Ohio Adjutant General's Department v. FLRA

by Supreme Court of the United States

Note: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

OHIO ADJUTANT GENERAL’S DEPARTMENT ET AL. v. FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
No. 21–1454. Argued January 9, 2023—Decided May 18, 2023

The Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS) provides for collective bargaining between federal agencies and their employees’ unions; bars each from committing unfair labor practices; and establishes the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) to investigate and adjudicate labor disputes. See 5 U. S. C. §7101 et seq. At issue here, the American Federation of Government Employees, Local 3970, AFL–CIO is the exclusive representative of certain federal civil-service employees known as dual-status technicians who work for the Ohio National Guard. After their prior collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) expired, petitioners here—the Ohio National Guard, the Ohio Adjutant General, and the Ohio Adjutant General’s Department (collectively the Guard)—asserted that the Guard was not bound by the FSLMRS when interacting with the Guard’s dual-status technicians. The Union subsequently filed an unfair labor practice complaint with the FLRA to resolve the dispute. Pointing to the fact that the FLRA only has jurisdiction over labor organizations and federal agencies, petitioners argued that the Guard was not an “agency” and that dual-status technician bargaining-unit employees were not “employees” for purposes of the FSLMRS. The Administrative Law Judge issued a recommended decision finding that: the FLRA had jurisdiction over the Guard; the dual-status technicians had collective-bargaining rights under the FSLMRS; and the Guard’s actions in repudiating the CBA violated the FSLMRS. A divided panel of the FLRA adopted the ALJ’s findings, conclusions, and remedial order. Petitioners sought review in the Sixth Circuit, which denied relief.

Held: The FLRA had jurisdiction over this labor dispute because a State National Guard acts as a federal agency for purposes of the FSLMRS when it hires and supervises dual-status technicians serving in their civilian role.

The question whether petitioners are an “agency” for purposes of the FSLMRS when they act as supervisors of dual-status technicians is bounded by a series of defined statutory terms. 5 U. S. C. §7116(a)(1). The FSLMRS defines “agency” to include the Department of Defense. §7103(a)(3). And each dual-status “technician … is an employee of the Department of the Army or the Department of the Air Force,” 32 U. S. C. §709(e); see also 10 U. S. C. §10216(a)(1)(A). Those Departments, in turn, are components of the Department of Defense. §§111(b)(6) and (8). Components of covered agencies plainly fall within the reach of the FSLMRS. See 5 U. S. C. §§7103(a)(12), 7112(a). Thus, when petitioners employ dual-status technicians, they—like components of an agency—exercise the authority of the Department of Defense, a covered agency.

The statutory authority permitting the Ohio Adjutant General to employ dual-status technicians as civilian employees in the federal civil service reinforces this point. See 5 U. S. C. §2105(a)(1)(F). Congress has required the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force to “designate” adjutants general “to employ and administer” technicians. 32 U. S. C. §709(d). That designation is the sole basis for petitioners’ authority to employ technicians performing work in their federal civilian roles. Here, a 1968 order of the Secretary of the Army “designate[s]” and “empower[s]” each adjutant general “to employ and administer the Army National Guard technicians authorized for his State … as the case may be.” General Order No. 85, ¶3. Accordingly, dual-status technicians are ultimately employees of the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force, and petitioners are the Secretaries’ designees for purposes of dual-status technician employment. Should a state adjutant general wish to employ federal dual-status technicians, the adjutant general must do so pursuant to delegated federal authority and subject to federal civil-service requirements. See 5 U. S. C. §2105(a)(1)(F).

The evolution of federal agency-employee relations law and the text of §7135(b) lend further support to the FLRA’s exercise of authority over the Guard. Section 7135(b) explicitly continues prior practice under the provisions of Executive Order No. 11491—the precursor to the FSLMRS—except where specifically revoked by the President or altered by the FSLMRS or corresponding regulations. The 1971 decision in Thompson Field is on point. See Mississippi National Guard, 172d Military Airlift Group (Thompson Field), Asst. Sec. Labor/Management Reports (A/SLMR) No. 20. There, the Assistant Secretary of Labor—exercising adjudicative authority under Executive Order No. 11491 analogous to the FLRA’s—held that Mississippi’s National Guard technicians were employees of the Federal Government under Executive Order No. 11491. The Assistant Secretary concluded that the State’s adjutant general had “been designated as an agent of the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force” in employing and administering dual-status technicians and that this agency relationship created the obligation to comply with Executive Order No. 11491. Id., at 7. The definitions of “employee” and “agency” that Thompson Field examined were materially identical to those that Congress ultimately adopted in the FSLMRS. The Court thus ordinarily presumes that the FSLMRS maintained the same coverage that existed under the prior regime, see, e.g., George v. McDonough, 596 U. S. ___, ___, and the Court identifies nothing to weaken that presumption here. Pp. 5–11.

21 F. 4th 401, affirmed.

Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson, JJ., joined. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Gorsuch, J., joined.

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