Dreams of a Spirit-Seer/Part 2/Chapter 3

by Immanuel Kant

THIRD CHAPTER.

PRACTICAL CONCLUSION FROM THE WHOLE TREATISE.

 

It is the zeal of a sophist to inquire into any idle proposition and to set to the craving after knowledge no other limits than impossibility. But to select from among the innumerable tasks before us the one which humanity must solve, is the merit of the wise. After science has completed its course, it naturally arrives at a modest mistrust and, indignant with itself, it says: How many things there are which I do not understand! But reason, matured by experience so as to become wisdom, speaks through the mouth of Socrates when, among all the merchandise of a fair, he says serenely: "How many things there are which I do not need!" In this manner two endeavours of a dissimilar nature flow together into one, though in the beginning they set out in very different directions, the one being vain and discontented, the other staid and content. To be able to choose rationally, one must know first even the unnecessary, yea the impossible; then, at last, science arrives at the definition of the limits set to human reason by nature. All hollow schemes, perhaps not unworthy in themselves but lying outside of the sphere of men, will then flee to the limbus of vanity. Then even metaphysics will become that from which at present it is rather far off, and which would seem the last thing to be expected of her — the companion of wisdom. As long as people think it still possible to attain knowledges about things so far off, wise simplicity may call out in vain that such great endeavours are unnecessary. The pleasure accompanying the extension of knowledge will easily make it appear a duty, and will consider deliberate and intentional contentedness to be foolish simplicity, opposed to the improvement of our nature. The questions about the spiritual nature, about freedom and predestination, the future state, &c., at first animate all the powers of reason, and through their excellency draw man into the rivalry of a speculation which reasons and decides, teaches and refutes without discrimination, just according to the nature of the apparent knowledge in each case. But if this investigation develop into philosophy which judges its own proceedings, and which knows not only objects, but their relation to man's reason, then the lines of demarcation are drawn closer, and the boundary stones are laid which in future never allow investigation to wander beyond its proper district. We had to make use of a good deal of philosophy to know the difficulties surrounding a conception generally treated as being very convenient and common. Still more philosophy moves this phantom of knowledge yet further away, and convinces us that it is entirely beyond the horizon of man. For in the relations of cause and effect, of substance and action, philosophy at first serves to dissolve the complicated phenomena, and to reduce them to simpler conceptions. But when one has, finally, arrived at fundamental relations, philosophy has no business any more. Questions like "How something can be a cause, or possess power," can never be decided by reason; but these relations must be taken from experience alone. For the rules of our reason are applicable only to comparison in respect to identity or contrast. But in the case of a cause something is assumed to have come from something else; one can find therefore no connection in regard to identity. In the same way, if this effect is not already implied in what preceded, a contrast can never be made out; because it is not contradictory to merely assume one thing and abolish another. Thence the fundamental conceptions of causes, of forces, and of actions, if they are not taken from experience, are entirely arbitrary, and can be neither proved nor disproved.^[1]:[2]:[3] I know that will and understanding move my body, but I can never reduce by analysis this phenomenon, as a simple experience, to another experience, and can, therefore, indeed recognize it, but not understand it. That my will moves my arm is not more intelligible to me than if somebody said to me that he could stop the moon in his orbit. The difference is only that the one I experience, but that the latter has never occurred to me. I recognize in myself changes as of a living subject, namely, thoughts, power to choose, &c., &c., and, as these terms indicate things different in kind from any of those which, taken together, make up my body, I have good reason to conceive of an incorporeal and constant being. Whether such a being be able to think also without connection with a body, can never be concluded from this empirical conception of its nature. I am conjoined with beings kindred to myself by means of corporeal laws, but whether I am, or ever shall be, conjoined according to other laws which I will call spiritual, without the instrumentality of matter, I can in no way conclude from what is given to me. All such opinions, as those concerning the manner in which the soul moves my body, or is related to other beings, now, or in future, can never be anything more than fictions. And they are far from having even that value which fictions of science, called hypotheses, have. For with these no fundamental powers are invented; only those known already by experience are connected according to the phenomena; their possibility, therefore, must be provable at any moment. It is different in the former case, when even new fundamental relations of cause and effect are assumed, the possibility of which can never, nor in any way, be ascertained, and which thus are only invented by creative genius or by chimera, whichever you like to call it. That several true or pretended phenomena can be comprehended by means of such assumed fundamental ideas, cannot at all be quoted in their favour. For a reason may be given for everything, if one is entitled to invent at will actions and laws of operation, We must wait, therefore, until perhaps in the future world, by new experiences, we are informed about new conceptions concerning powers in our thinking selves which, as yet, are hidden to us. Thus the observations of later days, analysed by mathematics, have revealed to us the power of attraction in matter, concerning the possibility of which we shall never be able to learn anything further, because it seems to be a fundamental power. Those who would have invented such a quality without first having obtained the proof from experience, would rightly have deserved to be laughed at as fools. Because, in such cases, reasons are of no account whatever, neither for the sake of inventing, nor of confirming the possibility or impossibility of certain results: the right of decision must be left to experience alone. Just as I leave to time, which brings experience, the ascertainment of something about the famous healing-powers of the magnet in cases of toothache, when experience shall have produced as many observations to the effect that magnetic rods act upon flesh and bones, as we have already proving their effect on steel and iron. But, if certain pretended experiences cannot be classified under any law of sensation that is unanimously accepted by men: if, therefore, they would only go to prove irregularity in the testimony of the senses — which, indeed, is the case with rumoured ghost-stories — then it is advisable to simply ignore them. For the lack of unanimity and uniformity makes the historic knowledge about them valueless for the proof of anything, and renders them unfit to serve as basis for any law of experience within the domain of reason.

