Gaines v. Hennen/Dissent Catron

by John Catron

United States Supreme Court

65 U.S. 553

Gaines  v.  Hennen

Mr. Justice CATRON dissenting.

A principal question in this case is, how far it is affected by the decree in the case of Gaines and wife v. Chew, Relf, and others, reported in 12 Howard.

In that case the complainant sought to recover: first, four-fifths of the real estate of Daniel Clark, alleged to be vested in the complainant, Mrs. Gaines, as heir of Daniel Clark; and, secondly, the undivided moiety of the real estate owned by Daniel Clark at his death, being the community interest taken by his widow, the mother of the complainant, Myra, from whom she obtained a conveyance for said moiety in 1844. In the former case this court found that Mrs. Gardette, the mother of Mrs. Gaines, was the wife of Jerome Des Grange, (in 1802 or 1803,) when the bill alleged she intermarried with Daniel Clark, and was, therefore, not the widow of Clark; and this moiety of the estate claimed by the bill was rejected.

2. It appeared in the former case, by the evidence furnished by the record in that suit, that Caroline Clark was the sister of Mrs. Gaines, born before the father and mother intermarried, as is alleged by the former bill; but she was fully recognised by the father as his illegitimate daughter, and was supported by him during his lifetime, and after his death by his friends. The deposition of Mr. Coxe proves these facts very fully.

Conceding the fact that the parents intermarried after Caroline's birth, then that marriage made Caroline a legitimate child of the marriage, and equal heir with Myra; such being the law of Louisiana. Nor could the father, by the laws of that State, take from his legitimate child more than one-fifth part of his estate by devise. Civil Code of 1808, ch. 3, sec. 1. And therefore Caroline and Myra each took as heir four-fifths of their father's estate, less the mother's moiety; that is, four shares each of twenty parts. On these portions the will of 1813 did not operate; the children holding the estate as heirs. It operated only on the two-twentieth parts which Daniel Clark had the power to devise by his will. Civil Code, 232, sec. 3; 234, sec. 4.

Caroline, who intermarried with Doctor Barnes, was a party respondent to the former suit, and answered the bill. She has since died beyond the jurisdiction of the court, and is not a party to this controversy; still, the interest of her absent heirs is entitled to protection. Nor can Mrs. Gaines set up any claim to that interest.

As respects the claim to one-tenth part, the next question is, whether the fact found in the former case, that the complainant was the daughter of Des Grange's wife, establishes the status of Mrs. Gaines, so that she is excluded from taking as devisee of Daniel Clark.

According to the provisions of the Code of 1808, this court held that Mrs. Gaines could not take as heir of her father; nor could she take her mother's grant by the deed of 1844.

By the laws of Louisiana, as they stood in 1813, the complainant was an adulterous bastard, and could not inherit from her father, (Code of 1808, p. 156, art. 46,) which declares, that 'bastard, adulterous, or incestuous children, even duly acknowledged, shall not enjoy the right of inheriting their natural father or mother.' And article 15, page 212, declares, that 'natural fathers or mothers can in no case dispose of property in favor of their adulterine children, even acknowledged, unless to the mere amount of what is necessary to their sustenance, or to procure them an occupation or profession by which to support themselves.'

The only issue decided in the former suit was, whether the complainant's mother for years before, and at the time of Myra's birth, was the lawful wife of Jerome Des Grange. The court so found, and based its decree dismissing the bill on that fact. The fact being established, carried with it all the legal consequences that result from the fact. 1st Stark. Ev., 182, sec. 57. One of these consequences is, that Mrs. Gaines was an adulterous bastard, according to the laws of Louisiana, and incapable of taking by the will of her father.

But suppose this consequence does not follow; then how does the matter of estoppel stand? The complainant, Mrs. Gaines, by her amended bill, filed in 1848, renounced all claim that she had to the property sued for by her original bill, (including the same sued for now,) as instituted heir of Daniel Clark, by the will of 1813, and asserted a right to four-fifths of said property as legal or forced heir and only legitimate child of Daniel Clark, and declared she would not rely on said will of 1813. O. R., p. 85.

