colorado
576926Bench and bar of Colorado (1917) — History of Bench and Bar of Colorado

History of Bench and Bar
of Colorado


WHEN the first seekers after gold pitched their camp upon the banks of Cherry Creek, near its confluence with the Platte, in the spring of 1858, and thus laid the foundation for what, in the course of a few years, developed into the City of Denver, the greater part of what today is known as Colorado was part of the Territory of Kansas. All the territory west of a straight line drawn from the northeast corner of New Mexico to the southern boundary of Nebraska and extending as far as the Utah line was embraced in the Kansas county of Arapahoe, and the first court in this region—the Pike's Peak country it was commonly called—was a Kansas court.

Buried in the archives of Kansas, among the records of that state's territorial days, is an act passed by the territorial legislature on August 25, 1855, which, among other things, provides for the appointment of one Allen P. Tibbitts as probate judge of Arapahoe county. Inasmuch as Arapahoe county contained the major part of our present-day Colorado, Tibbitts may rightfully be called Colorado's first judge, even though he never visited Arapahoe county, much less held court within its boundaries. Why Judge Tibbitts failed to assume the duties of his office is not recorded. Most likely he was aware of the fact that, with the exception of a few trappers and hunters, there were no white people in the country then, and he did not relish the long overland trip in those days when hostile Indians infested the region.

March, 1859, witnessed the organization of the first real court in the Pike's Peak country. With the arrival of a steady stream of gold seekers and others in the settlements along Cherry Creek and the Platte, the need of a court had made itself felt in the community. Accordingly the organization of a probate court, along with a full complement of county officers, such as sheriff, registrar of deeds, coroner, attorney, road supervisors, etc., was determined upon. An election was held in March, 1859, and S. W. Wagoner, one of the earliest arrivals in the Pike's Peak country, received most votes for the office of probate judge.

Memoirs of pioneer residents and the records of the State's early history fail to give any definite information regarding the territory over which the jurisdiction of this probate county extended—as a matter of fact, Judge Wagoner and the men who had elected him were not quite sure. In February, 1859, one month before Judge Wagoner's elevation to the bench, the Kansas legislature had enacted a law dividing the Arapahoe county of 1855 into four counties, Montana, Broderick, El Paso and Oro. The Cherry Creek settlements, where most of the people then lived, were within the confines of Montana, comprising practically the entire northwestern section of the State as constituted today.

Some contended that Wagoner was elected probate judge for the county of Arapahoe, as constituted by the Act of 1855, which had named Judge Tibbitts; others insisted that Wagoner's jurisdiction extended only over Montana county. Be this as it may, Wagoner duly qualified as probate judge, and the other officers elected with him assumed the duties of their office, among them Marshall Cook, the first county attorney.

Wagoner and his fellow officers had been in office but a few months when the settlers in the Rocky Mountain region, or at least a goodly portion of them, became imbued with the idea of seceding from Kansas and setting up an independent government. This movement, fostered chiefly in the Cherry Creek settlements, culminated in the establishment of what in history is known as the "Territory of Jefferson," and was, as far as the courts are concerned, responsible for a condition of affairs which may be called extraordinary. It brought into being a multiplicity of courts until there were so many of them that the law-abiding citizens, in sheer desperation, were compelled practically to take the law into their own hands when a serious crime had been committed.

The movement for an independent state or territory first sprung up late in the summer of 1859. Many level headed men among the settlers full well realized that any attempt on the part of the settlers to create a territory was without warrant of law, and that such a government never would be recognized by Congress or any other state, but their warnings remained unheeded. Leaders in the movement insisted that the act creating Kansas territory provided that all lands to which the Indian title had not been extinguished, should not be considered within the Kansas jurisdiction. They pointed out that the title to the land in the Pike's Peak region was still held by the Indians, and consequently, they argued, Kansas had no jurisdiction over the region.

The warnings of the opponents of an independent government remained unheeded and the "Territory of Jefferson" became an accomplished fact at an election held on October 24, 1859. A few weeks prior to this election a constitution had been adopted which, besides a full complement of officers from governor down, provided for a chief justice of the Supreme Court, two associate justices and an attorney general. A. J. Allison was elected chief justice, J. N. Odell and E. Fitzgerald associate justices, and R. J. Frazier attorney general.