Just as, on the one hand, by somewhat deeper investigation, one will learn that convincing and philosophic knowledge is impossible in the case under consideration, one will have to confess, on the other hand, in a quiet and unprejudiced state of mind, that such knowledge is dispensable and unnecessary. The vanity of science likes to excuse its occupations by the pretext of importance; thus it is pretended in this case that a rational understanding of the spiritual nature of the soul is very necessary for the conviction of an existence after death; again, that this conviction is very necessary as a motive for a virtuous life. Idle curiosity adds that the fact of apparitions of departed souls even furnishes us with a proof from experience of the existence of such things. But true wisdom is the companion of simplicity, and as, with the latter, the heart rules the understanding, it generally renders unnecessary the great preparations of scholars, and its aims do not need such means as can never be at the command of all men. What? is it good to be virtuous only because there is another world, or will not actions be rewarded rather because they were good and virtuous in themselves? Does man's heart not contain immediate moral precepts, and is it absolutely necessary to fix our machinery to the other world for the sake of moving man here according to his destiny? Can he be called honest, can he be called virtuous, who would like to yield to his favourite vices if only he were not frightened by future punishment? Must we not rather say that indeed he shuns the doing of wicked things, but nurtures the vicious disposition in his soul; that he loves the advantages of actions similar to virtue, but hates virtue itself? In fact, experience teaches that very many who are instructed concerning the future world, and are convinced of it, nevertheless yield to vice and corruption, and only think upon means cunningly to escape the threatening consequences of the future.^[4] But there probably never was a righteous soul who could endure the thought that with death everything would end, and whose noble mind had not elevated itself to the hope of the future. Therefore it seems to be more in accordance with human nature and the purity of morals to base the expectation of a future world upon the sentiment of a good soul, than, conversely, to base the soul's good conduct upon the hope of another world. Of that nature is also that moral faith, the simplicity of which can do without many a subtlety of reasoning, and which alone is appropriate to man in any state, because, without deviations, it guides him to his true aims. Let us therefore leave to speculation and to the care of idle men all the noisy systems of doctrine concerning such remote subjects. They are really immaterial to us, and the reasons pro and con which, for the moment, prevail, may, perhaps, decide the applause of schools, but hardly anything about the future destiny of the righteous. Human reason was not given strong enough wings to part clouds so high above us, clouds which withhold from our eyes the secrets of the other world. The curious who inquire about it so anxiously may receive the simple but very natural reply, that it would be best for them to please have patience until they get there. But as our fate in the other world probably depends very much on the manner in which we have conducted our office in the present world, I conclude with the words with which Voltaire, after so many sophistries, lets his honest Candide conclude: "Let us look after our happiness, go into the garden, and work."