She also virtually renounced as heir one moiety of the estate Daniel Clark died possessed of, and set up a deed from her mother for the moiety as lawful widow of said Clark; this being her community interest by the laws of Louisiana. Old R., p. 32.

That the widow was entitled to a moiety as her share in the community is alleged and relied on by the foregoing amendment; and the complainant being the party who made the avowal, is irrevocably bound by it. Such is the statute law of Louisiana, declared by the Code of 1808, (p. 314,) and the Code of 1825, (vol. 2, p. 355.)

In the former case the avowal was matter of title, and in this case it is conclusive evidence of the fact avowed as against the complainant. The law of Louisiana binds the Federal courts in like manner that it is binding on the State courts. So this court has uniformly held. 1 St. at Large, 92; note (a) to 34th sec. of Judiciary act of 1789.

If the mother was lawful widow of Clark, then her right to the moiety was undoubted, as the parties resided in Louisiana, and it is alleged the property was acquired during the coverture. Mrs. Gaines must abide by her allegations in the former suit, as on them the issues were formed, and on which the decree in that suit proceeded.

Nine of ten parts of Clark's estate was sued for by the former bill. The decree rejected on a direct issue five-ninths claimed to have been acquired by deed from said mother, on the ground that she was the wife of Des Grange, when, as is alleged, she intermarried with Clark, and when the complainant was born. This was the precise issue made, and found by the court, and is undoubtedly res judicata as respects the mother's moiety. As to the other five-tenths, Mrs. Gaines, by her amended bill of 1848, in express terms renounced one-fifth to the purchasers, under Daniel Clark's will of 1811. To the extent of one-fifth, the validity of that will was recognised. The complainant cannot be allowed to split up her claim and sue for portions by several suits.

The remaining four-fifths of the moiety Mrs. Gaines claimed to recover as legal or forced heir. Heir, or no heir, was the issue tried. This court found that she was Clark's daughter by Des. Grange's wife, and not Clark's lawful heir, and therefore dismissed her bill. It follows, that as to the four-fifths of one-half, the complainant stands barred as heir by the decree. She is also estopped by the former proceedings to sue a second time for the moiety derived from her mother; and thirdly, is estopped to set up a claim to the one-tenth part she renounced and abandoned.

An objection is raised that the parties in this cause are not the same who were sued in the former case. The bill alleges that they are the same; and so they are, except that Mr. Hennen claims under the railroad company by a conveyance of the land in dispute, made pending the former suit, which, if it had been decided against the railroad company, would have bound Hennen, and being decided in favor of the company, bound the complainant.

The rule in chancery proceedings is, that where there are contesting parties in each suit, as between these parties, a decree is res judicata. It was so held by this court at the present term in the case of Thompson and als. v. Roberts and als. Sixty defendants were sued by the former bill; they all, as joint respondents, got a decree against the complainant on her common title set up against them all. The estoppel operated against her for each defendant; and in this second contestation of the same title any one respondent to the former suit can set up the estoppel in his favor.

The laws of Louisiana are confidently relied on as prescribing the true rule of estoppel. In this English bill in equity, resorted to here, as a remedy, the rule is, that the same subject-matter cannot be litigated twice between the same parties on evidence brought forward or left out of the first case. Here the will of 1813 is introduced, and could just as well have been introduced in the former suit. The difficulty was, that it had not been proved and recorded in the probate court. But it might have been proved just as well forty years before the time it was admitted of record as now. If a title deed could not be read on the hearing for want of being recorded, the complainant might fail to recover. This is of constant occurrence; still, the judgment or decree would be as conclusive as if the deed had been authenticated and recorded. It was simply a neglect of the complainant to produce her proof in legal form; a matter with which the defendants had no concern. Holding back an existing will and making an experiment on the issue of heirship, requiring the same proof, and, in case of failure, to bring a second suit on the established will, is a mere contrivance, and an evasion of the due administration of justice, which cannot be allowed. On the will of 1813 the present bill is founded. By that will Daniel Clark declares the complainant, Myra, to be his only legitimate and lawful heir, and devises to her all his estate. She must, therefore, have been his daughter, born in wedlock. Conceding this to be true, and it follows as a consequence that the complainant took as heir, and not as devisee, to the extent of four-fifths. As to four-fifths of a moiety, we are by this bill called on to try the precise issue of heir, or no heir, that we tried in the former suit.

