On the Vital Principle/Book 1/Chapter 3
Before proceeding further, let us consider the nature of motion; for it may not only be untrue that Vital Principle is, as some affirm, essentially self-motive or capable of producing motion; but it may be one of those entities to which motion cannot possibly belong; and it has already been said that the motor is not necessarily itself in motion.
Everything moved admits of being moved in two ways: either by itself or by something else; and by something else we mean whatever is moved from being in something which is moving, as sailors for instance,—for they are not moved as is the vessel, since it is moved by itself, but they are moved from being in that which is moved. This is clear by reference to their limbs—a particular movement of the feet is walking, and walking is man's progression; but the sailors do not at that time move by walking. Since then motion may be spoken of in this two-fold sense, let us consider whether the Vital Principle moves by itself, and whether it partakes also of motion communicated to it. As there are four kinds of movement, translation, change, growth, decay, it follows that the Vital Principle should move according to one, or more than one, or all of them; and if it do not move by chance, then motion must be natural to it; and if so, then locality, for all the movements above alluded to are local.
But if Vital Principle be essentially self-motive, then accidental movement will not belong to it as to a white colour or a length of three cubits; for these properties do move, but then it is by accident, and owing to the bodies to which they belong happening to be in motion. Thus, there cannot be for them any locality as there will be for the Vital Principle, if it partakes of motion by its own nature. Although, however, it may be in motion by its own nature, it may still be moved by force, and if by force, still by nature; and the same holds good for the state of rest. Thus, the point towards which anything is by its nature moved, serves also by nature for its point of rest, as equally the point to which anything is moved by force serves also, by force, for its point of rest. It is not easy, however, even conjecturally to determine what will be the forced movements and forced states of rest of the Vital Principle—if its motion be upwards it will be fire, if downwards, earth, for such are the tendencies of those elements; and this conclusion applies equally to the intermediate movements. Since the Vital Principle besides appears to give motion to the body, it is probable that it communicates to the body the motions which it imparts to itself, and, if so, the converse may be true that it communicates to itself the motions which it imparts to the body. Now, the body is moved by translation, so that the Vital Principle should change with the body and be set free from it, either wholly or in its parts; and if this is admitted, it should follow that the Vital Principle, having gone forth from the body, might re-enter, and the consequence of this would be that the dead bodies of animals rise again. Could the Vital Principle be subject to casual motion communicated by some other power than its own, then an animal might be impelled to move by impulse from without; but it is noway necessary that that which is essentially self-motive should be moved by something else, unless by mere chance, any more than that which is good, in and for itself, should be so by or for the sake of something else. It may be confidently affirmed besides, that the Vital Principle, if it do move, is moved by objects which act upon the senses. Although, however, Vital Principle should be self-motive, it would still be in motion, and thus, as all motion is displacement of that which moved, as being moved, the Vital Principle might be displaced from its essence, unless its self-motion were a casual property; but self-motion is of its very essence.
Some philosophers maintain that the Vital Principle moves the body in which it is, as it is itself moving,—and this is the opinion of Democritus, who expresses himself almost in the words of the comic poet Philippus, who charges "Daedalus with having made a wooden Venus to become movable, when quicksilver was poured into it." Democritus, in fact, says much the same thing when he maintains that indivisible spheres are in motion, from their having been by nature constituted never to remain at rest, and that these spheres drag along with them and give motion to all things. But we will ask Democritus whether it is those self-same spheres which produce the state of rest, and it will be difficult or rather impossible for him to explain how they are to do so. It is not thus, besides, that the Vital Principle appears to give motion to an animal, as it acts, generally speaking, by some kind of election and thought.
It is in this same manner, however, that Timæus physiologically explains how the body is moved by the Vital Principle—that, from its being in motion, the body, with which it has been interwoven, is moved also; and having constituted it out of the elements, and divided it according to harmonic numbers, in order that it may have an innate sense of harmony, and that the universe may move in accordant orbits, he bent the straight line into a circle, and dividing that circle into two united in two parts, he again divided the single circle into seven others, as if to indicate that the orbits of the sky are the movements of the Vital Principle.
