Duns, Joannes Scotus (DNB00)

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DUNS, JOANNES SCOTUS, known as the Doctor Subtilis (1265?–1308?), schoolman, was born according to one tradition about 1265, according to another about 1274. The earlier date agrees better with the voluminous character of the works ascribed to him, unless indeed he continued to live and write long after 1308. He has always been represented by the Franciscans as a member of their order, though they have never been able to determine either when or where he entered it. There has been much dispute as to his nationality and birthplace. An Irish Franciscan, Maurice O'Fihely, archbishop of Tuam, who in 1497 edited a commentary on the ‘Metaphysics of Aristotle,’ which he supposed to be the work of Duns, claims him in the preface as a compatriot. As to the authenticity of this work see remarks on Wadding's edition of ‘Duns,’ vol. iv. infra. To this conjecture (for it seems to have been no more) Hugh MacCaghwell (1571–1626), archbishop of Armagh, added the suggestion that he was probably born at Dun (now Down) in Ulster; and Luke Wadding, also an Irishman, in the life prefixed to his edition of the complete works of Duns (Lyons, 1639), follows suit. On the other hand, the fourteenth-century author or editor of the commentary on Aristotle's ‘Metaphysics’ above referred to, in proclaiming himself at the close of the work a disciple of Duns, describes him as ‘natione Scotus,’ from which it is clear that he was then regarded as a native of Northern Britain. Thomas de Eccleston, a contemporary authority (Monumenta Franciscana, Rolls Ser. i. 32), disposes altogether of the idea that Ireland was known to the Franciscans as Scotia. He states that all Britain north of York was reckoned in the province of Scotia, from which he expressly distinguishes the province of Hibernia. On entering the Franciscan order Duns would, according to custom, take the name of his birthplace. Hence this was at an early date identified by the Scotch with Duns or Dunse in Berwickshire (Dempster, Asserti Scotiæ Cives sui, 17). Against this has to be set the authority (such as it is) of a statement of Leland that in a manuscript in Merton College, Oxford, Duns was said to have been born in the village of Dunstane in Northumberland (Comm. de Scriptt. Brit. i. cccxv). There is no evidence by which the point can be settled one way or the other. There is a tradition that he was a fellow of Merton College, which, however, is not confirmed by the records of the college. He is also said to have succeeded William Varron in the Oxford chair of divinity in 1301, and to have attracted great multitudes to his lectures, but his name does not occur in the catalogue of Oxford readers in divinity given in the ‘Monumenta Franciscana,’ app. ii., though the list purports to cover his period. His principal theological treatise has, however, always been known as the ‘Opus Oxoniense.’ On the strength of a letter (dated November 1304) from Gonsalvo, general of the Franciscan order, to the warden of the university of Paris, recommending one Joannes Scotus, described as ‘subtilissimo ingenio,’ for the bachelor's degree, Wadding asserts that Duns took the B.A. degree about that time. As, however, there is nothing improbable in supposing that the Franciscan order contained more than one Scotchman named John, who might in a letter of recommendation be credited with the possession of a subtle intellect, it is impossible to feel confident that the ‘frater Joannes Scotus’ referred to is identical with Duns. The rest of the traditional account, viz. that he became the ‘regent’ of the university of Paris, that in public disputation he maintained the tenet of the immaculate conception of the Virgin Mary with such ingenuity and resource as to win the title of Doctor Subtilis, that in 1308 he was sent by Gonsalvo to Cologne, that there he was received with enthusiasm by all ranks, and that there on 8 Nov. 1308 he died of apoplexy, seems to have no more solid foundation than the statements of writers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, such as William Vorrillong (Super Sentent. Venice, 1496, ad fin.), Paul Lange (fl. 1500, Chronicon Citizense, sub anno 1330), Pelbartus de Themeswar (fl. 1500), who in a passage quoted by Wadding relates what took place on the occasion of the disputation concerning the immaculate conception of the Virgin with the circumstantiality of an eye-witness, Tritheim (Catal. Scriptt. Eccles. Basel, 1494, fol. xcvii.), and Antonio Possevino (Apparatus, Venice, 1597). All that seems to be certain is that in 1513 a monument was erected to his memory in the Minorite church at Cologne, where he was supposed to have been buried. An inscription on a wooden tablet is said to have run, ‘Scotia me genuit, Anglia me suscepit, Gallia me docuit, Colonia me tenet.’

