derstand one another. This may be put to the actual test if any one is curious to prove it. Let any man teach a parrot to say "I" (it meaning thereby itself), and we pledge ourselves to unwrite all that we have written upon this topic. [1]
We have now, then, brought this question to a conclusion; besides having opened up slightly and incidentally a few collateral views connected with other problems, we have returned a distinct answer to the question — When does consciousness come into operation? Sensation, passion, reason, &c., all exist as soon as the human being is born, but consciousness only comes into existence when he has originated within him the notion and the reality denoted by the word "I." Then only does he begin to exist for himself. In our next paper we shall proceed to the discussion of the most important, but at the same time most difficult, question in all psychology — How does consciousness come into operation?
WHIG PRACTICES AND WHIG PROFESSIONS.
It is usual for statesmen and philosophers, in considering the position and prospects of a country, to search in the history of bygone times for circumstances analogous to those in which they feel themselves placed; and thus, very frequently, with the page of experience opened before them, they are supplied with beacons, and landmarks, and warnings, to aid them in the task of regulating the national affairs. But now, all speculators and rulers may search in vain for any records of a time similar to the present. There may have been seasons of more urgent peril, and periods of deeper gloom; there may have been eras of more misfortune, and times of greater distress; but never in the whole history of man was there an age of such vast importance, and of such manifest transitions, in which the controllers of popular destinies were more insignificant in their talents, and more unworthy of their charge. We look around us and see elements at work of the most powerful nature, principles at work of the most cogent force, and passions aroused of the strongest description; but those who are doomed to " ride on the whirlwind and direct the storm" are partakers of little of the energy of the time, and are feeble instruments in feeble hands. It is indeed marvellous to behold, at a period when mighty interests are at stake and mighty minds are wanted to uphold them, the great intellectual lords of the creation, excluded by a faction from influence and authority, and excluded thus in order to keep in positions they are not qualified to fill the trembling puppets of a corrupt court. We -much doubt if there be now a man in Britain of acknowledged mental superiority — if there be a single man whose name will float down the rushing stream of time, who possesses any direct influence on the national councils, or any weight in the management of public affairs.
- ↑ It will not do to say that man is capable of forming the notion expressed by the word "I," in consequence of the reason with which he has been endowed, and that the parrot and other animals are not thus capable of forming it in consequence of their inferior degree of intelligence. We have treated of this point at some length in the first part of our discussion. Let us now, however, make one remark on the subject. It is plain that an increase or a deficiency of reason can only cause the creature in which it operates to accomplish its ends with greater or less exactness and perfection. Reason in itself runs straight, however much its volume may be augmented. Is it said that this consciousness, this self-reference, this reflex fact denoted by the word "I," is merely a peculiar inflection which reason takes in man, and which it does not take in animals? True; but the smallest attention shows us that reason only takes this peculiar inflection in consequence of falling in with the fact of consciousness: so that instead of reason accounting for consciousness, instead of consciousness being the derivative of reason, we find that it is consciousness which meets reason, and gives it that peculiar turn we have spoken of, rendering it and all its works referable to ourselves. It is not, then, reason which gives rise to consciousness, but it is the prior existence of consciousness which makes reason human reason.