The legislature of the Territory of Jefferson went to work with a will. Its members were very much in earnest and actuated with a desire to give the territory a government and laws enjoyed by the states in the east. Criminal and civil codes, copied wholesale from eastern states, were adopted and approved by the "governor," R. W. Steele, an able lawyer who had come to Colorado early in 1859.

Courts and court procedure enjoyed the special attention of this first Jeffersonian legislature. In less than two months its members enacted, besides many other laws of a general nature, the following which directly affected the administration of justice: establishing a judicial system composed of a supreme, district, county, and justice of the peace courts, and defining the jurisdictions of each of these courts; appointing notaries public; providing docket fees; fixing terms of court; regulating and authorizing writs of attachment and garnishment; providing for the recovery of property by writs of replevin, and so forth. The legislature even authorized the appointment of commissioners for the codification of the laws.

While the men responsible for and active in the conduct of the "government" of the Territory of Jefferson were thus engaged in creating courts and enacting laws, a considerable portion of the citizens then living in this region, and not the least influential, absolutely refused to recognize the territorial government and the courts which had been created by the territorial constitution and the legislature. They maintained, and rightfully so, that the whole Rocky Mountain country was still a part of Kansas and that only officers elected under Kansas laws legally held office.

When the movement for the establishment of the Territory of Jefferson had assumed considerable momentum, the authority of the first probate court, presided over by Judge Wagoner, had begun to wane. As the territorial movement gained momentum, the people paid less and less attention to Wagoner and his court, until finally it passed completely out of existence. The disappearance of this court, recognized by them as the only court doing business legally within the territory, gave the champions of the Kansas cause their opportunity. They held an election in November, 1859, and elected a full set of officers, including a probate judge, for "Arapahoe County, Kansas."

About the time these Kansas officials assumed the duties of their office, courts under the Jeffersonian constitution were organized. The natural result was conflict between the two courts. To add to the confusion Denver City, under an act passed by the legislature, had organized an Appellate and Common Pleas Court for the territory embraced within the city limits, and, in addition, there was still another court conducted by the Arapahoe County Claim Club. Originally organized for the protection of its members against claim-jumpers, this club had gradually extended its jurisdiction until its "court" dealt with all classes of offenders.

Thus there were at least four courts doing business in Arapahoe county. With such a multiplicity of courts it is not surprising that the proper enforcement of law and order suffered. Litigants, of course, commenced what litigation they had in whatever court they knew was friendliest to them. When things did not go to suit them they would take a change of venue from one court to another until they found what they wanted. Criminals experienced little trouble in escaping just punishment, even though county attorney Robert Collier, was holding office in both the Kansas and Jeffersonian courts, having been elected by the adherents of both forms of government, and could prosecute in both courts.

Conditions in other counties created by the Kansas and Jeffersonian territories were not quite as bad as in Denver and Arapahoe county. The vast majority of the settlers lived in and near Denver and the other counties were only sparsely settled. On the plains east of the Rockies there were hardly settlers enough to keep a court busy, and in the mountains the miners had organized courts which were the recognized authorities of all the miners, and which made probate courts, such as provided by Kansas or Jefferson Territory, unnecessary. These courts in the mining communities, named "Miners' Courts," transacted all the court business there was to transact, and the miners paid little or no attention to any other courts.

As far as can be ascertained, the first of these Miners' Courts was organized in 1859, soon after the discovery of gold in the upper Clear Creek region. Its jurisdiction extended over what in those days was known as the Gregory district. All other Miners' Courts in the state were patterned after the Gregory district court. Their machinery was exceedingly simple, but they filled the wants of the people then digging for gold in the mountains.

The officers of a Miners' Court were a president, a probate judge, a sheriff or constable, a surveyor and recorder, a secretary and a treasurer. The probate judge was the chief executive officer. All officers were elected at a general meeting of the male residents of the district over which the court was to have jurisdiction. Codes, criminal as well as civil, were enacted. These codes were, as a rule, very simple. Anyone could understand them. The criminal laws, usually, were enacted with the one purpose in view of ridding the community of undesirables, either by the hangman or by banishment. The civil code dealt chiefly with those subjects in which the men who devised it were mostly interested such as mining claims, mill sites, and other matters relating to mining.

The Miners' Courts worked with promptness and dispatch. Litigants and defendants had little cause to complain about the law's delays. Once a Miners' Court had taken jurisdiction over a case it was not long before the case had been disposed of. To prevent miscarriage of justice and give everyone a square deal provision for appeal was made in every one of the districts. Every litigant and defendant had the right to appeal from the decision of the court to a miners meeting, composed of all the men in the district. The decision of the miners' meeting in all cases was final.

