tenuated substance called "mind," endowed with certain passive susceptibilities as well as with various active powers; and this hypothetical substance, together with all the false facts and foolish problems it brings along with it, has been permitted to maintain its place, almost without challenge, in all our schools of philosophy down to the present hour; so completely has psychological science in general taken the colour and imbibed the spirit of physical research.
"Ut multis nota est naturæ causa latentis!
At sua qui noscat pectora rarus adest"
It is time, however, that this substance, and the doctrines and facts taught in connexion with it, were tested in a more rigorous and critical spirit—not, indeed, upon their own account, but on account of those greater and more important truths whose places they have usurped. How, then, do we propose testing this substance? In this way. The word "mind" is exceedingly remote and ambiguous, and denotes—nobody knows what. Let us then substitute in place of it that much plainer expression which everybody makes use of, and in some degree, at least, understands—the expression "I" or "me"—and let us see how mind, with its facts and doctrines, will fare when this simple, unpretending, and unhypothetical word is employed in its place.
"External objects take effect upon mind, and perception is the result." This doctrine lies at the very threshold of our ordinary metaphysics, and forms the foundation-stone upon which their whole superstructure is erected. But is it true? Let us come to a more distinct understanding of it by changing it into the following statement, and we shall see what gross though deep-lurking falsities are brought to light by the alteration. Let us say "external objects take effect upon me, and perception is the result." We now then ask, To what period of our life is this proposition meant to have reference? Does the philosopher of "mind" answer that it may be applied to us during any period, from first to last, of our existence? Then we tell him, in return, that, in that case, the doctrine is certainly false, for it is not the fact that things take effect upon "me" at the birth or during the earlier years of that particular Being which afterwards becomes "I,"—there being at that time no "me" at all in the case—no "me" for things to take effect upon,—as was proved in the preceding problem, where it was shown that no man is born conscious, or, in other words, that no man is born "I." It is true that things take effect, from the very first, upon that particular Being which, after a time and after a certain process, becomes "I." But this particular Being was not "I" at its birth, or until a considerable time after it had elapsed, and, therefore, the proposition, "things take effect upon me," is seen to be untrue when applied to one period of human life at least, and thus the ego, or that which, in the case of each individual man, is "I;" or, in other words, his true Being, is liberated from the control of the law of causality, during the earlier stages at least of his existence, in the most conclusive and effectual way possible—namely, by showing that at that time this "I" has no manner of existence or manifestation whatsoever.
Does the philosopher of mind, giving up this point, maintain that the proposition quoted has, at any rate, a true and intelligible application to us in our grown or advanced condition? Then we tell him that, in that case, the affirmation, or dogma, is altogether premature, because, before it can be admitted, he is bound to explain to us how the particular Being given and contemplated, which was not "I" or "me" at first, became converted into "me." Before any subsequent averment connected with this "me" can be listened to, it is, first of all, incumbent upon him, we say, to point out to us how this conversion is brought about—to explain to us the origin and significance of this "I"—the circumstances out of which it arose, for, as we have already said, the particular Being which now appropriates it was certainly not sent into the world a born or ready-made "I."
Suppose, then, that the metaphysician should say that this Being becomes "I" under the law of causality, and beneath the action of the external objects which produce impressions upon it,—then we would like to know how it happened that these outward objects, which induced the human Being's sensations at the very first, did not cause