If the decision reported in 12 How. be overthrown, ruin must be the consequence to very many who have confided in its soundness. In a rapidly-growing city like New Orleans, much of the property supposed to be protected by our former decree must have changed hands. Large improvements must have been made in the nine years since that suit was deciced. It covered all Daniel Clark's estate as it existed at his death, and had over sixty defendants to it. If the twenty odd defendants to this bill can be recovered against, so can the others who were parties to the first suit.

It is most manifest from this record that the fragment of a cause brought here by Mrs. Gaines and Mr. Hennen by stipulation will, in effect, decide, and was intended to decide, the cause of the other defendants sued jointly with Mr. Hennen, and who are standing helpless, awaiting their fate at the hands of this court.

It is insisted by counsel that Clark, being a free man, could lawfully devise to his daughter; and that the laws of Louisiana did not apply to the case of a single and free man bequeathing to his child by a married woman, as was done here. Such a construction would evade the code to a great extent. Its terms are too plain for controversy, and so the courts of Louisiana have held. Jung v. Dorescourt, 4 L., 178.

According to this assumption, slaves might be devisees, if the evasion was used to suppress the fact that the mother was a slave. As in case of other conveyances, wills must have a grantee capable to take by the devise; and it is undoubtedly true that the heir-at-law, or a devisee, holding under a former will, can plead and prove the facts of incapacity by parol evidence, and thereby defeat the last will, and of course alienees, in the condition these respondents are, can do the same. The case above cited (4 L., 178) is directly to this point, and to the same effect it was held in Robinett v. Verdum, (14 L., 542.) There, the court declared that a disguised donation to a slave child under the forms of a sale was absolutely null.

But the right and justice of this cause depends on the defence of the plea of bona fide purchaser set up by the answer. The bill in chancery is a remedy peculiar in its character, when resorted to in the Federal court held in the State of Louisiana. In the State courts there, this defence is unknown. But when a complainant resorts to it to enforce rights to lands in the Federal court, the respondent can defend himself, as an innocent purchaser, if he pleads, and can show that he acquired by purchase at a fair price, and got an apparent legal title, without notice of an outstanding better title, the purchaser believing that he acquired full property in the land; and the question is, has the respondent here made out such a defence? The purchase was made from Mary Clark, in 1820, by her legally-constituted attorneys in fact, Chew & Relf. She claimed to be the true owner by a will made in her favor as instituted heir. It is an olographic will, in due form, fully proved, and regularly recorded. This will, from the time it was probated in 1813, stood as the true succession of Daniel Clark for more than forty years. An immense estate in lands and personal property has been acquired under it, by all classes of innocent purchasers, without any suspicion of the fact that any other and better title existed. It is admitted on behalf of the respondents, by stipulation in this cause, that each purchaser who bought in 1820, and every subsequent purchaser under the first one, bought for a full price, paid the purchase money, and got a regular conveyance for the land purchased. This title, tested by itself, was a perfectly fair legal title, according to the laws of Louisiana. Duplesse v. White, 6 A., 514. If Mary Clark sold the estate without an authorization from the court of probate, by that act she rendered herself liable to pay the testator's debts; but this did not affect the purchaser. He was not bound to know that any debts existed, nor to see to the application of the purchase-money. The present bill does not allege that there were any debts owing by Daniel Clark at the time of his death; on the contrary, the complainant sues for the lands, and the rents and profits of them, without any reductions. Finding Daniel Clark's estate to be insolvent on the accounts exhibited, General and Mrs. Gaines, by their amendment of 1844, declare that they do not require of said Chew & Relf any account, and that they 'discontinue their prayer to that end.'

