problem the 46th Division was destined to play a glorious and decisive part.
The General Staff, who, under instructions from the IX Corps, had planned the attack, and who had better means of estimating such doubtful features as the moral of the forces opposed to us and the general disposition of the enemy's forces, may have been confident of success. Many, however, who could only judge from direct observation of the enemy's positions, or from aeroplane photographs, were of opinion that the Division had been given an impossible task.
At the best it seemed likely that the efforts and sacrifices of the 46th Division might pin down the enemy on the Bellenglise front, and attract his reserves, whilst the Americans and Australians broke through on the left, where they were faced with no natural obstacle.
If this northern attack succeeded, the resultant pressure on the enemy's front to the north might then save the situation on the Bellenglise front, and enable the 46th Division to get forward at a later period.
The sequel was to show which of these opinions was justified, and incidentally to admit for ever the claim of the 46th Division to be classed with what the Germans would call “Sturmtruppen.”
On the 12th September, 1918, after fifteen months of almost continuous defensive warfare, the Division moved from the Bethune area to the neighbourhood of Beaucourt sur l'Hallue and passed into G.H.Q. reserve for a few days' rest and training before proceeding into action near the southern limit of the British front.
On the 21st September, after one or two days in the Tertry area, where the Division was still in reserve while the various Commanders were reconnoitring their future area and the various preparations for the hand-over were