Notes

1. 2 (p. 46).—"Without a knowledge of discrete degrees nothing whatever can be known of the distinction between spiritual and natural, thus nothing of correspondence. Nor, indeed, can anything be known of any difference between the life of men and that of beasts, or between the more perfect and the less perfect animals: neither of the differences among the forms of the vegetable kingdom, nor among the matters of the mineral kingdom. From which it can be seen that they who are ignorant of these degrees are unable by any judgment to see causes; they see only effects, and from these judge of causes, which is done for the most part by an induction that is continuous with effects. But causes do not produce effects by continuous but by discrete modes; for cause is one thing, and effect is another. The difference between the two is like the difference between prior and subsequent, or between that which forms and that which is formed.

   "I am not aware that anything has been known hitherto about discrete degrees, yet nothing of the real truth about cause can become known without a knowledge of degrees of both kinds. These degrees therefore shall be treated of throughout this Part (III. ), for it is the object of this little work to uncover causes, that effects may be seen from them, and thus the darkness may be dispelled in which the man of the church is in respect to God and the Lord, and in respect to Divine things in general which are called spiritual things. This I may mention, that the angels are in grief for the darkness on the earth; saying that they see light hardly anywhere, and that men eagerly lay hold of fallacies and confirm them, thereby multiplying falsities upon falsities; and to confirm fallacies men search out, by means of reasonings from falsities and from truths falsified, such things as cannot be overturned, owing to the darkness in respect to causes and the ignorance respecting truths."—Swedenborg: Sapientia angelica de divino amore et de divino sapientia. Angelic Wisdom concerning the Divine Love and Wisdom. Nos. 185, 188.

2. 8 (p. 53).—"Influx is effected by correspondences; it cannot be effected by continuity."—D. L. W., 88.

   "Respecting the life which proceeds from the Lord, respecting also the existence of all things in the universe derived from it, every man who is wise in heart may see that nature does not produce anything from itself, but that, for the purpose of producing, it merely ministers to the spiritual principle proceeding from the sun ofheaven, which is the Lord; as the instrumental cause ministers to its principal cause, or a dead force to its living force. From this it is evident how much men are in error, who ascribe to nature the generations of animals and productions of vegetables; for they are like those who ascribe magnificent and splendid works to the tool rather than to the artist, or who worship a sculptured image in preference to God. The fallacies, which are innumerable in all reasoning on spiritual, moral, and civil subjects, originate in this source; for a fallacy is the inversion of order; it is the judgment of the eye, rather than of the mind, the conclusion drawn from the appearance of a thing, rather than from its essence. To reason therefore from fallacies about the world and the existence of the things contained in it is to confirm, as it were, by argument that darkness is light, that that which is dead is alive, and that the body enters by influx into the soul, rather than the contrary. It is, however, an eternal truth that influx is spiritual, and not physical; that is, it is from the soul, which is spiritual, into the body which is natural, and from the spiritual world into the natural; and further that it is the Divine Being proceeding from Himself, and as He created all things by that which proceeds from Himself, so also He sustains all things by it; and lastly, that sustentation is perpetual creation, as subsistence is perpetual existence."—Athan. Cr., 102.

3. 9 (p. 54).—"The end is the all of the cause, and through the cause is the all of the effect; and thus end, cause, and effect are called first, middle, and last end; further the cause of the cause is also the cause of the thing caused; and there is nothing essential in causes except the end, and nothing essential in motion except conatus; also, the substance that is substance in itself is the sole substance.

   "From all this it can clearly be seen that the Divine, which is substance in itself, that is, the one only and sole substance, is the substance from which is each and every thing that has been created; thus that God is the All in all things of the universe."—D. L. W., 197, 198.

