And then DEA was assigned to be, sort of, like, 24 hours behind. They had special operations teams, but we wanted them to be slightly in reserve, so that if we had deploy everyone on day one, we had fresh officers to step in on day two. So DEA was on, like, a 24-hour lag behind everyone else.
But they all had a significant number of special operators designated to support whatever was going to happen on January 6th.
Q I want to draw your attention to exhibit 31, which is a memo from the Bureau of Prisons to obtain the Deputy Attorney General's approval or disapproval essentially for staffing for January 6th.
A Yes, I see it.
Q Would you or anyone in senior leadership at DOJ have received this from the other components? In other words, would there be paperwork to reflect the staffing and resources that were provided by DOJ's components for January 6th?
A Not for all of them, because it is driven by their statutory authority. So BOP, since they are generally limited to BOP institutions, they would not have general Title 18 authority to, like, make street arrests, so they had to be deputized to perform those functions. An FBI agent, who has inherently Title 18 authority because of their position, would not need a deputization. So there were some that needed it, some that did not.
These BOP operators were brought into Washington specifically to protect the DOJ headquarters, because we wanted to make sure that we did not draw resources away from any other law enforcement agency to protect our own building. Obviously, the Department was a potential target as well, because a lot of people were very upset with the Department and of the view that the Department hasn't done what it should do with regard to the election.
