surprised the Hessian garrison at Trenton, and gained a complete victory. Greene urged a rapid pursuit of the enemy, but was overruled by a council of war. The victory, however, was soon followed by a strategic movement on the weakened garrison at Princeton, and after a sharp engagement the British retreated to join the main army under Cornwallis. Greene's conduct and wise counsels throughout the campaign had commended him to Washington; and when, in March, 1777, the latter found it necessary to present to congress his views and plans, Greene was selected for the mission. The “Conway cabal,” which in the succeeding winter assumed dangerous proportions, had already begun its work of discrediting Washington and Greene with congress, and partly on this account Greene was sent. He succeeded in having a resolution passed relieving Washington from subservience to a council of war.
But Greene's most important work at this period was the part he took in the battle of the Brandywine, 11 Sept., 1777. The only hope of success for the British in the attempt to drive Washington from his very strong position at Chadd's and Brinton's fords was in turning his right flank by a circuitous march of eighteen miles up the Lancaster road and across the forks of the Brandywine toward Birmingham meeting-house. The British were safe in trying this, because their superior force (18,000 against 11,000) enabled them to separate the wings of their army with little risk. The movement was admirably conducted by Cornwallis, but he did not succeed in striking the American flank, because Washington made a new front with his right wing under Sullivan, near Birmingham meeting-house, so that Sullivan received the attack on his front. Yet, in spite of this, the superiority of the British in discipline gave them the advantage in the desperate fight that ensued, and Cornwallis succeeded in pushing Sullivan obliquely toward the village of Dilworth. If this movement had been completed it would have cut the American army in two and utterly routed it; but it was foiled by the generalship of Greene in executing Washington's prompt orders to stop the dangerous gap. Greene was in command of the reserve, stationed on a lofty eminence a little in the rear of Wayne, who commanded the centre behind Chadd's ford. On receiving Washington's order he marched his brigade five miles in forty-five minutes, and, connecting with Sullivan near Dilworth, averted the impending destruction of the army. Wayne had time to withdraw the centre, and Armstrong the right wing, in good order; and so the whole army was united at Chester in excellent condition. Careless writers have sometimes vaguely described the American army as “routed” at the battle of the Brandywine, and this notion has crept into text-books of American history. An army cannot properly be said to be “routed” when it is ready to renew the fight next day. The best commentary on the battle of the Brandywine is furnished by the fact that, while it was fought on 11 Sept., it was not until the 26th of that month that Gen. Howe reached Philadelphia. This delay was due to Washington's skilful manœuvring; but the best of generals cannot manœuvre and detain the enemy with an army that has just been routed. The reason why the Americans were not routed at the Brandywine is to be found in Greene's memorable double-quick march to Dilworth, and the admirable manner in which he sustained the languishing fight at that critical point.
On 26 Sept., Gen. Howe, having eluded Washington on the Schuylkill, entered Philadelphia, stationing the bulk of his army at Germantown, and on 4 Oct. the battle of Germantown was fought. Greene's division, moving in a circuitous course to attack the front of the British right wing, delayed by the difficulties of the route, and a mistake of his guide, did not get to the field as early as was planned, and Wayne accidentally occupied the ground assigned it. When victory seemed imminent an unfortunate mishap turned the tide, and Gen. Greene again, with wonderful skill, covered the retreat. The army went into winter quarters at Valley Forge, Greene meanwhile crossing to the west bank of the Delaware to oppose Cornwallis's march for its occupation; but he prudently retired on learning the unequal strength and resources of the opposing forces. The defective organization and administration of the quartermaster-general's department had been, from the beginning of the war, a source of embarrassment to the army; and, at the earnest solicitation of Washington, Greene accepted, in March, 1778, the office of quartermaster-general, reserving his right to command on the field of battle. On 18 June the British evacuated Philadelphia and took up the line of march through the Jerseys. Greene and Hamilton urged giving them battle, and on 28 June a general attack was made on Clinton's forces at Monmouth Court-House. Gen. Charles Lee commanded the advanced corps, Stirling the left, and Greene the right wing of the American forces. Lee, who had frowned upon the plan of opposing Clinton's march, disgraced himself on the day of battle by dilatory and disobedient conduct. After the battle, Clinton continued his retreat to New York, and Washington, marching northward, crossed the Hudson and encamped in Westchester county. After the battle, Greene, taking no time for rest, immediately attended to the numerous orders and dispositions required of him as quartermaster-general.
On the arrival of Count d'Estaing with the French fleet, it was determined to make a combined attack on Newport. Greene, from local interest, wished to take part in the expedition, and in August took up his quarters with one division of the army at Tiverton. The designs of the allies failed through a variety of mishaps, chief among which was the disablement of the French fleet by a tremendous gale. Shortly afterward Greene went to Philadelphia, at the request of the commander-in-chief, to give information of the late expedition, and the causes of its failure, to congress, and there he was received with distinguished consideration. The year 1779 was inactive and uneventful, the Americans held the line of the Hudson, and the operations of the enemy were confined to burning defenceless towns on the coasts of Connecticut and Virginia. Greene found abundant labor in his difficult and annoying duties as quartermaster-general. The delays of congress in providing for a systematic method of raising supplies caused the greatest annoyance. The winter of 1780 was one of great suffering to the Americans for the want of proper shelter and lack of food. A general defection of the troops was threatened, and Knyphausen, learning of it, and hoping to deal a decisixe blow, hastened from Staten Island, and on 7 July, 1780, took possession of Elizabethtown, and burned the village of Connecticut Farms, but was driven back from Springfield to the coast, where he tarried until Clinton's arrival from the south. Washington had proceeded northward with his main body, leaving Greene, with Maxwell's and Stark's brigades, Lee's corps,