The traditional account of the life of Duns is repeated with variations by Bale (Scriptt. Maj. Brit. 1548), Pits (De Angl. Scriptt. 1619), Ferchi (Vita Duns Scoti, Cologne, 1622), and with the help of legendary embellishments is expanded into a considerable volume by Ximenes Samaniego (Vida del Padre J. Dunsio Escoto, Madrid, 1668). The question of nationality was hotly debated in the seventeenth century (see Dempster as cited in the text, and also his Historia Ecclesiastica (1627, Bann. Club), p. 227; Tractatus de Joannis Scoti Vita et Patria, by Joannes Colganus (John Colgan), Antwerp, 1655; Apologia pro Scoto Anglo, by Angelus à S. Francisco (N. Mason), 1656; Scotus Hiberniæ Restitutus, by Joannes Poncius (John Ponce), Paris, 1660). A tradition that Duns was buried alive was also the subject of controversy in the seventeenth century (see Hugh MacCaghwell, Apologia pro Johanne Duns Scoto adversus Abr. Bzovium; the reply of Nicholas Janssen entitled Animadversiones et Scholia in Apologiam nuper editam de Vita et Morte Duns Scoti; and the rejoinder of MacCaghwell entitled Apologia Apologiæ pro Johanne Duns Scoto scriptæ adversus Nicholaum Janssenium, Paris, 1623).

Among mediæval thinkers Duns is distinguished not only by breadth and depth of learning—he was familiar with the logical treatises of Porphyry and Boetius, and the works of the great Arabian and Jewish schoolmen, such as Averroes and Avicebron, not to speak of christian writers—but by originality and acuteness of intellect. His hitherto undoubted works embrace grammar, logic, metaphysics, and theology. The treatise on grammar is remarkable as the first attempt to treat the subject philosophically, i.e. to investigate the universal laws of articulate speech without exclusive reference to any particular language. Werner (Scholastik des späteren Mittelalters, 6) regards it as a development of one of Roger Bacon's ideas. Its title, ‘De Modis Significandi sive Grammatica Speculativa,’ is suggestive of the large scope of the work. The logical treatises of Duns took the shape of ‘Quæstiones’ suggested by the ‘Isagoge’ of Porphyry and the ‘Organon’ of Aristotle. It is hardly necessary to say that he regarded the syllogism as an organon, and, indeed, as the only organon. It is on his treatment of the question of universals that his chief claim to originality as a logician rests. Previous thinkers had either, like St. Thomas Aquinas and Albertus Magnus, been content to adopt without criticism the Arabian division of universals as ‘ante rem,’ ‘in re,’ and ‘post rem,’ or, like Roscellin, Anselm, and Abelard, had entirely failed to bring the controversy to a clear issue. Duns discarded the Arabian classification, and set himself to think out the problem de novo. In this he was only very partially successful, but his labours materially contributed to the establishment of the modern doctrine of conceptualism. Logic he defines as the science of the concept, and the concept as the mean between the thing and the word (Works, i. 125). The thing in itself (‘quiditas rei absoluta quantum est de se’) he declares to be neither universal nor singular, but ‘indifferent’ (ib. ii. 546). On the other hand, he holds the singular or individual thing to be real, and, indeed, the final reality. The question of the nature of individuality, or, as he puts it, of the ‘principium individuationis,’ is one of the points in which he differs most decidedly from St. Thomas Aquinas. By one set of thinkers numerical unity, by another matter had been held to be the ‘principium individuationis.’ St. Thomas Aquinas seems to have given countenance to both views. Of the second theory Duns disposes by pointing out that matter is itself a universal. To the first he opposes an argument which seems to rest upon the principle of the identity of indiscernibles. Mere numerical unity is too abstract to give individuality. Two things which differed only in number would not differ at all. By individuality is meant ‘unitas signata ut hæc’ (ib. vi. 583), or as he elsewhere says, ‘hæcceitas’ (ib. xi. 327). Individuality is not synonymous with indivisibility, but it does imply a repugnance to division. The individual is related to the species, as the species to the genus (ib. vi. 375, 402, 408, 413, xi. 324–6). He is clear that knowledge begins with the individual, and that the universal is reached by a process of abstraction. By abstraction, however, he does not mean merely the process of denuding a perception of all but its particular elements, which, since all in his view