The complainant admits the existence and probate of the will of 1811, but denies in general terms that the sales were lawfully made. For more than forty years the respondents and their alienors had a regular legal title, traceable to the only then existing succession of Daniel Clark; they could sue for and recover the land by force of that title. They knew nothing of the existence of Myra. She was born in New Orleans in 1804 or 1805, and immediately after her birth was taken from her mother by Daniel Clark, her reputed father, and put into the charge of Colonel and Mrs. Davis. In her childhood she was carried to the State of Pennsylvania, raised up and resided there till 1832, when she intermarried with William W. Whitney, under the name of Myra Davis, during all which time she was ignorant of her true name, history, and rights. She so states in her first bill, filed in 1836, put in evidence in this suit. Of course the purchasers of the lands sued for could have no knowledge of the complainant's existence when they paid their money and took title, in 1820.

But the respondents would have been bona fide purchasers had the will of 1811 never existed. Mary Clark was the apparent legal heir of her son in the ascending line. Daniel Clark was known and recognised in New Orleans as an unmarried man; he had resided there from his youth, and was extensively and uncommonly well known, having represented the Territory of Orleans in Congress. A number of witnesses prove, and most conclusively, that he was deemed and recognised universally as a man who had never been married up to the time of his death. His father was then dead, and Mary Clark, his mother, recognised as his undoubted heir. He addressed and made propositions of marriage to ladies of his own rank, after it is pretended he had married Madame Des Grange. Those who purchased in 1820, including judges of the highest rank residing on the spot, could not doubt the validity of Mary Clark's title, and power to sell the lands they bought and paid for.

In the printed argument submitted to us on behalf of the complainant, and again on the oral argument delivered before us in this court, the answer to this apparently complete defence was, that Mary Clark was dead in 1820, when her attorneys made the sales, and conveyed in her name.

The bill alleges no such fact, nor does the answer refer to it. But the complainant, by her bill of 1848, in evidence here, states that Mary Clark died in June or July, 1823, leaving a will, alleging who the legatees were, (of which the complainant was one;) and some of these legatees are made defendants to that bill. Daniel W. Coxe proves the circumstances connected with making the will of Mary Clark, and says she died in 1823, in which year her will was duly proved and recorded in Philadelphia county, Pennsylvania.

It is also relied on that Mary Clark did not accept the succession by taking possession of the estate in legal form. She made her power to sell, and did sell, and gave possession to the purchasers, and they have held actual adverse possession under their conveyances since 1820. This is admitted of record; and it is now too late, after the lapse of thirty-five years before they were sued, to set up this technical objection. The presumption in favor of regularity in the proceeding is too clear to admit of controversy.

Another objection is made to this plea of bona fide purchaser, namely, that Chew & Relf had no authority from the probate court to sell, and that they joined with Mary Clark in the conveyance. The conveyance of Mary Clark was valid, notwithstanding this circumstance, as the Supreme Court of Louisiana held in Duplesse v. White, 6 A., 514. She held the actual legal title. The will operated as a conveyance in the same manner that a private act of sale would have done. It is proved that the sales of the estate were made at auction, and had the form of sales made by authorization of the court; this is the fair presumption; nor can the complainant at this late day have a decree against these respondents. Presumption that the executors were duly authorized to make sales for payment of debts comes instead of proof. This bill was filed more than thirty years after Mrs. Gaines became of age, and thirty-six years after the first vendor purchased and took title, in 1820; and it must be presumed that the proper orders of the probate court were granted. The presumption arises from possession and lapse of time. Possession of itself is, in the nature of men and things, an indiceum of ownership. If all persons acquiesce in the possession, the acquiescence tends to prove property in the possessor; and after the lapse of thirty years the probabilities so increase, that courts of justice, for the safety of society, hold an adverse claim to be without foundation. He who thirty years ago may have been abundantly able to show regularity of proceedings and evidence of ownership, may be unable to do so now. His witnesses may be dead, as is emphatically the case here. His title-papers may be destroyed or lost; and a court of equity must say, as the Supreme Court of New York did in the case of McDonald v. McNeal, (10 Johns. R., 380,) 'The fact is presumed for the purpose and from a principle of quieting men's possessions, and not because the court really think a grant has been made.' Or, as the Supreme Court of Tennessee said in the case of Hanes v. Peck, (Martin & Yerger's R., 236,) 'In such case, length of possession supplies the place of testimony; presumption is substituted for belief; we believe when the fact is proved; we presume in the absence of proof.'

