Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Road Commission/Dissent Stewart

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Dissenting Opinion
Stewart

United States Supreme Court

379 U.S. 487

Jankovich  v.  Indiana Toll Road Commission

 Argued: Dec. 10, 1964. --- Decided: Jan 18, 1965


Mr. Justice STEWART, with whom Mr. Justice BLACK joins, dissenting.

Although the opinion of the Supreme Court of Indiana relies on state and federal precedents, I can find nowhere in its opinion any clear indication of whether that court's ultimate conclusion is based upon the Federal Constitution, the Constitution of Indiana, or both. Therefore, I think the posture of this case is identical to that presented in Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 60 S.Ct. 676, and that we should, as the Court did there, vacate the judgment of the State Supreme Court and remand the cause for further proceedings.

'It is important that this Court not indulge in needless dissertations on constitutional law. It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state constitutions. But it is equally important that ambiguous or obscure adjudications by state courts do not stand as barriers to a determination by this Court of the validity under the federal constitution of state action. Intelligent exercise of our appellate powers compels us to ask for the elimination of the obscurities and ambiguities from the opinions in such cases. Only then can we ascertain whether or not our jurisdiction to review should be invoked. Only by that procedure can the responsibility for striking down or upholding state legislation be fairly placed. For no other course assures that important federal issues, such as have been argued here, will reach this Court for adjudication; that state courts will not be the final arbiters of important issues under the federal constitution; and that we will not encroach on the constitutional jurisdiction of the states. This is not a mere technical rule nor a rule for our convenience. It touches the division of authority between state courts and this Court and is of equal importance to each. Only by such explicitness can the highest courts of the states and this Court keep within the bounds of their respective jurisdictions.' 309 U.S. at 557, 60 S.Ct. at 679.

Notes[edit]

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).

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