are particular, would result in nothing at all, but the process of noting points of agreement and neglecting differences. By this process the universal is, properly speaking, created. He denies, however, that it is on that account a figment. A figment has nothing corresponding to it in the objective world, and this the universal has, viz. a cause moving the mind to the formation of the concept. This objective cause is likeness (ib. i. 90). Likeness, he holds, must be an objective reality, otherwise the only unity in the universe would be numerical, and this he obviously regards as a reductio ad absurdum of the nominalist position (ib. vi. 336). The foregoing is an exposition of so much of Duns's theory as is intelligible; there is much besides about ‘intelligible species,’ by means of which he supposes that likeness is perceived which is by no means intelligible (ib. iii. ‘De Rer. Princ.’ qu. xiv.). The treatise ‘De Rerum Principio’ contains a lucid and fairly compendious statement of his principal metaphysical theories. He begins by adducing sixteen arguments for the existence of a single cause, at once efficient, formal, and final, of all things. It is noticeable, however, that he makes no attempt to establish the identity of the first cause with an intelligent and moral being (ib. qu. i.). This he assumes. Such an attempt is indeed found in a fragment entitled ‘De Primo Rerum Principio,’ but is too feeble to require notice, and the authenticity of the fragment, which is full of devotional expressions, and otherwise very unlike the usually severe style of Duns, may be doubted. Having reached the existence of God per saltum, he argues against Avicenna that his unity is not incompatible with his being the immediate cause of plurality. Following Aristotle (Metaph. ii. c. ii.) he holds that the immutability of the divine will is not inconsistent with but implied in the existence of change. ‘God,’ he says, ‘sees all things “uno intuitu,” does all things “uno actu volendi”’ (ib. qu. iii. sects. 7–20). With this doctrine he attempts to reconcile the existence of contingent matter by distinguishing between that which is necessary absolutely and that which is necessary secundum quid, a distinction which it is not easy to grasp. The creation he attributes to the goodwill and pleasure of God, whom he regards as an absolutely free agent (ib. qu. iv. art. ii. sect. v. qu. v.). From Ibn Gebirol (fl. 1045), a Spanish Jew, author of a philosophical work entitled ‘Fons Vitæ’ and some hymns, whom he knew only by the name of Avicebron, and probably supposed to be an Arabian, he adopts the theory controverted by St. Thomas and Albert of Cologne of a universal matter, the common basis of all, even spiritual existences. The idea is probably traceable to a Neo-Platonic source, but it was known to Western Europe simply as the doctrine of Avicebron. Duns labours hard to show that the objections of St. Thomas and Albert were based on a misconception (ib. qu. viii.) The soul he holds to be the ‘specific form’ of the body, and present in its entirety in every part thereof. On the question of immortality he is silent. With regard to the origin of the soul he held the creationist theory (ib. qu. ix. x. xii.) Unity, whether specific, generic, or merely numerical, he regards as a reflection of the Divine unity (ib. qu. xvi.) Time he reckons to be subjective in respect of its modes, but to have an objective cause (ib. qu. xviii.) He does not deal with the problem of space. The treatise terminates abruptly in the middle of a discussion of the curious question ‘utrum creatura rationalis sit capax gratiæ vel alicujus accidentis antequam sit in effectu’ (ib. qu. xxvi.). Neither in this work nor elsewhere does Duns show any tendency to take refuge in innate ideas. Of his psychological doctrine we have no authentic exposition. A fragment on the ‘De Anima’ of Aristotle was printed for the first time by Wadding in vol. ii. of his edition, with annotations and a lengthy supplement by MacCaghwell. It is probably spurious (see remarks on Wadding's edition, vol. ii. infra). The theological views of Duns are expounded in a commentary on the ‘Sententiæ’ of Peter Lombard, supposed to have been written at Oxford, and hence known as the ‘Opus Oxoniense,’ by distinction from the ‘Reportata Parisiensia,’ which is a digest and epitome of the same work. It is not possible here to do more than indicate a few salient points in his system. This is in a certain sense positive, i.e. he denies the possibility of rational theology, and bases dogma entirely upon the authority of the church. The function of reason is merely to articulate the dogmatic system, and to defend it against attacks. Such knowledge of God as natural reason affords is ‘equivocal, indistinct, obscure.’ All dogmas are alike indemonstrable (Works, xi. 21). His cardinal principle is the omnipotence and absolute freedom of God. Everything, even the distinction between right and wrong, depends upon the will of God (ib. x. 252), who created the world de nihilo, and sustains the fabric from moment to moment (ib. xi. 247, 252, 877). Hence he rejects Anselm's theory of the Atonement, and rests the necessity and sufficiency of the sacrifice solely upon the will of God (ib. 719, vii. 423 et sqq.). Duns also held the absolute freedom of the human will, and that such freedom was nevertheless contingent upon the will and compatible with the fore-knowledge of God (ib. 85, 913, and ‘De Rer. Princ.’ qu. iv. sects. 36–51). He exhibits no tendency towards mysticism. Among his contemporaries Siger of Brabant, who taught in Paris in the last decade of the thirteenth century, and there, according to Dante (Par. x. 138), ‘sillogizzò invidiosi veri,’ Peter of Auvergne and Alexander of Alexandria were more or less influenced by Duns, but the first decided Scotist was Antonius Andreæ, a Spaniard (fl. 1310), as to whose writings see remarks on Wadding's edition of Duns, infra. Others followed, such as Petrus Aureolus (d. 1321), Franciscus de Mayronis (d. 1325), Nicholaus de Lyra (d. 1340), both apparently Frenchmen, Joannes de Bassolis, John Dumbleton, Walter Burleigh (fl. 1330), and William of Occham (d. 1347) [q. v.] With Occham a schism, the germ of which is already traceable in Petrus Aureolus, developed itself on the question of ‘intelligible species,’ Occham disputing their existence on the ground that ‘entia non sunt multiplicanda præter neces- sitatem,’ while Burleigh defended the ancient doctrine. Pietro dell' Aquila (fl. 1345), bishop of S. Angelo, wrote what seems to have been the first commentary on the ‘Opus Oxoniense,’ a summary of which was printed at Speyer in 1480, fol. (Brit. Mus. Cat. ‘Petrus de Aquila’). The ‘Opus Oxoniense’ itself was printed at Venice in 1481, 4to. A summary of the system by Nicholaus d'Orbellis was printed at Basel in 1494, 4to. The ‘Grammatica Speculativa’ followed in 1499, Venice, 4to. A collection of cruces, logical and theological, attributed to Duns, and entitled ‘Quæstiones Quodlibetales,’ edited by Thomas Penketh at Venice, 1474, 4to, was reprinted in 1505 (ed. Philippo a Bagnacavallo), in 1510 (ed. Antonius de Fantis), and with the ‘Collationes Theoremata’ and ‘De Primo Principio’ at Paris in 1513, fol. (ed. Mauritius Hibernicus or De Portu, i.e. Maurice O'Fihely, archbishop of Tuam). The logical treatises issued from the Barcelona press about 1475, fol. A volume of ‘Quæstiones’ on them by Joannes de Magistris was printed at Heidelberg in 1488, fol. The Barcelona edition was reprinted at Venice 1491–3, fol. and 4to, and again (ed. O'Fihely) in 1504. A volume entitled ‘Questionum Optimarum Cursus cum textualibus Expositionibus super Physicorum et ceteros Naturalis Philosophiæ libros Arestotelis’ (sic), was printed as the work of Duns about 1495, fol. As to its authenticity, see remarks on Wadding's edition, vol. ii. infra. Maurice O'Fihely also edited as works of Duns (1) ‘Expositio in xii libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis,’ together with the treatise ‘De Primo Rerum Principio,’ and some ‘Theoremata,’ Venice, 1497, fol.; (2) a volume of ‘Quæstiones’ on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, Venice, 1506 (see remarks on Wadding's edition, vol. iv. infra). O'Fihely also published (1) ‘Expositio sive Lectura accuratissima in Questiones Dialecticas D. Joannis Scoti in Isagogen Porphyrii,’ Ferrara, 1499, Venice, 1512 and 1519; which, at least in the last edition, included the ‘Grammatica Speculativa;’ (2) ‘Epithemata in insigne Formalitatum Opus de mente Doctoris Subtilis,’ Venice, 1510–14, 4to. A commentary by Franciscus Leuchetus (Francesco Liceto of Brescia, general of the Franciscan order) on the first three books of the ‘Opus Oxoniense’ and on the ‘Quæstiones Quodlibetales’ (see remarks on Wadding's edition, vol. xii.) appeared at Parma in 1520, fol. The foregoing is of course far from being a complete account of the Scotist literature of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, a bare enumeration of the principal works being all that limits of space permit.