Had Mary Clark's devisees sued this purchaser, he could have relied on presumption to supply proof of regular orders from the probate court to authorize the executors to sell, or that Mary Clark regularly accepted the succession; and the same presumption must prevail against this complainant.

It is provided by the 7th section of the act of March 25, 1810, that contracts of sale of real property in Louisiana shall be recorded in the office of the parish judge where the property is situated; and if not so recorded, the contract shall be void. It is admitted in this case that both the power of attorney from Mary Clark and the deeds to purchasers made under that power were not recorded in the office of the probate judge, but that they were recorded in a notary's office in New Orleans; and it is assumed, and the cause is made to depend mainly on the fact, that the sales of Chew & Relf, as attorneys of Mary Clark, are null as to third persons for this reason. This is an entire mistake. The act of 1810, section 7, never had any application to the parish of Orleans, where the land in dispute lies. It 'had reference to those parishes where the office of parish judge was established, combining with the judicial powers of the officer those of notary and recorder of mortgages,' &c. 'These powers were not possessed by the judge of the parish and city of New Orleans. The law is not applicable to this parish, and has been so considered ever since its enactment.' Morris v. Crocker, 4 Louis'a, p. 149. It is further held, that the notarial offices of the city were the proper offices in which the record was to be made. Id. In this, and all other respects, Mary Clark's conveyance was regular.

The evidence shows, that as against the respondents to this bill, the claim set up is grossly unjust. Clark's failure was very large; his estate was wholly insolvent. The purchasers have in fact paid his debts to a large amount. Many of them are yet unpaid. The purchasers have built houses and raised families on the property now sought to be recovered. A city has been built upon it. It has probably increased in value five hundred fold since 1820; much of it certainly has.

That the respondents have been harassed with a previous lawsuit for the same property, in which the complainant claimed as heir, and was defeated, neither helps her case nor lessens the hardships imposed on the respondents.

At the argument, conclusions of law and of fact were relied on as having been established by the case of Patterson v. Gaines and wife, reported in 6 How. R. That was a false and fictitious case made up by Gaines and wife, with the assent of Patterson, they having relinquished to him the property sued for. The object of that suit was to circumvent this court by a fraudulent contrivance to obtain an opinion here, to the end of governing the rights of the other defendants sued jointly with Patterson. And in this, General and Mrs Gaines seemingly succeeded. They obtained both the opinion and decree they sought; but when the other defendants came to a hearing they examined Patterson as a witness, and proved and exposed by his testimony the contrivance and fraud practised; and for us now to declare that so gross a contempt to this court, and the practice of a fraud so disgraceful to the administration of justice, established any matter of fact or any binding principle of law, would be to sanction and uphold that proceeding, and to invite its repetition. That case should be disregarded, as it was disregarded, when the cause of which it was part was fully and fairly heard in 1852, and which is reported in Howard's Reps., vol. 12.

The case of Lord v. Veazie, (8 How., 253,) is full to the point, that a fictitious proceeding is void because there is no contest. Patterson did not act in the matter at all, further than to lend his name to General and Mrs. Gaines. They made up the case by filing the answer to their own bill-filing such evidence as suited their purposes; and bringing up the appeal to this court in Patterson's name.

By an amendment to their bill made in 1849, (12 Howard, 537,) General and Mrs. Gaines had the boldness to allege and claim that the decree in Patterson's fictitious case was res judicata, and an estoppel to the other defendants to that suit; and to that end relied on the decree on the final hearing in 1852, thereby avowing the fraudulent object of obtaining that decree.

