Page:Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent Buckley.djvu/350

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COUNCIL OF LYONS.
317

of the kind, and thus that the matter did not devolve by appeal upon the same archbishop or his official: let the same (unless it first be evident to them that the cause itself was laid wholly before them) not presume to prevent them from proceeding in that cause, or [from going on] to the execution of the sentence.

But if it be objected that the appeal laid arose from an unjust cause, or from one not altogether legitimate before the sentence, and in consequence thereof that no such appeal is to be admitted; the aforesaid archbishop or his official cannot prevent them from proceeding in the cause, unless the appeal being first received, as arising from a probable cause, they begin to learn regarding such a cause whether it be true. But if it be said that the appeal was made after sentence in cases not interfered with by law (as after sentence pronounced on a manifest and notorious crime, or one to which the party has confessed), or in such like, they may prevent the sentence being carried into execution (after they have begun to take cognizance whether the appeal interposed by him is to be received or not). Against another also, who makes any attempt after their inhibition regarding the matter in dispute between the appellant and his adversary, they cannot claim any jurisdiction to themselves on an occasion of this kind. But when he who sends forth the voice of appeal on any cause to the court of Rheims, he must, nevertheless, submit in other causes to the jurisdiction of his ordinary; let not the archbishop of Rheims or his official interfere with his jurisdiction in other cases, so as entirely to take such appellant from the power of the same ordinary. But the appeal ought to be made to them from the bishops of the aforesaid province relative to causes in which they exercise temporal jurisdiction, unless perchance it may be necessary to appeal to another, by custom or privilege, or some other special right. Sentences also of interdict, or of suspension, or excommunication, promulged against an appellant by him from whom it is supposed to appeal, are by no means to be revoked and declared null and void, unless the parties be summoned, and the appeal be duly taken cognizance of. But when an appeal has been made before sentence to the archbishop of Rheims from the audience of his suffragan on any cause, let