The Miners' Courts, perhaps more than any other agency, were responsible for the maintenance of law and order in the mining communities. They enjoyed the universal respect of the law-abiding citizens and were feared by evildoers. The first assembly of the Territory of Colorado, in 1861, by special enactment, confirmed their judgments and also enacted into state-wide laws many of the provisions of their simple codes as they affected the mining industry.

Failure of the Kansas, Jeffersonian and municipal courts in Arapahoe county to punish evildoers, according to their deserts, resulted in the organization, by the better class of citizens, of what became known as Peoples' Courts. During the year 1860 there was an extraordinary influx of settlers into the Rocky Mountain region. Reports that gold had been discovered in the mountains and that men were growing rich fast had spread throughout the east. As the natural result, thousands flocked to the new El Dorado, and with them came scores of criminals of the worst type. Most of these undesirables made their headquarters in Denver.

It was with these criminals that the Peoples' Courts dealt. They were not courts in the usually accepted sense, though, in a way, all the forms of court procedure were observed in their proceedings. They have been compared with the vigilantes of other western communities of the early days, but this comparison is hardly fair because, unlike the vigilantes, they gave every accused man a fair trial and the benefit of a legal adviser before their sentences were pronounced and carried out.

Peoples' Courts were organized whenever an especially serious crime, such as a murder, had been committed. There were three judges and a jury of twelve, composed of substantial citizens. The man on trial was given every opportunity to present his side of the case and offer such testimony as would prove his innocence. The sentence of a Peoples' Court usually was death, though there are a number of cases on record in which the juries brought in verdicts of acquittal. In no case, as far as is known, did a People's Court ever make a mistake when it sent a man to the gallows. The sentence was usually carried out immediately after it had been pronounced.

In their methods and the speedy execution, the Peoples' Courts resembled the Miners' Courts of the mountain communities. There the similarity ends, because the Miners' Courts were regularly organized and permanent institutions, while the Peoples' Courts were called together only when the occasion required action by the law-abiding element. The Peoples' Courts did not possess any authority based upon law, other than the law of self-preservation, for had they not meted out justice, the communities might as well have been turned over to the lawless element. They, more than the courts organized in accordance with the law, either Kansas or Jeffersonian, were responsible for the maintenance of law and order.

Kansas and Jeffersonian courts held regular sessions in Denver and other towns of the region for several months. Gradually the influence of the government of the territory began to wane. The people began to realize that they had made a mistake and acted contrary to law when they had organized a territory, instead of letting Congress attend to the matter. In addition, the men in the mining communities refused to recognize the territorial "government" and pay the poll tax which was ordered to produce revenue with which to defray the expenses of the government. Through their own courts they were enabled to administer justice and regulate their own affairs to their entire satisfaction. They did not need the territorial government or its courts.

When the time for the second election of officers of the territorial government arrived, Jefferson territory had been abandoned by most of the people living within its boundaries. Out of a population of more than 25,000 less than a thousand went to the polls and cast their votes. Shortly after this election the people of Eastern Kansas Territory adopted a constitution for a State of Kansas, which was to extend west to the 102nd meridian, thus leaving out practically all the territory embraced by the Territory of Jefferson.

Far-seeing men, who realized that the time had come for the organization of a territory in accordance with the laws of the United States, interested President Buchanan and Congress, and in February, 1861, Congress passed the bill which created the Territory of Colorado, with boundaries corresponding with those of our state today. Jefferson Territory, and with it the judicial system which had been created under it and all of the laws passed by its legislature, passed out of existence in June, 1868. The last act of Robert W. Steele, the "Governor," was a proclamation asking that all officers, especially all judges, surrender their commissions and abstain from the exercise of the duties of their office.

With the inauguration of the territorial government in 1861 order was brought out of the judicial chaos into which the adherents of Jefferson Territory had plunged the whole Rocky Mountain region. All courts, whether Jeffersonian or Kansas, or holding authority from the various miners' districts or the City of Denver, ceased automatically to exist on the day the territorial officers took charge of affairs.

The organic act creating the new territory ordered the legislature, to be elected under it, to divide the territory into three judicial districts; each district to be presided over by a judge who was to have his residence in the district. These judges, the act provided, should sit separately as district judges in their respective districts, and jointly as supreme court judges.

