wish for things that could not possibly be performed by our agency, as, for instance, that a certain actor or a certain athlete should win the prize; but no one wills anything of that sort: we only will things that we think may possibly be effected by our agency. Further, wish is mainly directed to the end and will to the means; we wish to be in good health and we will the means of attaining good health. Or again, we wish to be happy, and we say so; but it is inappropriate to say that we will to be happy, for, to put it generally, will appears to be confined to things in our power."[1]
It is one of the conditions of moral progress that we should not allow desires and wishes to remain mere desires and mere wishes. They should be brought into relation to the self as a whole. The self should judge whether they are worthy to be identified with itself or not. If it decides that they are worthy, it should "back" the desires so that they become volitions; and, so far as the ends which it wishes are attainable, it should will the means by which they may be achieved. On the other hand, if desires are unworthy and wishes vain, they should at once be suppressed and denied. It is a source of weakness to the moral life to dally for a moment with desires which are evil or alien to the true self. And the weakest thing in the world is a life which is at the mercy of a swarm of impotent wishes. Like gnats, they goad it not to action but simply to irritation.
All volition involves deliberation on the one hand, and choice or decision on the other.
