Page:Breaking the Hindenburg Line.djvu/113

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The Battle of Ramicourt
93

bank, must get out their orders, and the battery commanders sitting in shell-holes must work out, by fitful candle-light, their barrage tables. A telephone exchange must be established at Brigade Headquarters and some miles of telephone lines laid to batteries.

All this must take place in absolute darkness, working every minute against time, while the enemy is scattering gas shells over the whole area. It needs little imagination, therefore, to realize the immense difficulties and the thousand chances that fate may oppose to the achievement of the result aimed at.

The fact that good positions were selected and all Brigades, except the 232nd Army Field Artillery Brigade, were able to open fire up to time reflects the greatest credit on the energy and good leadership of the commanding officers, and on the zeal with which their orders were carried out by all subordinate officers and by the rank and file of the Brigades.

The Brigade above mentioned was at a considerable distance from Divisional Headquarters and was not at the time in communication with the latter by telephone. Orders did not, therefore, reach its commander until very late, and at zero hour this Brigade was still moving, though it came into action shortly afterwards.

The barrage to be fired by the Field Artillery was naturally of a somewhat impromptu nature, as no time was available for the issue of elaborate time-tables and barrage maps. Everything possible was done, however, to ensure accurate firing, and the precaution referred to above, that of throwing the initial barrage some distance in front of the Infantry, enabled the latter to conform to any slight irregularities. The reports of all ranks who advanced under it, indeed, show that, though there was slightly more short shooting than usual, the barrage as