   "The principal end is the love of man's will, the intermediate ends are subordinate loves, and the ultimate end is the will's love existing as it were in its own effigy. Since the principal end is the will's love, it follows that the intermediate ends, because they are subordinate loves, arc foreseen, provided, and produced, through the understanding; and that the ultimate end is the use foreseen,provided, and produced by the will's love, through the understanding; for everything that love produces is use."—Athan. Cr., 77.

4. 62 (p. 121).—"Some people believe that to live the life which leads to heaven, which is called spiritual life, is difficult, because they have been told that man must renounce the world and deprive himself of the lusts which are called lusts of the body and the flesh, and that he must live spiritually. And these things they do not understand otherwise than that they must reject worldly things, which consist chiefly in riches and honours; that they must walk continually in pious meditation about God, about salvation, and about eternal life; and that they must spend their life in prayers and in reading the Word and pious books. This they esteem to be renouncing the world, and living in the spirit and not in the flesh. But that the case is altogether otherwise it has been given me to know by much experience, and from conversation with the angels; and indeed that they who renounce the world and live in the spirit in this manner, procure to themselves a sorrowful life, which is not receptive of heavenly joy; for with every one his own life remains. But to the intent that man may receive the life of heaven, it is quite necessary that he live in the world and engage in its business and employments, and that he then by moral and civil life receive spiritual life; and that spiritual life cannot otherwise be formed with man, or his spirit prepared for heaven. For to live internal life and not externalat the same time, is like dwellinq in a house which has no foundation, which gradually either sinks, or becomes full of chinks and breaches, or totters till it falls."—H. H., 528.

   THE MOTIVES OF SPIRITUAL LIVING.

   "If the life of man be viewed and explored by rational intuition, it is discovered to be threefold, namely, spiritual life, moral life, and civil life, and those lives are distinct from each other. The spiritual man believes in the Divine, and he acts sincerely and justly, not merely because it is according to civil and moral laws, but also because it is according to divine laws. For the spiritual man, inasmuch as he thinks about divine things when he acts, communicates with the angels of heaven, and as far as he does this, he is conjoined with them, and thus his internal man is opened, which viewed in itself is a spiritual man. When man is of such a character, he is then adopted and led by the Lord while he himself is not aware of it, and then in doing acts of sincerity and justice which are of moral and civil life, he does them from a spiritual origin; and to do what is sincere and just from a spiritual origin, is to do it from sincerity and justice itself, or to do it from the heart. His justice and sincerity in the external form appear altogether like the justice and sincerity with natural men, even with evil and infernal men; but in the internal form they are altogether dissimilar. For evil men act justly and sincerely merely for the sake of themselves and the world; and therefore if they did not fear the law and its penalties, also the loss of reputation, of honour, of gain, and of life, they would act altogether insincerely and unjustly, inasmuch as they neither fear God nor any divine law, and are not restrained by any internal bond. They would therefore in such case to the utmost of their power defraud, plunder, and spoil others, and this from delight. … Although such a person does not commit adultery, still because he believes it allowable, he is perpetually an adulterer; for as far as he can, and as often as it is permitted, he commits it. Although he does not steal, yet inasmuch as he covets the goods of others, and regards fraud and evil arts as not contrary to law, in intent he is continually acting the thief. The case is similar as to the precepts of moral life, which teach not to bear false witness and not to covet the goods of others. Such is the character of every man who deniesthe Divine, and who has not a conscience grounded in religion. That such is his proper character appears manifestly from similar spirits in the other life, when, on the removal of things external, they are let into their internals; then, inasmuch as they are separated from heaven, they act in unity with hell, and so are consociated with those who are in hell. It is otherwise with those who have in heart acknowledged the Divine, and in the acts of their lives have had respect to divine laws, and have acted according to the three first precepts of the decalogue equally as according to the rest. When these, on the removal of things external, are let into their internals, they are wiser than when in the world ; for when they come into their internals it is like coming from shade into light, from ignorance into wisdom, and from a sorrowful life into a blessed one, inasmuch as they are in the Divine, thus in heaven. These things are said to the intent that the quality of the one and of the other may be known, though both have lived a similar external life."—H. H., 528, 531.