Littell's Living Age/Volume 181/Issue 2348/The Future of Holland

It is, we believe, quite certain that grave and well-informed men of business in Berlin regard the extinction of the male line of Orange-Nassau, which is now certain and may occur at any hour, with a feeling of uneasiness. They do not believe that the government of Germany is satisfied with the arrangements made for the Dutch succession, and think that it may interfere in a way which at present is not at all anticipated. A well-informed correspondent of our own, in particular, has warned us repeatedly to watch events, and not to trust implicitly in the carefully diffused Dutch view, that the occurrence has been so carefully provided against that complications are not to be expected. We entirely confide in the sincerity of these warnings, but confess ourselves quite at a loss to understand whence, on the death of the present king of the Netherlands, disturbances are to arise. It is not even rumored that the Dutch themselves object to the succession of the king’s daughter, the little Princess Wilhelmina, or that they desire a republic, and there is only one external power which has the means even to raise the question. France has no claim, and puts forward no claim, either on Holland or Luxemburg; the Austrian claims, once so real, were disposed of by the Treaty of Vienna, and there remains only Germany which could benefit even by successful interference. It is understood, however, that Germany consents to the devolution of Luxemburg upon its heir, the mediatized Grand Duke of Nassau, who is accepted by the Luxemburgers, and it would be difficult even for the German lawyers who argued the case of Schleswig-Holstein to make out a colorable right to interfere in Holland.

That the German government would like, if it could, to include Holland within the empire may be conceded without discussion. The Germans look upon the Dutch as their cousins, and the Dutch marshes as their own natural road for reaching the North Sea. The Rhine, they say, deposited Holland, and it is natural to a people who own the upper waters of any great river to desire the rich lowlands which lie along the debouchure of the stream. The Germans, too, long, as they admit, and as is well known, for “ships, colonies, and commerce,” and the possession of the Netherlands would bring them all three. By exempting the Dutch from the military conscription, but subjecting them to maritime service, they would gain a body of sailors and naval officers adequate to the maintenance of a large fleet, and they would at the same time acquire a grand and well-consolidated colonial empire. The Dutch possess in farther Asia, besides the island of Java, of which alone the English often hear, the islands of Celebes and Sumatra, together with Bali, Flores, and Timor, and strong, though ill-defined, rights to a vast extent of Borneo and New Guinea. They themselves estimate the area of their possessions in Asia at six hundred thousand square miles, or three-fifths the area of India, with a population of twenty-three millions, and a revenue of at least a million. Their position, moreover, is so central, and their alliances with native chiefs are so ramified, that it is not too much to say that if they were supported by a first-class power they might possess themselves firmly of the whole of the Eastern Archipelago from Australia to the Philippines, a dominion which, though far less populous than India, would be greater in area, and probably richer in fertile land, thick forests, and universal resources. Part of it, too, would be suitable for European settlement, that is, if the Germans, like the Spaniards, would consent to acclimatize themselves in lofty and healthy, though undoubtedly more than semi-tropical, regions. Possessed of the Dutch East Indies, Germany would have ample employment for her navy, now too much confined to northern waters, and might within half a century, by good management and persistent effort, develop them into a second India. They could find opportunities of wealth and distinction or maintenance for at least a hundred thousand Germans, and this even if no German put his hand to a plough. It is known that this vision did atone time flash before Prince Bismarck, who, in 1871, mentioned it publicly in a speech; and it is not impossible that it may have attracted the present emperor William II., who greatly desires the enlargement of his navy, and who thinks that Germany has scarcely attained the world-wide influence consonant with her great position in the European family. It is not to be wondered at that such a prospect should prove attractive to ambitious men, or that diplomatists who are not so scrupulous as their English rivals should have studied the chances presented by the change in the Dutch succession, which seem great to them, though they do not to Englishmen, with some attentiveness.