here; for, independently of the abstruse nature of all mental processes, there is, evidently about it, confusion, arising from the assumption of a something associated with sensibility, which the brain only could rectify.
Note 4, p. 160. The point and every analogous division, &c.] With respect to quantity[1], in relation to indivisibility, "a point which has position, (καὶ θέσιν ἔχον στιγμή) is indivisible, but a line is divisible in one, surface in two, and body in several directions;" and by privation is implied that the point is without length, depth, or breadth; the line without either breadth or depth; and the surface without depth. It is obvious, from what has been said, that every affirmation or negation must, as depending upon sentient impressions, be either true or false; but that the judgment, when deciding upon essential or abiding qualities, may be true, and that, when drawing its inferences from accidental qualities or relations of bodies, it may be erroneous.
CHAPTER VII.
Note 1, p. 165. Images belong, naturally, to the thinking principle, &c.] This very suggestive comparison between intellectual and sentient perceptions, seems, even in the absence of knowledge of the brain, to assume that
- ↑ Metaphysica, IV. 6. 24.
