Diffenderfer v. Central Baptist Church of Miami, Florida, Inc./Dissent Douglas

by William O. Douglas

United States Supreme Court

404 U.S. 412

Diffenderfer  v.  Central Baptist Church of Miami, Florida, Inc.

 Argued: Dec. 6, 1971. --- Decided: Jan 10, 1972

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, dissenting.

The extent to which a State may constitutionally authorize a tax exemption for church-owned property used primarily for commercial purposes is a question of substantial national importance, and is squarely presented by appellants' challenge to Fla.Stat. § 192.06(4), F.S.A. in this case. The Court says, however, that the controversy over the exemption awarded appellee church is moot, appellants having asked only for declaratory relief as to the unconstitutionality of § 192.06(4), which section was replaced by new legislation, effective December 31, 1971, that substantially narrowed the authorized exemption. Fla.Stat. § 196.192, F.S.A.

I am not as eager as is the Court to hold moot a case on appeal which is justiciable in every respect save for an intervening change in the underlying law. It does not necessarily follow that there is no longer a live controversy between these parties, even if we assume, arguendo, that the new statute satisfies all of appellants' constitutional objections to the old one. Here, appellants argue that should their appeal prevail, the church will be liable for three years' back property taxes, pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 193.23, now § 193.092, F.S.A. ^[1] If this is so, the controversy would appear vital despite the repeal of § 192.06(4). Cf. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491; Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 87 S.Ct. 339, 17 L.Ed.2d 235. See also Note, 83 Harv.L.Rev. 1672 (1970).

Appellees contest this interpretation of state tax law, arguing from state court decisions that state or local taxing authorities would be estopped from asserting appellee church's liability for back taxes. ^[2] Neither side, however, can point to a definitive interpretation of the precise point of state law at issue.

In my view, this situation lends itself to the Florida procedures by which this Court and other federal appellate courts may certify unresolved questions of Florida law to the State Supreme Court for decision. ^[3] If a declaration that § 192.06(4) was unconstitutional would result in tax liability to appellee church, then this case is surely not moot. We have the opportunity to ask the Florida Supreme Court for a definitive answer to this question. I would take advantage of it.

Notes

1. Fla.Stat. § 193.092 reads, in pertinent part:
2. See, e.g., City of Naples v. Conboy, 182 So.2d 412 (Fla.1965); Coppock v. Blount, 145 So.2d 279 (Fla.App.1962). Appellants, however, construe these cases to hold that back taxation may be estopped on equitable principles only when there are 'special circumstances' involved. Appellants contend that the present situation involves no such 'special circumstances' that would justify an estoppel under these cases.
3. Certification is authorized by Fla.Stat. § 25.031 (1969), F.S.A.:

'The supreme court of this state may, by rule of court, provide that, when it shall appear to the supreme court of the United States, to any circuit court of appeals of the United States, or to the court of appeals of the District of Columbia, that there are involved in any proceeding before it questions or propositions of the laws of this state, which are determinative of the said cause, and there are no clear controlling precedents in the decisions of the supreme court of this state, such federal appellate court may certify such questions or propositions of the laws of this state to the supreme court of this state for instructions concerning such questions or propositions of state law, which certificate the supreme court of this state, by written opinion, may answer.'

The implementing rule is Fla.App.Rule 4.61, 32 F.S.A. We have used this statute before, noting that it demonstrates 'rare foresight' on the part of the Florida Legislature. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, 363 U.S. 207, 212, 80 S.Ct. 1222, 1225, 4 L.Ed.2d 1170.