of the thickening of the mist due to the smoke from the shells, which soon produced an impenetrable fog. Keeping direction in an early-morning attack is a sign of good leadership at the best of times, but on this foggy day—when, even behind the lines so far back as Divisional Headquarters, officers and men were wandering about in vain endeavour to find their way—it required positive genius to succeed in leading straight to prearranged objectives. A certain amount of confusion did result from this fact, but fortunately the very nature of the obstacles to be encountered helped the advancing troops, and the Brigade fell upon the first-line trenches in fair order and fleshed their bayonets, killing most of the garrison, who, to do them justice, in spite of the barrage and their surprise at the unexpected attack, put up a stout enough resistance. Taking this first system of trenches in their stride and leaving stray Germans and individual strong-points to be dealt with by the mopping-up parties of the supporting companies, the Staffordshire men, with barely a pause to reorganize, swept on to the banks of the Canal well up to time, whilst the 1st Division, in accordance with Corps orders for the battle, formed a strong defensive right flank from our original trenches along the spur towards Bellenglise.
The enemy barrage fell on our trenches five minutes after the troops had left, showing that, while his batteries were on the alert, no particular attack had been expected. By that time, our troops were fighting in the enemy outpost line, and suffered very few casualties from his shells. His Artillery Command, however, were quick to realize that their guns were not likely to do much to hinder our attack unless the range was shortened, and, before our troops were over the Canal, they took the risk of shooting down their
