ledge, as I have said, that their responses are of demons, and not of God, with whom there is never falsehood.
Chap. xxiii.—Evil not in substance.
"But if any one, proceeding more curiously; inquire: What then was the use of God's making these evil things, which should have so great a tendency to subvert the minds of men? To one proposing such a question, we answer that we must first of all inquire whether there is any evil in substance. And although it would be sufficient to say to him that is not suitable that the creature judge the Creator but that to judge the work of another belongs to him who is either of equal skill or equal power; yet, to come directly to the point, we say absolutely that there is no evil in substance. But if this be so, then the Creator of substance is vainly blamed.
Chap. xxiv.—Why God permits evil.
"But you will meet me by saying, Even if it has come to this through freedom of will, was the Creator ignorant that those whom He created would fall away into evil. He ought therefore not to have created those who, He foresaw, would deviate from the path of righteousness. Now we tell those who ask such questions, that the purpose of assertions of the sort made by us is to show why the wickedness of those who as yet were not, did not prevail over the goodness of the Creator.[1] For if, wishing to fill up the number and measure of His creation, He had been afraid of the wickedness of those who were to be, and like one who could find no other way of remedy and cure, except only this, that He should refrain from His purpose of creating, lest the wickedness of those who were to be should be ascribed to Him; what else would this show but unworthy suffering and unseemly feebleness on the part of
- ↑ There is considerable variety of reading in this sentence, and the precise meaning is somewhat obscure. The general sense, however, is sufficiently evident, that if God had refrained from creating those who, He foresaw, would fall into evil, this would have been to subject His goodness to their evil.
