Curran v. Arkansas/Dissent Daniel

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Curran v. Arkansas, 56 U.S. 304 (1853)
Dissenting opinion by Peter Vivian Daniel
2799925Curran v. Arkansas, 56 U.S. 304 (1853) — Dissenting opinionPeter Vivian Daniel
Court Documents
Case Syllabus
Opinion of the Court
Dissenting Opinions
Catron
Daniel

Mr. Justice DANIEL.

From the decision of this court, just announced I am constrained to declarc my dissent. According to my apprehension there is no legitimate ground of jurisdiction and of course for the interference of this court in this case, within the just intent and objects of the 10th section of the 1st article of the Cbnstitution. By the legislature of the State of Arkansas, which has [p322] been assailed, the obligation of no contract is denied. The claims of every stockholder and every noteholder of the Bank of the State of Arkansas are, in reference to that corporation, fully recognized. The utmost that can be ojected to the action of the State is, that in a contest amongst the creditors of a failing corporation, the State, as one oF those creditors, and the largest creditor of the number, may have appropriated to herself a portion of the- assets of that corporation greater than would have been warranted by perfect equity, or other eauality, amongst all the creditors. But should this conclusion be conceded, the concession implies no attempt to deny or impair any obligation of the bank to satisfy every creditor. It might raise a question of fraud or unfairness in the action of the State in reference to the other creditors of the bank, but it carries with it no interference with the obligation or the sanctity of their contract with the corporation, whatever that irdght be. The mere question of fraud, in the execution or non-performance of contracts, surely the Constitution never intended to constitute as a means by which the federal authorities were to supervise the polity and acts of the State governments. Such a claim of power in the federal government would justify the interference with, and the supervision by this court of any act of the State legislatures, and of every transaction of private life, and in the necessarily imperfect attempts to exercise such a power, would encumber it with a mass of business, which would disappoint and entirely prevent the performance of its legitimate duties.