laborious days," with all their boredom and weariness, in order to advance science or provide for his family. The attainment of these comprehensive ends may be accompanied by pleasurable feeling, but it may not. The man may simply do it because he conceives that it is his duty.
(3) But, in general, the objects that we desire bring with them pleasant feelings. I desire a dish of steak and onions: the eating of it is pleasant. I desire to hear Melba: listening to her singing is pleasant. I desire a game of tennis: the exercise is pleasant. In every case the satisfaction of the desire is attended by pleasant feeling. But that does not mean that we desire the object in order to enjoy the feeling. I may desire the steak and onions because I need nourishment; I may desire to hear Melba in order to be able to write a descriptive report of her singing; and I may desire the game of tennis simply for the sake of my health. To think that we desire the object or activity simply for the sake of the pleasure that accompanies it is as absurd as to suppose that, in William James's words, "because no steamer can go to sea without incidentally consuming coal, therefore no steamer can go to sea for any other motive than that of coal-consumption."[1]
§6. Pleasure and the Self. We conclude, then, that pleasure is neither the supreme moral end nor the standard of judgment. But we admit that pleasure occupies an important place in life. As we have seen, all experience is permeated by pleasure and pain as its affective tone; and it is eminently
- ↑ Principles of Psychology, ii. p. 558.