In the sixteenth century Duns rapidly fell into disrepute except in theological quarters, and when the Renaissance penetrated to Oxford he was treated with the utmost indignity. Richard Layton writes to Cromwell, under date 12 Sept. 1535: ‘We have set Dunce in Bocardo, and banished him Oxford for ever, and is now made a common servant to every man, fast nailed up upon posts in all houses of common easement’ (Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic, 1535, p. 117). Scotism, however, died hard. Hugo Cavellus, i.e. Hugh MacCaghwell (1571–1626), archbishop of Armagh, published (1) ‘Scoti Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum cum annotationibus marginalibus,’ Antwerp, 1620, fol. (This edition included also the ‘Reportata Parisiensia,’ the ‘Quæstiones Quodlibetales,’ and a life of Duns.) (2) ‘Quæstiones in Metaphysicam, expositiones in eandem, et conclusiones ex eadem collectæ; Tractatus de Primo Principio et Theoremata,’ Venice, 1625; (3) ‘Quæstiones in libros de Anima’ (see also note to life of Duns, ad fin. supra). Angelo Vulpi of Monte Peloso, in Lucania, expounded the system in twelve volumes, entitled ‘Sacræ Theologiæ Summa Joannis Scoti Doctoris Subtilissimi,’ Naples, 1622–40.

The only complete edition of the works of Duns is that of Luke Wadding, in 12 vols. Lyons, 1639, fol. The contents are as follows: Vol. i. (1) life by Wadding; (2) ‘De Modis Significandi sive Grammatica Speculativa;’ (3) ‘In Universam Logicam Quæstiones.’ Vol. ii. (1) ‘Expositio et Quæstiones in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis’ (identical with the ‘Questionum Optimarum Cursus,’ &c., printed 1495 (?). This work was pronounced spurious by Wadding, on account of the looseness of the style and the heterodoxy of some of the positions. It probably belongs to the period of the Renaissance. (2) ‘Quæstiones super libros Aristotelis de Anima.’ This is a mere fragment, accepted as genuine by Wadding. Some of the ‘Quæstiones,’ however, cannot possibly be authentic, as they contain examples of the use of ‘objectum’ in the modern sense where Duns, in common with other writers of his age, habitually uses ‘res’ or ‘subjectum,’ reserving ‘objectum’ to signify only modes of consciousness (see pp. 490, 493, 495, 497, 506, 521, 528, 543, and compare ‘De Rer. Princ.’ qu. ix. sect. 64, qu. xiv. sect. 26). To most of the ‘Quæstiones’ are appended lengthy glosses by MacCaghwell. Vol. iii. (1) ‘Meteorologica,’ four books of commentary on Aristotle's treatise, printed for the first time by Wadding, and regarded by him with suspicion, on the ground that St. Thomas Aquinas, who was not canonised until after Duns's death, is referred to as ‘beatus,’ and mention is made of a treatise ‘De Proportionibus,’ by Thomas Bradwardine (d. 1349). ‘Objectum’ and ‘impressio’ are used in the sense of object and phenomenon respectively (see pp. 2–8, 35–8); (2) ‘Tractatus de Rerum Principio;’ (3) ‘Tractatus de Primo Rerum Principio;’ (4) ‘Theoremata;’ (5) ‘Collationes;’ (6) ‘De Cognitione Dei;’ (7) ‘De Formalitatibus.’ The two last treatises are fragments of doubtful authenticity printed for the first time by Wadding from MSS. Vat. 890, 869. Vol. iv. (1) ‘Expositio in xii libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis’ (the work edited by Maurice O'Fihely in 1497). It was pronounced spurious, and assigned to Antonius Andreæ by Dempster and Ferchi in the seventeenth century. The book concludes with a note purporting to be by the author, in which he states that he was a pupil of Duns, and there is no reason to suppose that this is other than the true account of the matter. Whether the author was Antonius Andreæ or another follower of Duns is of minor importance; (2) ‘Quæstiones in Metaphysicam,’ a fragment derived by O'Fihely from the same source as the former work, and probably by the same author. O'Fihely added to both works lengthy glosses of his own. Vols. v–x. (inclusive), ‘Quæstiones in libros Sententiarum’ (‘Opus Oxoniense’), with the commentaries mentioned above by Francesco Liceto and Hugh MacCaghwell, a third by Antonius Hiquæus (Anthony Hickey, an Irishman, d. 1641), and a supplement by John Ponce, also an Irishman (fl. 1650). Vol. xi., ‘Reportata Parisiensia’ (a summary of the ‘Opus Oxoniense’). Vol. xii., ‘Quæstiones Quodlibetales,’ a collection of dissertations on miscellaneous theological questions.

