Page:An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding - Hume (1748).djvu/142

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130
ESSAY VIII.

and remains still undecided, we may presume, that there is some Ambiguity in the Expression, and that the Disputants affix different Ideas to the Terms employ'd in the Controversy. For as the Faculties of the Soul are suppos'd to be naturally alike in all Men; otherwise nothing could be more fruitless than to reason or dispute together; 'twere impossible, if they affix'd the same Ideas to their Terms, they could so long form different Opinions of the same Subject; especially when they communicate their Views, and each Party turn themselves on all Sides, in Search of Arguments, which may give them the Victory over their Antagonists. 'Tis true; if they attempt the Discussion of Questions, that lie entirely beyond the Reach of human Capacity, such as those concerning the Origin of Worlds, or the Oeconomy of the intellectual System or Region of Spirits, they may long beat the Air in their fruitless Contests, and never arrive at any determinate Conclusion. But if the Question regard any Subject of common Life and Experience; nothing, one would think, could preserve the Dispute so long undecided, but some ambiguous Expressions, which keep the Antagonists still at a Distance, and hinder them from grappling with each other.

This has been the Case in the long-disputed Question concerning Liberty and Necessity; and to so re-markable