PROBABILISM
445
PROBABILISM
aside bj' authoritative decisions or by unanswered
arguments.
IV. Moral Systems Opposed to Probabiusm. — A. /Equiprobabilism. — This system can be expressed in the tliree following propositions:
(1) The opinions for and against the existence of a law having equal or nearl}' equal probabilities, it is permissible to act on the less safe opinion.
(2) The opinions for and against the cessation of a law having equal or nearly equal probabilities, it is not permissible to act on the less safe opinion.
(3) The safe opinion being certainly more probable than the less safe opinion, it is unlawful to follow the less safe opinion.
With the first of these propositions Probabilists agree; but they deny the truth of the second and third propositions (cf. IVtarc, "Institutiones Morales", I, nn. 91-103).
Arguments for ^^^quiprobabilism: (1) In proof of their first proposition ^-Equiprobabilists quote the axiom: lex dubia non obligat. When the opposing probabilities are equal or nearly equal, the law is doubtful in the strict sense, and a doubtful law im- poses no obligation in conscience. They also apply the rule: in dubio melior est conditio possidentis. '^Tien the doubt regards the existence, as distinguished from the cessation of a law, liberty is in possession, and accordinglj' the opinion which favours liberty can be followed in practice.
(2) In proof of their second proposition, ^Equi- probabilists quote the same a.xiom: in dubio melior est conditio possidentis. When the doubt concerns the cessation of a law, the law is in possession, and there- fore the law must be obser\-ed until it is displaced by a stronger probability in favour of liberty.
Probabilists reply to this argument that libertj' is always in possession, since law and obligation pre- suppose Uberty in the subject.
(3) In proof of their third proposition ^quiprob- abiUsts put forward various arguments, of which the following are the most forcible:
(a) A person is bound serioush- to endeavour to bring his actions into harmony with objective moral- ity. But a person who follows the less probable opinion in favour of liberty fails to observe this dictate of prudence, and consequently acts unlawfully (cf. Wouters, "De Minusprobabilismo", p. 71).
Probabilists reply that this argument, if carried to its logical conclusion, would end in Rigorism, because the onl}' way efficiently to bring our actions into per- fect harmony with objective morality is to follow the safe opinion, so long as the less safe opinion has not acquired moral certainty. This is the only way of preventing all serious danger of committing material sin, and coiLsequently is the only way of observing perfect harmony with objective morality. Since, how- ever. Rigorism is universally condemned, the argu- ment must be rejected, and the principles of Proba- bilism must be adopted which hold that it is sufficient to observe harmony with objective morality in so far as this is known with moral certainty (cf. Lehmkuhl, "Theologia Moralis", I, n. 191).
(b) On 26 June, 1680, the Holy Office, under the presidency of Innocent XI, issued, in connexion with the teaching of Thyrsus Gonzalez, S.J., a Decree of which the authentic text was published 19 April, 1902, by the Secretary of the Holy Office. So much con- troversy has recently arisen in regard to the value of this decree, that it is opportune to quote the whole text: "A report ha\'ing been made by Father Laurea of the contents of a letter directed by Father Thyrsus Gonzalez, S.J., to Our Most Holy Lord; the Most Eminent Lords said that the Secretary of State must write to the Apostolic Nuncio of the Spains [directing him] to signify to the said Feather Thyrsus that His Holiness, having received his letter favourably, and having read it with approval, has commanded that he
[Thyrsus] shall freely and fearlessly preach, teach, and
defend with his pen the more probable opinion, and
also manfully attack the opinion of those who assert
that in a conffict of a less probable opinion with a
more probable, known and estimated as such, it is
allowed to follow the less probable; and to inform
him that whatever he does and writes on behalf of the
more probable opinion will be pleasing to His HoH-
ness.
" Let it be enjoined upon the Father General of the Society of Jesus, as by order [de ordine] of His Holi- ness, not only to permit the Fathers of the Society to write in favour of the more probable opinion and to attack the opinion of those who assert that in a con- flict of a less probable opinion with a more probable, known and estimated as such, it is allowed to follow the less probable; but also to write to all the Univer- sities of the Society [informing them] that it is the mind of His Holiness that whosoever chooses may freely write in favour of the more probable opinion, and may attack the aforesaid contrary [opinion]; and to order them to submit entirely to the command of His Holiness".
^EquiprobabUists say that in this Decree there is a clear ex-pression of the mind of Innocent XI about the morality of teaching that it is permissible to act on the less safe opinion when the safe opinion is cer- tainly more probable. The pope disapproves of this teaching, commends Father Gonzalez for his opposi- tion to it, and orders the General of the Jesuits to allow full liberty so that anyone who pleases may write against it.
Probabilists reply that, though Innocent XI was opposed to Probabilism, his official Decree merely com- manded that liberty of teaching be allowed to the members of the order. Moreover, they point out that Gonzalez was not an J^^quiprobabiUst, but a Prob- abiliorist of a strict type whom St. Alphonsus re- garded as an extremist.
B. Probabiliorism. — According to the teaching of Probabiliorists, it is unlawful to act on the less safe opinion unless it is also the more probable opinion. In addition to an argument derived from the Decree of Innocent XI, the principal arguments for Probabil- iorism are the following:
(1) It is not lawful to follow the less safe opinion, unless it is truly and expeditely probable. But an opinion which is opposed by a more probable opinion is not truly and expeditely probable, since its argu- ments are annulled by more potent opposing argu- ments and cannot in consequence gain the assent of a prudent man. Hence it is not lawful for a person to follow the less safe opinion when he regards the safe opinion as more probable.
As has already been ex-plained in connexion with Probabilism, Probabilists maintain that the less safe opinion does not necessarily' lose its solid probability because of more probable opposing arguments. This being so, the law is not certain, and consequently does not impose an obligation in regard to action, even though in regard to speculative assent it is rightly looked on as more probable.
(2) As in speculative doubt we are boimd to give assent to the view which is more likelj" to exclude error, so in practical doubt about lawfulness we are bound to adopt the opinion which is more Ukely to exclude the danger of material sin. But the more probable opinion is the more Ukely to exclude this danger. Consequently in practical doubt we are bound to adopt the Probabiliorist view. Probabihsts reply that this argument leads to Tutiorism rather than to Probabiliorism, because the only efficacious way of excluding reasonable danger of material sin is to act on the safe opinion so long as the less safe opinion is not morally certain. Moreover, Probabil- iorism would impose an intolerable burden on the con- sciences of timorous minds, since it would demand an
