defined exigencies.[1]
Those delay provisions clearly reflect the Congressional effort to balance executive needs against the privacy rights of United States persons, as recommended by Justice Powell in the Keith case when he stated that:
Different standards may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment if they are reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of Government for intelligence information and the protected rights of our citizens.. U.S. v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. at 322-323.
Also reflective of the balancing process Congress pursued in FISA is the requirement that interceptions may be for no longer than a ninety day duration, minimization is again required,[2] and an aggrieved person is again (as in Title III) required to be notified of proposed use and given the opportunity to file a motion to suppress.[3] Also again, alternatives to a wiretap must be found to have been exhausted or to have been ineffective.[4]
A FISA judicial warrant, moreover, requires a finding of probable cause to believe that the target was either a foreign power or agent thereof,[5] not that a crime had been or would be committed, as Title III's more stringent standard required. Finally, a special FISA court was required to be appointed, of federal judges designated by the Chief Justice.[6] They were required to hear, ex parte, all applications and make all orders.[7] [*28]
