Page:An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding - Hume (1748).djvu/90

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78
ESSAY V.

particular Links might be connected with each other, the whole Chain of Inferences would have nothing to support it, nor could we ever, by its Means, arrive at the Knowledge of any real Existence. If I ask, why you believe any particular Matter of Fact, which you relate, you must tell me some Reason; and this Reason will be some other Fact, connected with it: But as you cannot proceed after this Manner, in infinitum, you must at last terminate in some Fact, which is present to your Memory or Senses; or must allow, that your Belief is entirely without Foundation.

What then is the Conclusion of the whole Matter? A simple one; tho' it must be confess'd, pretty remote from the common Theories of Philosophy. All Belief of Matter of Fact or real Existence is deriv'd merely from some Object, present to the Memory or Senses, and a customary Conjunction betwixt that and any other Object. Or in other Words; having found, in many Instances, that any two Kinds of Objects, Flame and Heat, Snow and Cold, have always been conjoin'd together; if Flame or Snow be presented anew to our Senses; the Mind is carry'd by Custom to expect Heat or Cold, and to believe, that such a Quality does exist, and will discover itself upon a nearer Approach. This Belief is the necessary Result of placing the Mind in such Circumstances. 'Tis an Operation of the Soul, when we are so situated, asunavoid-