only, although it was a safeguard which might take on a real meaning in the case of a usurper or a headstrong interrex. The passage of the lex de imperio, which is not properly a part of the ceremony attending the choice, and the inauguration of the king, were also matters of form in so far as the choice of the king was concerned, since the refusal of the curiae to pass the measure is inconceivable.
17. Powers of the King. Sallust characterizes the power of the king as an imperium legitimum. This can mean little more than that the king has to observe the mos maiorum. So, for instance, he was expected, although not required, to consult the senate on important matters. This general limitation on the power of the king found definite expression, perhaps, in the lex de imperio, which was probably in the nature of a contract, on the part of the people to render obedience, on the part of the king to observe the practices of the forefathers. Except for the limitations just mentioned, the king was a supreme ruler, — the chief executive, the chief priest, the lawgiver, and the judge of the state. After war had been declared he had sole power to levy and organize troops, to choose leaders, and to conduct the campaign. The property of the state was under his control, and he was authorized to dispose of conquered territory and to take charge of public works. He was the official representative of the community in its relations with the gods, as well as in its dealings with other communities. Changes of a permanent or far-reaching character, however, such as the introduction of new deities, could only be made with the consent of the priests. It would be unwarrantable to import modern notions into our conception of the king's position and to speak of him as legislating for the people, but undoubtedly he formulated and executed such measures as he thought essential to the community,
