Page:Allen v. Milligan.pdf/56

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Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023)
11

Thomas, J., dissenting

districting plans as dilutive relative to a nonneutral benchmark “would result in a substantial increase in the number of mandatory districts drawn with race as ‘the predominant factor motivating the legislature’s decision,’ ” thus “ ‘raising serious constitutional questions.’ ” Id., at 21–22 (first quoting Miller, 515 U. S., at 916, then quoting LULAC, 548 U. S., at 446). To avoid setting §2 on a collision course with the Constitution, courts must apply a race-neutral benchmark in assessing any claim that a districting plan unlawfully dilutes a racial minority’s voting strength.

B

The plaintiffs in these cases seek a “proportional allocation of political power according to race.” Holder, 512 U. S., at 936 (opinion of Thomas, J.). According to the 2020 census, black Alabamians account for 27.16% of the State’s total population and 25.9% of its voting-age population, both figures slightly less than two-sevenths. Of Alabama’s seven existing congressional districts, one, District 7, is majority-black.[1] These cases were brought to compel “the creation of


  1. District 7 owes its majority-black status to a 1992 court order. See Wesch v. Hunt, 785 F. Supp. 1491, 1493–1494, 1496–1497, 1501–1502 (SD Ala.), aff’d sub nom. Camp v. Wesch, 504 U. S. 902 (1992). At the time, the Justice Department’s approach to preclearance under §5 of the Act followed the “so-called ‘max-black’ policy,” which “required States, including Alabama, to create supermajority-black voting districts or face denial of preclearance.” Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 575 U. S. 254, 298 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Although Wesch was a §2 case and the court-imposed plan that resulted was not subject to preclearance, see 785 F. Supp., at 1499–1500, there can be little doubt that a similar ethos dominated that litigation, in which all parties stipulated to the desirability of a 65%-plus majority-black district. See id., at 1498–1499. To satisfy that dubious need, the Wesch court aggressively adjusted the northeast and southeast corners of the previous District 7. In the northeast, where District 7 once encompassed all of Tuscaloosa County and the more or less rectangular portion of Jefferson County not included in District 6, the 1992 plan drew a long, thin “finger” that traversed the southeastern third of Tuscaloosa County to reach deep into the