The first three district and supreme judges appointed by President Lincoln were: Benjamin F. Hall of New York, Chief Justice; Charles Lee Armour of Ohio and S. Newton Pettis of Pennsylvania, Associate Justices. Chief Justice Hall's commission was dated March 25, 1861 while Justices Armour and Pettis received their commissions three days later. The court was organized on July 10, 1861.

When the legislature convened it created three judicial districts in accordance with the provisions of the organic act. The first district was known as the Central City District, with Judge Armour as its judge. The second district was known as the Denver District, with Denver as its headquarters; Chief Justice Hall presided over it. Judge Pettis was assigned to what was known as the Southern District. Canon City was originally named as the residence of the judge of this district, but later the legislature first changed it to Colorado City and then to Pueblo. The creation of the judicial districts was followed by the adoption of a code, which remained in force until it was amended in 1868.

Though the new territory had three judicial districts and three judges, some time elapsed before the courts got into good working order. Judge Pettis, from all that can be learned, was not favorably impressed with the district assigned to him and he returned to his home in Pennsylvania without ever having held a single session of court. Allan A. Bradford was appointed to fill the vacancy created by his resignation.

Judges Hall and Armour entered upon their duties soon after they had qualified. Hall remained in office two years, holding court in Denver. His successor was Stephen H. Harding, a former governor of Utah; a man who proved very unpopular, not alone with the attorneys practicing at the law, but with the people of his district generally.

Unpopular as Harding was, still he was better liked than Judge Armour, the third of President Lincoln's original appointees. Armour was a very eccentric man and managed to make himself very unpopular by his manners and his decisions from the bench. Lawyers who had cases pending in his court absolutely refused to try them before him. They either sought to remove them to one of the two other districts, on changes of venue, or had them continued and continued again, in hopes that the judge would resign or be removed. Petitions for his removal were circulated but without result.

Matters finally reached such a stage that the territorial legislature took cognizance of the enmity of the attorneys towards Judge Armour. A law was enacted creating a judicial district of Costilla and Conejos counties, inhabited largely by Mexicans. Judge Armour was assigned to this district, but the legislators had reckoned without their host.

Instead of taking up his residence in the new district, Judge Armour refused pointblank to go. He remained at Central City drawing his salary and enjoying life generally until 1865, when he left the state. In the same year Justice Harding resigned and emulated Judge Armour's example.

More than a year elapsed from the day that they had been inducted into office before the three judges were called upon to sit as a supreme court. With the slate swept clear, so to speak, with the inauguration of the territorial government and with the new government taking no cognizance of the courts which had existed before the organization of the territory, it was but natural that some time should have elapsed before an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court.

The first case to be decided by the Supreme Court was appealed from Park County. It was the case of Gardner vs. Dunn; an action in forcible entry and detainer, begun originally before one of the Park County justices of the peace, appealed to the District Court and thence to the Supreme Court.

The first criminal case to occupy the attention of the Supreme Court was one of the most celebrated murder cases in the early history of the state. William Franklin, known as "Billy" Franklin, had been sentenced to be hanged by the District Court of Gilpin County. His attorneys appealed upon the ground that the indictment, upon which he had been tried, failed to name the territory in which Gilpin County was located and, therefore, was void. The Supreme Court took the same view of the case and reversed the sentence of the District Court.

Franklin never was tried again. Released upon bail, he reported at the Gilpin County courthouse at every term of court for many years, fully expecting to be placed on trial again. His periodical visits to the courthouse gave rise to a standing joke among atttorneys and court officials. Whenever Franklin made his appearance, they would say, "Here comes Billy Franklin to be hanged again." The records do not disclose why Franklin never was placed on trial again. He was a very popular man and public feeling was greatly in his favor.

That clause in the enabling act providing that the territory's three judges should sit separately as district judges and jointly as a supreme court, was the cause of many extraordinary situations. Sometimes the associate justices would join forces and reverse one of the chief justice's opinions, rendered by him as district judge. Again the chief justice and one of the associate judges would "sit on" the other associate justice. As a rule the judges got along very well and managed to dispose of all appeals in a manner satisfactory to all parties concerned, especially so after the original appointees had been replaced by better and abler men.

