Page:An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding - Hume (1748).djvu/76

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.
64
ESSAY IV.

where is that Process of Reasoning, which from one Instance draws a Conclusion, so different from that which it infers from a hundred Instances, that are no way different from that single Instance? This Question I propose as much for the Sake of Information, as with an Intention of raising Difficulties. I cannot find, I cannot imagine any such Reasoning. But I keep my Mind still open to Instruction, if any one will vouchsafe to bestow it on me.

Should it be said, that from a Number of uniform Experiments, we infer a Connexion betwixt the sensible Qualities and the secret Powers; this, I must confess, seems the same Difficulty, couch'd in different Terms. The Question still recurs, On what Process of Argument this Inference is founded? Where is the Medium, the interposing Ideas, which join Propositions so very wide of each other? 'Tis confess'd, that the Colour, Consistence, and other sensible Qualities of Bread appear not, of themselves, to have any Connexion with the secret Powers of Nourishment and Support. For otherwise we could infer these secret Powers from the first Appearance of these sensible Qualities, without the Aid of Experience, contrary to the Sentiment of all Philosophers; and contrary to plain Matter of Fact. Here then is our natural State of Ignorance with regard to the Powers and Influence of all Objects. How is this remedy'd by Experience?It