Alito, J., dissenting
“predominant” factor in legislative districting. “[W]hen statutory language is susceptible of multiple interpretations, a court may shun an interpretation that raises serious constitutional doubts and instead may adopt an alternative that avoids those problems.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 2). This same principle logically applies with even greater force when we interpret language in one of our prior opinions. It therefore goes without question that we should apply the Gingles framework in a way that does not set up a confrontation between §2 and the Constitution, and understanding the first Gingles precondition in the way I have outlined achieves that result.[1]
B
The Court’s subsidiary criticisms of Alabama’s arguments are likewise inapplicable to my analysis. The Court suggests that the “centerpiece” of Alabama’s argument regarding the role race can permissibly play in a plaintiff’s illustrative map seeks the imposition of “a new rule.” Ante, at 15, 22. But I would require only what our cases already demand: that all legislative districts be produced without giving race a “predominant” role.[2]
- ↑ The second and third Gingles preconditions, which concern racially polarized voting, cannot contribute to avoiding a clash between §2 and the Constitution over racial predominance in the drawing of lines. Those preconditions do not concern the drawing of lines in plaintiffs’ maps, and in any event, because voting in much of the South is racially polarized, they are almost always satisfied anyway. Alabama does not contest that they are satisfied here.
- ↑ The Court appears to contend that it does not matter if race predominated in the drawing of these maps because the maps could have been drawn without race predominating. See ante, at 26–27, n. 7. But of course, many policies could be selected for race-neutral reasons. They nonetheless must be assessed under the relevant standard for intentional reliance on race if their imposition was in fact motivated by race. See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U. S. 222, 227–231 (1985); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 264–