Holding of court in the early Colorado days was quite often difficult, if not positively dangerous. With no railroads to carry them to the towns, in which they were to hold court, the judges were compelled to use stages or private conveyances. The country was infested with hostile Indians and made unsafe by desperate characters who had fled from Eastern cities and sought refuge in the mountain fastnesses. As a result it often became necessary to provide the judges with armed escorts when they started to make the rounds of their districts. Accommodations, so far as courtrooms and as well as lodgings were concerned, were of the most primitive order.

The first three judges had retired from the bench by 1865. Judge Bradford, who had been appointed to fill the vacancy created by Judge Pettis' resignation, relinquished his office in 1865. He was succeeded by Charles F. Holly. William H. Gale was named to take the place of Judge Armour when the latter decided to leave the territory and return to his home in the east. Holly and Gale were followed on the bench in 1866 by W. H. Gorsline and Christian S. Eyster. Chief Justice Harding resigned late in 1866, and Moses Hallett, then one of the youngest members of the territorial bar, was appointed to fill his place. Judges Gorsline and Eyster were succeeded by James B. Belford and Ebenezer T. Wells. Andrew W. Brazee succeeded Judge Belford and Amherst W. Stone was appointed in place of Judge Wells. Chief Justice Hallett and Justices Brazee and Stone were on the bench when Colorado was admitted to the Union as a state.

The names of Justices Hallett, Wells and Belford are remembered by many of the attorneys of the present generation. Justice Hallett, appointed to the bench through the united efforts of the bar and the people of the territory, by his ability and great learning and fearlessness, soon gained the confidence of lawyers and litigants alike. His appointment to the federal judgeship, upon Colorado's admission to the Union in 1876, met with universal approval of lawyers and laymen alike. While filling the office of Chief Justice, Judge Hallett was called upon to decide many cases involving" questions which had never been presented to a court before; notably cases growing out of the booming mining industry and irrigation. To this day our courts follow the law as laid down by him in his opinion.

Judge Belford, after serving on the Supreme and District Bench, retired to the private practice of law. At the first election held after Colorado had become a state, he was elected the state's first representative in the lower house of Congress. Three times afterwards his fellow citizens honored him by electing him a representative in Congress.

Judge Wells earned the everlasting gratitude of judges and lawyers alike by compiling the first revision of the statutes of the state, a work much needed and greatly appreciated. He is today the official reporter of the Colorado Supreme Court. His reports are, as every lawyer and judge in the state knows, distinguished by the same clearness which marked his decisions when he was on the bench.

The constitution adopted upon the state's admission to the Union in 1876 provided for a Supreme Court of three judges and for four judicial districts, with one judge for each of the district courts. The first election of Supreme Court judges resulted in the election of Henry C. Thatcher, Samuel H. Elbert and Ebenezer T. Wells. The latter resigned before the expiration of his term and his place was filled by the election of Wilbur F. Stone, one of the pioneer lawyers in the southern section of the state and one of the most active members of the bar. Judge Stone, hale and hearty, at 84 today, is the Commissioner of the United States Court for Colorado in Denver.

With a steady influx of settlers into the young state and the growth of the business of the courts, four judicial districts proved inadequate within a few years. In order to give relief and bring about a speedier administration of justice, the general assembly in 1881 increased the number of judicial districts to seven and provided for seven judges, one for each district. Seven judges soon were no more able to attend to all of the business of the district courts than four had been. Dockets became more and more congested, especially in Denver, Pueblo and Leadville, the largest cities in the state in those days. When the bill creating seven districts was enacted by the general assembly an attempt was made to further lighten the burdens of the Denver district judge by the creation of a special criminal court. The bill providing for such a court was passed but declared unconstitutional.

In 1883 the next general assembly, realizing that the congestion of the court business was becoming serious, again considered relief measures. The result was that a bill was passed creating special criminal courts in Arapahoe, Pueblo and Lake counties. These courts were given jurisdiction over all criminal cases, with the exception of capital offenses. In Arapahoe County further relief for the district court was provided at the same time by the establishment of a Superior Court. This court had concurrent jurisdiction with the district court but its jurisdiction did not extend beyond the limits of the City of Denver.

The criminal courts remained until 1889 when they, and with it Denver's Superior Court, were abolished by the Seventh General Assembly. That body of lawmakers simply failed to make any provision for the maintenance of these courts and ordered the cases pending in them transferred to the district court. During the six years of its existence the Denver Criminal Court had only two judges, Platt Rogers, still an active member of the Denver bar, and Wilbur F. Stone, who was appointed to this court after he had completed his term on the Supreme bench.