But, in the first place, it is not correct to say that the Vital Principle is magnitude, for Timæus evidently means that this Principle of the universe is such as is the so-called mind; and, then, that Principle of the universe can resemble neither the sentient nor the concupiscent faculty, as neither of these moves in a circle. The mind is one and continuous as is cogitation, and cogitation as are thoughts, and thoughts are, by concatenation, one, in the sense, not of magnitude, but of number; and, therefore, the mind is not continuous in the sense of magnitude, but either it is without parts, or, at all events, not continuous as magnitude. How, indeed, were it magnitude, is it to think—as a whole, or by some one of its parts? But parts must be regarded either as magnitude, or as points, if, indeed, a point may be regarded as a part; and, if parts be considered as points, then, as points are innumerable, the mind, clearly, will never be able to recount them all, and if, as magnitude, the mind will have to dwell very often, or rather continuously, upon the same subject. But it is manifest that thinking may be exercised once for all. If, besides, it suffice for thinking, that there should be contact by some one of its parts, why should it move in a circle, or why be magnitude? And if necessary for thinking that there should be contact by the whole circle, then what means contact by its parts? How, besides, shall that which has parts think by that which is without parts, or that which is without by that which has parts ? Thus, it follows that the mind must be that circle: for thinking is the movement of the mind, as the periphery is the movement of the circle ; and, if thinking be the periphery of the mind, the mind may be regarded as the circle, of which thinking is the periphery. But then the mind will be ever thinking, and necessarily so, since the peripheral movement is unceasing. Now, there are limits to practical thoughts, (as all such are for the sake of something else,) and so equally there are to speculative thoughts, in their reasons; and every reason is either a definition or a demonstration. Thus, demonstrations set out from a principle, and are, in some way, terminated by a syllogism or a conclusion; and even though not concluded, they do not revert to their principle, but, taking up another mean and extreme, they proceed onward; but the periphery, on the contrary, does revert to its point of departure. Definitions, however, are always limited. If, moreover, the same periphery recur often, the mind will be driven to think often upon the same subject, and thinking, besides, seems rather to be a kind of rest and a halt than motion; and this applies equally to the syllogism. As every condition, besides, which is compulsory and ungenial must be unhappy, so unless movement be an essential property of that mind, it must be moving against its nature, and it cannot but be painful for it to have been so connected with the body as to be unable to free itself from it; nay more, it is a lot to have been avoided, since it is better for the mind, as is commonly said, and to many seems reasonable, not to have been connected with a body at all. The cause too, of the circular movement of the sky is obscurely stated—for the essence of the Vital Principle is not the cause of that movement, as it never does, excepting it be by chance, so move, nor can the body be the cause, as it is the Vital Principle rather which gives motion to it; neither is it explained how it is better for the Vital Principle to be so circumstanced, and yet it ought to have been shewn that God had caused it to have a circular movement, as better for it to be in motion than at rest, and to move in that rather than in any other direction. But as this is an inquiry which belongs rather to other studies, it may, for the present, be laid aside.
The same incongruity which occurs in most of the theories upon Vital Principle is met with here, in that writers join Vital Principle to and place it in a body without having first settled for what purpose the body is to receive it, or how it is fitted for the office. It would seem, however, to be necessary that this should be settled, as it is through this connexion that the one acts and the other is acted upon, that the one moves and the other is moved; and these are relations which cannot be attributed to casual associations. There are writers who content themselves with saying what Vital Principle is, without determining any thing about the body its recipient, as if it were admissible, according to Pythagorean legends, that any kind of Vital Principle might clothe itself with any kind of body; but every thing, on the contrary, seems to have its own particular character and form. Such opinions are, in fact, very much like maintaining that the builder's art may be undertaken with musical instruments; but we affirm that as each art must employ its own instruments, so each Vital Principle must employ its own body.
Notes[edit]
Note 1, p. 29. It is not easy, however, &c.] That is, if the Vital Principle be a first cause and an element or combination of the elements, it cannot be determined, if subject to external impulse, what its movements will be—if it be of fire, it must move upwards, if of earth, downwards, and so for intermediate movements. Plato maintains, as was said, that, as there can be nothing visible or tangible without fire or solid without earth, these were the first of created elements; and that, as there can be no enduring combination out of two elements, air and water were next created and placed between the first two.
Note 2, p. 30. Now, the body is moved by translation.] This passage has been the subject of much and serious controversy, both as to its meaning and its genuineness; and yet, although an argumentum ad absurdum, it is a fair conclusion from those premises. Thus, if the Vital Principle be an entity distinct from the body which it animates, and if the body be moved, by translation, from it, the Vital Principle, having also that movement, may set itself free, and if able to do this, it may re-enter and resuscitate the body which it had left. The assumption, in fact, is an evident objection to the opinion that Vital Principle moves itself as it moves the body; and seems to be necessary to the completion of the argument.
The passage, however, has been regarded as an interpolation introduced by some Christian writer, (adeo verba Christianum seculum referunt,) in order to support the doctrine of the resurrection: and Trendelenberg, while unwilling to suppress the passage, seems to question its authenticity. The subsequent paragraphs are in support of Aristotle's opinion that the Vital Principle, if self-motive, cannot be subject to motion by other impulse than its own, (just as that which is good in itself, cannot be so by or for the sake of something else,) and that, if it were so subject, its motion would be due to sentient impressions.
Note 3, p. 31. Some philosophers maintain.] This passage is a covert satire of the doctrine of Democritus that motion is transmitted through all nature by atoms in constant motion ; and these are said to have been likened by Philippus, the reputed son, according to Meineke, of Aristophanes, to globules of quicksilver, which, when poured in, made a wooden figure to become moveable. It is uncertain, by the way, when this metal was first employed; it is here alluded to as a well-known substance, and is so spoken of by Theophrastus. [1] Pliny says that "it was brought from the silver mines of Spain, in the form of cinnabar, and, when freed from its ore, used in metallurgy;" further, "that it is always fluid, and an universal poison."
