Page:An introduction to ethics.djvu/154

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been validated.
137
STANDARD OF MORAL JUDGMENT

But every boy will admit that there is one and only one right answer. Similarly, we believe that in every actual situation, only one action is possible which is right; and that in precisely similar situations precisely similar actions will always be right.

(3) True moral judgments are impartial. Perfect impartiality is one of the rarest things in the world. If we consider only our own feelings and emotions, our own likes and dislikes, we cannot be impartial. Our feelings constantly lead us to be partial in our judgments and in our actions. Our feelings naturally tend to make us judge ourselves more leniently than we judge others. Actions which we condemn in strangers we condone in our friends. The teacher finds that his personal affection or dislike for a pupil makes it difficult to treat him impartially. Yet he recognises that he ought to be impartial. The moral standard stands above his feelings. When feelings are fanned into passions, and slumbering animosities break out in a great war, it becomes almost impossible to be impartial in our moral judgments. The Uhlan cuts off the ears of his dead enemy: we can find no words to express our horror at such an abominable action. The redoubtable Turco does the same: we laugh it off as an amusing, if regrettable, foible. We judge that the peace-loving efforts of Dr. Liebknecht and his socialist friends are highly praiseworthy: we judge that the peace-loving efforts of Mr. Ramsay Macdonald and his socialist friends are highly reprehensible. Our feelings are responsible for leading us into such ridiculous inconsistencies. Moral judgment should always seek to be impartial and disinterested. It