The abolishment of the Criminal and Superior courts in Denver had been foreshadowed by an act of the Sixth General Assembly in 1887, when it had increased the number of the Arapahoe County district judges to two and had created two additional districts. In order to provide enough judges in Arapahoe County to dispose of all of the business which the district court was bound to receive as the result of the doing-away with the Superior and Separate criminal courts, the Seventh General Assembly increased the number of the divisions of the district court to four, with a judge for each. The next general assembly, in 1891, added still another judge.

Though the population of Denver has more than doubled since, the number of judges has remained the same. Repeated efforts, the last before the Twenty-second General Assembly in 1917, to induce the law-making body of the state to increase the number of judges have failed. The natural result is a badly congested docket. The judges are not to blame for this condition of affairs. They work hard and earnestly; new cases simply are brought faster than the judges can dispose of them, if they wish to give them that consideration which they should give them.

At the same time that Arapahoe County was given five district judges, the General Assembly redistricted the entire state. A bill was passed dividing the state into thirteen judicial districts. These thirteen districts remain today as fixed by this bill. Elsewhere in this volume will be found a list of the districts and of the counties embraced by each of them and of the judges holding court in them today. Though the districts have not been changed since 1891, the number of judges has been increased from time to time. In 1893 the tenth or Pueblo District was given a second judge. Two years later the number of judges in the fourth or Colorado Springs district was increased to two. In 1903 the eighth district was given a second judge and the fourth a third. A second judge was provided for the third district in 1915. The number of judges remained unchanged until the present year, when the Twenty-second General Assembly saw fit to abolish one of the three judgeships in the fourth district. Today twenty-two district judges are disposing of the business which forty-one years ago four judges were able to handle satisfactorily. The only special court in Colorado today is the Denver Juvenile Court, created by an act of the General Assembly in 1909.

For ten years following Colorado's admission to the Union, the Supreme Court remained the only appellate court of the state. As the years passed and the district courts began to dispose of an ever-increasing number of cases, the number of causes submitted to the Supreme Court for final review grew also until finally the court's docket became as badly congested as that of any district court in the state. Litigants were compelled to wait a year or more before their cases were finally disposed of.

Many attorneys practicing at the bar advocated an increase of the number of judges of the Supreme Court as the best and speediest remedy to bring relief. They, however, were in the minority. Following the example set by a number of eastern states, the General Assembly in 1887 created what was known as the Supreme Court Commission as an auxiliary to the court. Under the provision of the act creating this commission, the Supreme Court judges assigned such cases as they selected to the commissioners, of whom there were three. The commissioners examined these cases and, their examination of the record finished, submitted opinions to the judges for approval. The plan would have worked excellently but for the fact that the judges, in order to be able to approve the opinions submitted by the commission, were compelled to look into the cases themselves to see whether they agreed with the commissioners or not. The result was that as much time was required for the disposition of a case as if a judge had handled the case from the very beginning.

Three years of the Supreme Court Commission convinced lawyers and laymen alike that some other remedy had to be found to bring about a speedier adjudication of civil action and criminal cases. The advocates of an enlarged Supreme Court again made an effort to have the number of judges increased, but, as before, their efforts were doomed to failure. Instead, the Eighth General Assembly in 1891 created a Court of Appeals, giving it jurisdiction over litigation coming up from the lower courts. George Q. Richmond, today an active member of the Denver bar, Gilbert R. Reed and Julius Bissell were the first judges appointed as judges of this court. For fourteen years this court assisted the Supreme Court in disposing of the litigation which had accumulated in the course of years. Altogether its judges decided not less than 2,631 cases.

The Court of Appeals was abolished by the Sixteenth General Assembly. In 1905 those lawyers and judges favoring an increased Supreme Court as the only satisfactory means of successfully disposing of the accumulation of appealed cases, were successful in their efforts to have the number of the judges of the state's highest tribunal increased to a number which, in their judgment, would be sufficient to take care of all appealed cases. Through their efforts the General Assembly was induced to pass a bill abolishing the Court of Appeals and increasing the number of Supreme Court judges from three to seven. The Court of Appeals passed out of existence on April 4, 1905, and on the following day the enlarged Supreme Court, with William H. Gabbert as chief justice, held its first session.