Note 4, p. 31. It is in this same manner, &c.] If the Vital Principle be to the body what Plato, in the Timæus, made the great animating principle to be to the Universe, a source of intelligence and ordered motion, there must be an accordance between terrene and celestial bodies and movements; but as earthly bodies are moved by objects of sense and perception, and as their movements are not, like those of the heavenly, in a circle, their natures must be different. It would be idle to attempt to make a digest of the opinions entertained in the Timæus, the most abstruse and laboured of all Plato's works, or to trace the analogy between the constitution and motions of the supernal orbs, and the constitutions and conditions of earthly bodies. But four points seem to be evident —that the universe moves by motions communicated by the anima; that the anima is from the elements; that it has so been divided, as to have an innate sense of harmonic numbers; and that it has been made to move in the same circles as the sky. This summary is adduced by Aristotle to shew how scarcely possible it could be to adjust this speculation to his own subject of inquiry, and he may have been led to criticise it the rather, as the great principle of the universe is synonymous with his own treatise; each is, in fact, ψυχή. But to quote the learned[2] commentator, "Platonem in Timæo quam maxime obscurum illustrare, hujus loci non est."
Note 5, p. 32. But, in the first place.] These critical objections cannot be fully realised without reference to the leading opinions and arguments of the Timæus, which, although, perhaps, at the time, regarded only as speculations and now stand self-confuted as physics, are enshrined in words which shall endure, until mankind cease to find delight and instruction in pure and abstract studies. The first objection raised by Aristotle is to the ascription of magnitude to that anima (which is to be necessarily inferred from its being divisible,) as well as to the intelligence or mind, which is identified with it; for magnitude would imply a material entity, and matter conjoined with form and essence implies parts, and whatever has parts cannot either be self-existent, or indefinite in duration. Another objection, much insisted upon, is the movement in a circle, which cannot, it is said, be the motion produced by the passions or appetites; but the chief topic is resumed, and the mind is shewn to be, like the thoughts which emanate from it, immaterial. Aristotle's subject, however, unlike that of the Timæus, was confined to the agent or principle, whatever it be, which imparts motion and other vital properties to organised matter.
Note 6, p. 33. Now, there are limits to practical thoughts.] The origin[3] of whatever is original is in the maker or creator, whether it be mind, or art, or a special faculty—it is an abstraction that is; but, whatever is practical is dependent only on an agent, or his choice, for the act is identical with what is chosen. Thus, practical thoughts are confined to the particular faculties and organs which are required for securing what may have been chosen.
Note 7, p. 33. Terminated by a syllogism.] The syllogism[4] is an argument, in which, from given premises, something different from the terms laid down results, necessarily, from their admission. Modern definition is much like this—the syllogism is said to be an argument of three propositions, having the property, that the conclusion necessarily follows from the two premises; so that if the premises be true, the conclusion must be true; and a conclusion is the proposition which is inferred from certain former propositions, termed the premises of the argument.
Note 8, p. 34. The same incongruity.] This is an objection by Aristotle to the doctrine of metempsychosis, adopted by the Pythagoreans, and, being placed upon obvious physical relations, it may be considered as irrefragable. Thus, philosophers held numbers to be elements, and perceived in them and their combinations resemblances to, or types of faculties and sentient properties, as has been observed. Their doctrine[5] was, "that man consists of an elementary nature, and a rational or divine principle, and that of this last, the divine is seated in the brain, the passions and appetites in the liver and heart; that the rational part is immortal, the sentient principle perishable." They further taught, that the imperishable part, freed from the chains of the body, assumes a new form, passes to the centre of the earth for judgment, and, if not deemed worthy of associating with perfect spirits, is returned to earth to inhabit another body, of higher or lower nature, according to its former deserts. This doctrine has been so developed and exemplified in the final teaching of Socrates, before his death, that that dialogue[6] may be regarded as a faithful exposition of the argument and its merits. Aristotle, overlooking every supernal cause or agency, objects to the doctrine, not on its own grounds but, by reasonings, which are purely deductive; and the doctrine is, no doubt, when tested by physical science, incongruous.
Note 9, p. 35. Such opinions are, in fact, &c.] This passage is apparently abstruse and ambiguous, owing to the terms being applicable to more than one art or implement; and yet, "[7] as it involves a kind of antithesis between the art and the implements, the Vital Principle and the body," the general sense can be made sufficiently obvious. The purport of the phrase is well given in the Latin version: Perinde igitur dicunt atqui si quispiam artem fabrilem fistulas ingredi dicat ; etenim ars quidam instrumentis, anima vero corpore utatur oportet. The French version is less definite: "C'est absolument comme si l'on pretendoit que l'architecture peut se mêler de fabriquer des instruments de musique."