Page:An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding - Hume (1748).djvu/129

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Of the Idea of Power.
117

But if we would have a more philosophical Confutation of this Theory, perhaps the two following Reflections may suffice.

First, It seems to me, that this Theory, of the universal Energy and Operation of the supreme Being, is too bold ever to carry Conviction with it to a Man, who is sufficiently appriz'd of the Weakness of human Reason, and the narrow Limits, to which it is confin'd in all its Operations. Tho' the Chain of Arguments, that lead to it, were ever so conclusive and logical, there must arise a strong Supicion, if not an absolute Assurance, that it has led us quite beyond the Reach of our Faculties, when it establishes Conclusions so extraordinary, and so remote from common Life and Experience. We are got into Fairy-land, long ere we have reach'd the last Steps of our Theory; and there we have no Reason to trust our common Methods of Argument, or think that our usual Analogies and Probabilities have any Weight or Authority. Our Line is too short to fathom such immense Abysses. And however we may flatter ourselves, that we are guided in every Step we take by a kind of Verisimilitude and Experience; we may be assur'd, that this fancy'd Experience has no Authority, when we thus apply it to Subjects, that lie entirely out of the Sphereof