Wadding (Preface, ad fin.) also mentions the following ‘positive’ works as attributed to Duns: 1. ‘Tractatus de Perfectione Statuum’ (of doubtful authenticity). 2. ‘Lectura in Genesim.’ 3. ‘Commentarii in Evangelia.’ 4. ‘Commentarii in Epistolas Pauli.’ 5. ‘Sermones de Tempore.’ 6. ‘Sermones de Sanctis.’

A considerable mass of Scotist literature issued from the press during the seventeenth century. The following are among the more important works: ‘Cursus Philosophiæ ad mentem Scoti,’ by John Ponce, Lyons, 1659, fol.; ‘Cursus Theologiæ juxta Scoti doctrinam,’ by the same author, Lyons, 1667, fol.; ‘Œcodomia Minoriticæ Scholæ Salamonis Johannis Duns Scoti,’ &c., by Anthony Bruodine, Prague, 1663, 8vo; ‘Duns Scotus defensus,’ by Bonaventura Baro, Cologne, 1669; ‘Sol Triplex,’ by Joannes Armand Hermann, Sulzbach, 1676; Belluti and Mastrio's ‘Philosophiæ ad mentem Scoti Cursus integer,’ Venice, 1678, 1708, 1727 (fol.); ‘Quæstiones in mentem Scoti,’ by Llamazares, Madrid, 1679 (fol.). A compendium of the entire system, by Bernard Sannig, entitled ‘Schola Philosophica Scotistarum,’ appeared at Prague in 1684. The eighteenth century produced: O'Devlin's ‘Philosophia Scoto-Aristotelica Universa,’ Nuremberg, 1710, 4to; Dupasquier's ‘Summa Theologiæ Scotisticæ,’ Padua, 1719–20, 12mo; Krisper's ‘Theologica Scholæ Scotisticæ seu Solida Expositio quatuor librorum Sententiarum Scoti,’ Augsburg, 1728, 4 vols. fol.; ‘Summa ex Scoti Operibus,’ by Hieronimus de Monte Fortino, Rome, 1728; Locherer's ‘Clipeus Philosophico-Scotisticus sive Cursus Philosophicus juxta mentem et doctrinam Doctoris Subtilis Joannis Duns Scoti,’ Stein, 1740, 3 vols. fol.; Antonio Ferrari's ‘Philosophia Peripatetica … propugnata rationibus Joannis Duns Scoti,’ Venice, 1746, 4to; Ruerk's ‘Cursus Theologiæ Scotisticæ in via Joannis Dunsii Scoti,’ Valladolid, 1746–7, 2 vols. 4to; Picazo's ‘Cursus integer Theologiæ juxta mentem Joannis Duns Scoti,’ Alcala de Henares, 1746–8, 2 vols. fol.; ‘Scotus Aristotelicus seu Philosophia Peripatetica … juxta mentem Joannis Duns Scoti,’ by Antonio S. Maria Angelorum, Lisbon, 1747–59, 2 vols. 4to. During the present century there have appeared: ‘Die Thomistische und Scotistische Gewissheitslehre,’ by A. Schmid, Dillingen, 1859, 4to; ‘Tractatio practica de Sacramento seu Systema Scoti ad praxim applicatum,’ by H. Van Rooy, Mechlin, 1872, 8vo; and ‘Die Körperlehre des Johannes Duns Skotus und ihr Verhältniss zum Thomismus und Atomismus,’ by M. Schneid, Mainz, 1879, 8vo.

[A careful analysis of Duns's logical doctrine will be found in vol. 3 of Prantl's Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande, Leipzig, 1855 et sqq., 8vo; his entire system is expounded by C. Werner in Die Scholastik des späteren Mittelalters, vol. i., Vienna, 1881 et sqq., 8vo. Reference may also be made to Hauréau's Histoire de la Philosophie Scolastique, Paris, 1872–80, 8vo.]

J. M. R.