Accumulation of business again compelled the state's lawmakers to have recourse to a Court of Appeals in 1913. Despite the increase of its membership to seven, the Supreme Court had been unable to dispose of its cases as rapidly as was desirable in the interests of right and justice. For the purpose of helping the court to dispose of many cases of minor importance, the Court of Appeals was called into being again. It was composed of five judges, to whom were assigned cases of minor importance. It was created for the sole purpose of disposing of accumulated cases. When that task was finished two years later, the court again passed out of existence.

With the ever-increasing court business it is but a question of time, in the opinion of attorneys, until it will become necessary to either increase the number of Supreme Court judges again, or once more create a Court of Appeals. Lawyers and litigants alike are entitled to and demand a speedier disposition of cases than a court of last resort of but seven members, with the utmost application and diligence can give them.

When Colorado was admitted to the Union as a state, a United States District Court was established with Denver as the seat of the judge presiding over it. Elmer S. Dundy, judge of the District of Nebraska, held the first session of the court on December 5, 1876. On January 23, 1877, Moses Hallett, for ten years chief justice of the Colorado Territorial Supreme Court, took the oath of office as United States judge, and until death called him thirty years later, he presided over the court. Westbrooke S. Decker was the first United States District Attorney for Colorado. He took office on the day that Judge Hallett ascended the federal bench.

Since the day it was established, the United States Court for Colorado has had only two judges: Moses Hallett and Robert E. Lewis, the present judge, appointed upon Judge Hallett's death in 1906.

No history of the bench and bar of Colorado, no matter how brief, would be complete without some reference to the men who were and are members of the bar, and called to the bench to administer the laws. It is no exaggeration to say that, from the days when the first gold-seekers flocked into the country at the base of the Rockies until the present day, Colorado has been fortunate in having lawyers and judges who have been a credit to the state, and who, in taking care of the interests of those in need of legal advice and assistance and in administering the law, have been and are second to none in the country.

Lawyers and judges of the early days of the state were called upon to deal with many questions which were entirely new to them. There was no precedent to guide them in their arguments and decisions. As the gold-seekers left the banks of the streams on the plains and discovered the yellow metal in the mountains, rules and regulations for the protection of the miners and their property became necessary. Colorado in those days was practically the only state in the Union in which mining, other than by placer methods, was carried on.

It was here that the pioneer lawyers of the state showed their ability and genius. As advisers of the Miners' Courts and Miners' Districts, they formulated the laws governing mining claims, millsites, and such other matters connected with the rapidly developing industry. These regulations formed the basis for many of the laws affecting mining enacted by the legislature after Colorado had been made a territory.

Farming by irrigation presented other knotty problems to the pioneer lawyers. As in litigation growing out of mining, there was no precedent to guide them. Step by step they were compelled to work out the solution of these problems until the rights of the users of water, the digging of ditches and establishment of reservoirs, had been settled. Years passed before many of the questions had been settled and the law laid down for all time.

It required men of unusual ability and resourcefulness to successfully meet all the questions which presented themselves to them in this region in the early days. Not only were these qualities required of the men practicing at the bar but also, and if not in a higher degree, of the judges on the bench. With very few exceptions, the judges proved themselves equal to the task. The few exceptions were political favorites, sent into the states by the powers-that-were at Washington—not because of their fitness for the high office, but because they happened to have influence enough to bring about their appointment. The judges who, after the first few appointments, were selected through the influence of the people within the territory, without an exception, were men of the highest character and ability.

There were quite a number of attorneys among the men who came West and settled in Colorado during the first few years. These men, aside from practicing their profession, took a great interest in public affairs. They were among the leaders in the movements which resulted in the organization of Jefferson territory, and later brought about the organization of the territory and the admission of the territory as a state. As members of the territorial legislatures and of the general assemblies, lawyers took a leading part in the framing of our laws and of the criminal and civil codes.

Many lawyers were not only honored by their elevation to the bench, but were placed in high positions by the people of the state. Among Colorado's governors, United States senators, congressmen, and other high officials, there are found scores of men whose names are famous in the court's annals of jurisprudence—men whose names are known from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and from the Great Lakes to the Gulf—men whose achievements have brought everlasting glory to the people of the state who elected them.

Colorado may well be proud of the men to whom her people have entrusted the administration of justice, and who are today practicing within her borders the noble profession of the law.