Page:Cambridge Modern History Volume 7.djvu/321

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page needs to be proofread.

178?] Various modes. Rotation. 289 by foreign powers. The State judiciaries could not be thought of. The choice then lay between appointment by electors chosen by the people and an immediate election by the people. He thought the first was free from many of the objections urged, and far preferable to appointment by the national legislature. The electors chosen would meet at once and proceed immediately to an appointment, so that there would be little chance for cabal or corruption. This mode had however been rejected so recently by the Convention that it could hardly be proposed again. He passed therefore to election immediately by the people. That, he believed, would be the best mode. He would notice but two objections ; first, the disposition of people to prefer a citizen of their own State, and hence the disadvantage to which the smaller States would be exposed. This objection he thought less important than objections to other modes; and it might be obviated. The second arose from the disproportion of voters in the northern and southern States, and the consequent disadvantage to the latter. The answer was, first, that this disproportion would be continually decreasing, and secondly, that local considerations must give way to the general welfare. Ellsworth's motion was hereupon lost; four States favouring, seven opposing it. Charles Pinckney then moved that election by the national legislature be qualified with a proviso, that no person should be eligible to the executive office for more than six in any twelve years. The motion was favoured by Mason and Gerry, and opposed by Gouverneur Morris. Morris was against rotation in office (this was a popular watchword), in every form; rotation was a school in which the scholars, not the masters, governed. The evils to be guarded against were, first, the undue influence of the legislature, secondly, the instability of counsel, thirdly, misconduct in office. To guard against the first, they ran into the second ; rotation produced instability ; change of men was followed by change of measures. They had seen it in Pennsylvania ; Rehoboam would not imitate Solomon. Nor would rotation prevent intrigue and dependence upon the legislature. The magistrate would look forward to the time, however distant, when he would be re-eligible. Finally, to avoid the third evil, impeachments would be necessary another reason against election by the legislature. He favoured election by the people, and next, the suggestion of Wilson, that it should be by electors chosen by lot from the legislature. A motion was now made that the people should elect the executive upon the plan of each man voting for three candidates. One, it was suggested, would probably be from the voter's own State, the other two from other States ; and thus the small States would not be at a dis- advantage. The plan was favoured by Gouverneur Morris and Madison, and opposed by Gerry. The motion was lost ; five States voting aye r six nay. Then Charles Pinckney 's motion was rejected, also by a majority of one. The resolution in regard to the executive, except the part C. M. H. VII. CH. VIII. 19