1775-82] Causes of American success. 23o fought against troops who knew no formation but close order. Of all the British commanders, Ferguson was the only one who methodically adapted his tactics to the special conditions of the country. On the American side colonial life was specially fitted to develop that versatility and self-reliance which are so important in the irregular warfare suited to a half-reclaimed country, where it is impossible to employ troops in large masses. The Americans had always a reserve of civilians who under the pressure of local invasion became effective combatants. The one counterbalancing defect in the American system which enabled the British to prolong the struggle was the short period of enlistment. This was aggravated by the fact that the several colonies offered to their local forces higher pay than Congress did, and thus hindered the process of recruiting for the general continental army. Where invasion had to be repelled from a particular district, there was no lack of zeal ; but when an American commander undertook connected operations on a large scale, as Washington did against Howe in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, or Greene against Cornwallis in South Carolina, he was liable to be perpetually hampered by defections, and by the impossibility of reckoning with certainty on the number of soldiers at his disposal. On the other hand the Americans enjoyed a great advantage over their opponents, in that they were practically fighting with a number of moveable bases. An American army situated as Burgoyne's was would have broken up, dispersed and become available for future service. The British were fighting with one base the ocean. It is at this point that the supreme value of the French alliance comes in. As we have seen, the actual co-operation of the French never became effective till the very last act of the drama. But the presence of a French naval force in the West Indies was a factor of vast importance. It distracted British operations by sea, and compelled Great Britain to devote to the protection of the Islands those resources which might have been used to maintain communications with the force in America. Nor must it be forgotten that a European coalition was gradually formed to assist the revolted colonies. The relations of the United States with France brought as a consequence, not indeed the alliance, but the help of Spain. The Spanish government at first declined to enter into direct communication with the revolted colonies, and was with difficulty persuaded to take any part in the quarrel. But ultimately French diplomacy prevailed. In April, 1779, a treaty was signed between Spain and France, which committed the former Power to hostility with England ; and in the following June Spain declared war. In the next year (1780) a league of the Baltic kingdoms was formed on the initiative of Catherine of Russia, and accepted by Denmark and Sweden. It was entitled the Armed Neutrality, and had for its main object the practical enforcement of the principle that the vessels of a neutral Power might carry without molestation goods belonging to the subjects of a belligerent. CH. VII.