A question not directly decided in the case reported in 12 How. was, whether Daniel Clark married Mrs. Des Grange. Madame Despau swore that she was present at the marriage in Philadelphia, and that several others were present. Her integrity and credit as a witness were so directly overthrown in the former case by the deposition of Daniel W. Coxe, and by many circumstances, as to leave her evidence of no value. She swore that she went to Philadelphia with her sister to procure evidence of Des Grange's marriage previous to marrying her sister. Coxe proved beyond doubt that the two women came there for the sole purpose of concealing the birth of a child, of which Mrs. Des Grange was pregnant, and of which she was very soon delivered, and it was secreted and raised to womanhood near Philadelphia. This was Caroline, afterwards Mrs. Barnes. And so soon as Mrs. Des Grange was able to travel, the two women returned to New Orleans. Me. Despau also swore in several depositions that this was Des Grange's child. At the time of its birth he had been absent in France for more than a year. Clark sent Mrs. Des Grange to Mr. Coxe with a letter, saying the child was Clark's, and to provide for the mother, and take charge of the child, which Coxe did. It was suggested at the argument that Coxe was not a competent witness, and not altogether entitled to credit. Clark's estate owed Coxe largely, and if Mrs. Gaines recovered, then Coxe expected to be benefited by the recovery. So that he was interested to uphold Mrs. Gaines's claim; nor has the deposition of Mr. Coxe been objected to; on the contrary, it is admitted by stipulation. R., 93.

Mr. Coxe's character for integrity is prominently manifest by sustaining facts.

Clark never admitted the marriage to any one entitled to credit, or who could be believed, when swearing to what a dead man had said.

He proposed to marry another lady in 1808, and Mrs. Des Grange and Madame Despau came to Philadelphia, and sent for Mr. Coxe, then in partnership with Mr. Clark in large mercantile transactions, and inquired of him whether the fact was true. Coxe assented. Mrs. Des Grange said that Clark had promised to marry her, and that she then felt at liberty to marry herself; and soon after, she was married to M. Gardette, a dentist of Philadelphia.

In 1805 Des Grange returned to New Orleans, and was sued by his wife for alimony. She recovered, and had a decree against him for five hundred dollars per annum. Mrs. Des Grange never assumed that Clark was her husband, so far as we are informed from any reliable source. She resided in Louisiana for many years, and until these proceedings had progressed for fifteen years and more, and could have deposed to the fact of marriage had her daughter seen proper to examine her as a witness; but this was not done.

It is altogether immaterial, however, whether Clark did or did not marry Des Grange's wife, as it could be of no value to the complainant if he did. Clark must have been an innocent and deluded party to give Mrs. Gaines the benefit proposed by the will of 1813-as in case of an adventurer, from abroad, marrying an innocent single woman, leaving a wife behind him. There, the children of the second marriage cannot be disinherited and condemned; they can take as bastards, from the mother. So the courts of Louisiana hold. But what are the facts here? Clark acted in concert with Mrs. Des Grange and her sisters in sending Des Grange to France, as agent of his wife's family, to settle up the affairs of an estate of theirs at Bordeaux. Des Grange was absent about fifteen months, and in the mean time, and shortly before the expiration of the time, Mrs. Des Grange was delivered of the child Caroline at Philadelphia, which Clark admitted at all times before his death was his child. This is an undisputed fact. Clark acted as the friend of Des Grange, and corresponded with him during his absence, and aided his wife. The criminal connection that was exposed by the birth of the child had obviously existed before Des Grange was sent to France; and in the transaction of sending him away, and of prosecuting him on his return, Mrs. Des Grange, her two sisters, and Clark, were undoubtedly acting in conjunction. Madame Caillivet swears that she set on foot the prosecution against Des Grange. 12 How., 509, 510.

That Des Grange had a wife living when he married the complainant's mother was a mere pretence to cover a nefarious transaction, as is abundantly established by the facts appearing in the case reported in 12 Howard. The idea, therefore, that Clark was an innocent and deluded party, is wholly inadmissible, and must be rejected as the least sustained part of this remarkable case.

I am of the opinion that the decree of the Circuit Court should be affirmed.