Criticism on the Declaration of Independence, As a Literary Document/Part 2
N o t e s.
N o t eA.
Since this criticism has grown to dimensions far exceeding any thing I purposed at the commencement, it has occurred to me, that it would be convenient to the reader, to have the first, and so much of the second paragraph, as I have commented on, inserted in a note. I accordingly subjoin them here, as they stand in the last edition of our statutes.
"When in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume, among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires, that they should declare the causes, which impel them to the separation."
"We hold these truths to be self-evident—That all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed," &c.
This is I believe, verbatim et literatim; except that I have italicized the preposition "to" that its ungrammatical position may be more obvious.
N o t eB.
The ideas set forth are these; that necessity obliged them to do a certain act; which act also nature entitled them to perform. That there are such a class of acts is true. Nature entitles us (gives us the privilege) to sleep, to eat, &c., and other acts, cognate, correspondent or correlative. It may be said also, that nature obliges (compels) us to do these things. But acts of this sort are extremely limited. They are such as belong to man as an animal, and not to him as a rational being. A man with a bad cold, is entitled by the laws of nature to sneeze; and as he can not very well help doing it; it may be alledged that necessity obliges him to do it. To go into a declaration of causes why we sleep or eat, or do other cognate or correlavant acts, would appear particularly superfluous in our day; and I can hardly be made to understand, why it was not as much of a superfluity seventy years ago. No decent respect, to the opinions of mankind, would require a declaration of causes for such acts. Nor do I think a decent apology can be made for stating them, if indeed they are causes of a character ascribed to them. The document subsequently goes into a statement of causes, and very good ones they are too, but of a character as different from the one alledged of them by the author, as facts ever are from falsehoods. They are made by the recital, to consist wholly in the magisterial and judicial cruelties of the British government.
N o t eC.
When we reduce the rhetoric of the first paragraph to its plain truth, it amounts to about this: the "laws of nature," meant simply a will, to resent certain injuries—the "necessity," a will to do nothing else but resent them. The entire expression "laws of nature and of nature's God," furnishes no idea more than the simple word nature would furnish.
Instances of these metaphorical expansions, however, in their appropriate place, are sometimes exceedingly felicitious. The fatuous example—"sink or swim, live or die, survive or perish,"—when we consider the time, place, and circumstances, in which it was uttered, is in the highest degree beautiful. It is obvious enough to be sure, that these several expressions are but a repetition of the same idea; nevertheless, the want of additional ideas in the words uttered, is more than compensated by the testimony they furnish of the superabundant and overflowing patriotism of the speaker. But a similar expansion inserted in a King's speech from the throne, would be as singularly infelicitious as it is happy in the speech of an ardent orator. I have frequently observed, that brilliant and devout men, in the exercise of prayer, use these metaphorical expansions with a very fine effect indeed. The scriptures furnish many specimens of inimitable beauty. Job, in particular, abounds in this trope. Its use is justified, and in fact sanctified on certain occasions. Where enthusiasm, devotion or ardor, are allowable, there this species of metaphor is admissible. But where facts are of more value than rhetoric, it is as much out of place as it would be in a note of hand or bill of exchange.
N o t eD.
There is no subject on which I am accustomed to hear so much poor logic, as on the subject of "rights," except that of the human mind. I could never account for this, unless it arose from confounding the literal and metaphorical meanings of the word. Illogical minds, making no distinction, the effect of their logic is but to puzzle, not convince. No man can be said to have a right to any thing he is not possessed of, unless he has such proof of title, as will effect a restoration. A right that cannot be proved, how can it be known that it is a right? Possession or the ability to get possession are all the proofs of rights. Rights, without one or the other of these proofs, are mere pretensions. In our system, that is a right, which the law contemplates as one. The southern planter has a right to buy and sell men as slaves. He is not only in possession of this right, but the law secures him from being dispossessed. His right is as clear, as the right to life while it lasts. But the law which gives the planter this right, is a cruel law, and the man who exercises the right, in most cases, is as cruel as the code that sanctions it.
N o t eE.
To make a man a present of his own face, would be a specimen of generosity of the same value, as presenting him an example of what was self-evident. If a gentleman should propose to introduce me to myself, for the purpose of enlarging the circle of my acquaintance, I should consider his politeness of the same kind with that which would exert itself to increase my knowledge, by informing me of what I knew before. What was self-evident, I must have known; to suppose to the contrary, presupposes my powers inadequate to comprehend a statement. If the thing to be stated, was what I knew, then there was no use for the statement. If it was what I did not know, then it was not self-evident. I think this logic, must be sufficient to show, that a statement of self-evident truths, is altogether a piece of gratuitous nonsense.