Page:American Journal of Sociology Volume 6.djvu/167

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ETHICS OF THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS 153

Inasmuch, therefore, as in the unrestricted struggle for existence it is the nine-tenths that are submerged in order that the one- tenth shall survive, the evolutionary system must, upon utili- tarian grounds, be oppressive and irrational to the great majority of the individuals affected by it.

This is precisely the point seized upon by Benjamin Kidd in his book Social Evolution, Building in the main upon Spencerian premises, Kidd declares that when that process of development which is helplessly and unthinkingly submitted to by the brute creation is examined in the light of men's reason, it is seen to be, as to the majority of them, an essentially irrational one. The reason why men have not long ago sought to end this destructive competition has been due, he declares, to the fact that religion has supplied super-rational or irrational sanctions to sustain social subordination. There are inherent defects in Mr. Kidd's argument both as to the rational, or rather the irrational, character of all religious beliefs, and as to that absolute hostility of the interests of the individual to those of society which he states in the broadest manner possible. Of these we will speak later. But certainly Mr. Kidd's theory that, from the standpoint of the individual, the simple biologic process of evolution cannot be defended upon utilitarian grounds, is correct.

As regards the third implied assumption of Mr. Spencer, that an unrestricted struggle for existence is as beneficent among human races as among sub-human species, the objections that may be urged are so numerous as to render difficult their treat- ment within the compass of a single chapter. The gist of them all are, however, contained in the two following statements of fact. First, that it is the general desire, as well as the true duty, of man not simply to live, but to live well. Second, that man as a rational being has the ability to modify his relation to his environment, either by consciously adapting his manner of life to it, or by altering its conditions.

The first truth has been well stated by President Schurman in a review of Mr. Spencer's Justice in the Philosophical Review:

The receipt [says President Schurman] of the natural consequences of an individual's nature, active or quiescent, wherein Mr. Spencer discovers the