Harris v. South Carolina/Concurrence Black

by Hugo Black

United States Supreme Court

338 U.S. 68

Harris  v.  South Carolina

 Argued: Nov. 16, 1948. --- Decided: June 27, 1949

Mr. Justice BLACK concurs in the judgment on the authority of Chambers v. State of Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 60 S.Ct. 472, 84 L.Ed. 716; Ashcraft v. State of Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 64 S.Ct. 921, 88 L.Ed. 1192.

For dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice JACKSON, see 338 U.S. 49, 69 S.ct. 1357.

On the record before us and in view of the consideration given to the evidence by the state courts and the conclusion reached, THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice REED and Mr. Justice BURTON believe that the judgment should be affirmed.

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS (concurring).

The undisputed facts concerning the arrest and interrogation of the petitioner are as follows:

A storekeeper and his wife were killed in Aiken, South Carolina. The killing seemed similar to other crimes which had been committed in the community and which constituted a local crime wave. Local feeling was running high and the sheriff's office was anxious to find a solution. Numerous persons were interrogated. Nearly three months later suspicion fell on petitioner, because it became known that he possessed a pistol and had left the community for Nashville, Tennessee, shortly after the murder had occurred. The sheriff secured a warrant of arrest for the petitioner, allegedly for possessing a stolen pistol. The authorities in Nashville were notified that petitioner was wanted, and he was picked up there and placed in custody on a Friday. On the next Sunday he was delivered to the South Carolina officers. He was not read the warrant of arrest, nor was he informed that he was suspected of having committed the murder with which he was later charged and now stands convicted. While handcuffed, he was driven back to Aiken and lodged in the Aiken jail late that afternoon without being brought before a magistrate. That was Sunday. It was not until Monday afternoon that he was informed that he was under suspicion of having committed the murder. He was questioned a short time. He denied his guilt. A more extended questioning was held that night. The next day, Tuesday, the vigor of the questioning was increased. Petitioner was interrogated in the afternoon and again in the evening until around midnight. It was during this session that two incidents occurred. Petitioner had denied his guilt, but finally made a statement implicating another negro, who denied guilt when confronted with the accusation. It was also on Tuesday evening that one of the officers laid a hand on the petitioner. Sharp issue is taken on the nature of this act. Petitioner contends that he was struck with force. The officer testified that he merely placed his hand on petitioner's shoulder with no malice and that he merely stated that he did not believe certain statements that the petitioner had made.

On Wednesday afternoon the questioning was begun again. Petitioner still denied guilt. Wednesday evening he finally broke. The sheriff was alone with petitioner late at night. He threatened to have petitioner's mother arrested for having stolen property. It was then that petitioner offered to make the confession that was eventually used against him. Petitioner made his confession, and he was then removed to the state penitentiary for protection.

These interrogations had been held in a small room eight feet by beleven. Small groups of different officers conducted these interrogations, which went on and on in the heat of the days and nights. But during this time he was denied counsel and access to family and friends.

This is another illustration of the use by the police of he custody of an accused to wring a confession from him. The confession so obtained from literate and illiterate alike should shand condemned. See Haley v. State of Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 68 S.Ct. 302, 92 L.Ed. 224.

Notes