with which we are acquainted, no sense can be wanting; and Cuvier[1] adopted a similar argument to prove that no animal, unknown to Zoology, remains to be discovered.
Note 2, p. 132. And this we are able to do, &c.]
This passage is elliptical and obscure; but, as "the rela-
tive is too closely connected with the example something
sweet to admit of being separated," it may imply that the
sight may, by colour and refraction, determine the quality
of a particular fluid. But, as no sense can judge, excepting
indirectly, of compound qualities, the perception of such
is accidental, a kind of guess, that is, just as it would be
in the case of a fair individual, in the example of Cleon's
son.
Note 3, p. 133. The senses, however, do perceive casu-
ally, &c.] This passage remains, according to its wording,
unintelligible, notwithstanding the attention bestowed upon
it by commentators, because of the difficulty of attaching
any sense to the assumption, that the senses can become
as one. The comment "si unum et idem uno et eodem
tempore a diversis sensibus percipitur, ni sensus in unum
coalescunt," assumes but does not shew that the senses can
so coalesce, and then judge of impressions made upon them
individually. And thus here again is required a central
organ, the common origin of the perceptive power of the
senses, to which all impressions are to be referred and by
which they are to be compared; and such an organ is the
brain. But still, from the moment that we judge of more
- ↑ Discours sur les Revolutions de la terre, 66-67.
