On 22 January 2018, a Sydney Trains passenger train (A42) failed to stop as intended at the Richmond Station platform, and collided with the buffer stop at the end of the platform at a speed of about 26 km/h. There were 26 people on board the train (including the driver and a guard). Sixteen people were injured and treated at the scene, some with serious injuries.
The ATSB’s investigation found that the driver of A42 did not slow the train at a crucial time when approaching the buffer stop at the end of Platform 2 at Richmond Station. A number of possibilities for the driver’s inaction were examined during the course of the investigation, these included: the driver blacking out, the driver experiencing a microsleep due to fatigue impairment, or the driver being distracted / inattentive. The investigation was unable to conclusively determine what caused the driver to have no control system input for 22 seconds shortly before impact.
The ATSB concluded that the buffer stop withstood the impact of the collision and prevented the train from crossing onto a main road. It further concluded that the two hydro-pneumatic rams on the front of the buffer stop did not perform as designed, due to non-alignment with the crash energy management system on the front of the Waratah train, and Sydney Trains’ riskmanagement procedures did not rectify deficiencies in the buffer stop design at Richmond before the incident. The crash energy management system on A42 reduced the impact force of the collision but not all components performed as designed.
The buffer stops for Platforms 1 and 2 at Richmond were redesigned. The new buffer stops are compliant with the NSW buffer stop standard. The NSW Asset Standards Authority (ASA) has reviewed and updated their buffer stop standard.
Other measures which may have prevented the collision, such as the installation of an intermediate train stops and automatic train protection, were not present at the time of the incident. Intermediate train stops, previously identified and recommended as a risk control, have been installed at Richmond since the incident. Automatic train protection which, if installed on A42, may have prevented the incident, was still in trial stage at the time of the incident. Transport for New South Wales (TfNSW) have scheduled automatic train protection to be operational on most Sydney Trains electric rolling stock by May 2021.
Computer modelling and analysis of the crash performance of the A-set and its crash energy management system has been undertaken. This will provide better understanding for future rolling stock specification and design.
Rail operators should ensure that multi-layered defences are in place against over-speeding. This should include infrastructure design, rolling stock design and train crew health management. They need to ensure that identified risk controls are implemented, and that these control measures are effective in their performance.
