SCIENCE
599
SCIENCE
(4) The medi(!;il and biological sciences have oc-
casioned serious discussion concerning the existence
of the human soul, its spirituahty and immortality,
its difference from the vital principle in animals; the
phj'siological unity of mankind; the justification of
prevention and extinction of human life. In reality,
however, all these questions lie outside the domain
of medicine. (5) In natural sciences, especially nat-
ural philosophy, the points of contact are: — the cre-
ation of the world and of man (materialistic doc-
trines, eternity of matter, absolute necessity of natural
laws, impossibility of miracles. Darwinian origin of
man); the Deluge, its existence and ethnographical
universality. The mathematical and experimental sci-
ences, also known as exact sciences, have no con-
tact whatever with faith, although at one time, it
was erroneously believed that the geocentric system
was contained in the Bible. The celestial phenomena
mentioned in the Scripture, like the star of the magi,
the solar eclipse during the Paschal full moon, the
stars falling from heaven as forerunners of the Last
Judgment, are aU of the miraculous kind and beyond
the laws of nature.
II. Legitimate Freedom. — Legitimate freedom is needed for science as well as for any human develop- ment. The only questions are these: what is legiti- mate freedom, and what are its limitations? (1) Science comprises two functions: researcli and teach- ing, (a) The object of scientific researc^h is practically indefinite in extent and can never be exhausted by the human mind. In this field there is more freedom than has ever been claimed. Compared to its field, the progress of science appears small, so much so, that the greatest progress seems to consist in the knowledge of how little we know. This was the conclusion ar- rived at by Socrates, Newton, Humboldt, and so many others. The very instruments teach this lesson: the deeper the microscope descends into the secrets of nature and the higher the telescopic power reaches into the heavens, the vaster appears the ocean of un- discovered truths. This ought to be kept in mind, when the progress of science is loudly proclaimed. There has never been a general progress of all sciences; it was always progress in some branches, often at the cost of others. In our own days natural, medical, and historical sciences advance rapidly in comparison with past ages; at tlio s;im(> time the philosophical sciences fall just as rai)idly behind the early ages. The science of law owes its foundat ion to the ancient world. Some of the theological sciences reached their height in the early part of tho Middle Ages, others towards the be- ginning of the seventeenth century, (b) By teaching is here understood every diffusion of knowledge, by word or print, in school or museum, in pubhc or private. Progress and the freedom necessary for it are as much to be desired in teaching as in research. There is a doctrinal freedom, a pedagogical freedom, and a professional freedom. Doctrinal freedom regards the doctrine itself which is taught; pedagogical free- dom, the manner in which science is diffused among scholars or the general public; professional freedom, the persons who do the teaching. Science claims freedom of teaching in all these respects.
(2) It has to be seen whether there are limitations to research and teaching and what these limitations are. All things in this world may be considered from a triple point of view: from the logical, the physical, and the ethical. Applied to science we discover limi- tations in all three, (a) Logically science is limited by truth, which belongs to its very essence. Knowl- edge of things cannot be had from their causes, unless the knowledge be true. False knowledge cannot be derived from the causes of things; it has its origin in some spurious source. Should science ever have to choose between truth and freedom (a choice not at all imaginary), it must under all circumstances decide for truth, under penalty of self-annihilation. As long
as the case is thus put theoretically, there is no differ-
ence of opinion. Yet in practice, it is almost hopeless
to reconcile conflicting sentiments. When, in 1901,
a vacant chair at the University of Strasburg was to
be filled by a Catholic historian, Mommsen pub-
lished a protest, in which he exclaimed: "A sense of
degradation is pervading German university circles".
On that occasion he coined the shibboleth "vorausset-
zungslos", and claimed that scientific research must
be "without presuppositions". The same cry was
raised by Harnack (1908) when he demanded "un-
bounded freedom for research and knowledge". The
demand was formulated a little more precisely by the
congress of academicians in Jena (1908). Their claim
for science was "freedom from every view foreign to
scientific methods".
In the latter formula the claim has a legitimate meaning, viz., that unscientific views should not in- fluence the results of science. In the meaning of Mommsen and Harnack, however, the claim is illog- ical in a double sense. First, there can be no "science without presuppositions". Every scientist must ac- cept certain truths dictated by sound reason, among others, the truth of his own existence and of a world outside of himself; next, that he can recognize the external world through the senses, that a reasoning power is given to him for understanding the impres- sions received, and a will power free from physical constraint. As a philosopher, he reflects upon these truths and explains them on scientific methods, but will never prove all of them without involving himself in vi(!ious circles. Whatever science he chooses he has to build it upon the natural or philosophical pre- suppositions on which his life as man rests. The fact is that every positive science borrows from philosophy a number of established principles.
So much for the general premises. They alone would show how illogical is the claim for "science without presuppositions". But this is not all. Each science has its own particular presuppositions or ax- ioms, distinct from its own conclusions, just as every building has its foundation, distinct from its walls and roof. Nay, the various branches of any special sci- ence have all their own proper presuppositions. Eu- clid's geometry is built upon three kinds of presup- positions. He calls them definitions, postulates, and common notions. The latter were called axioms by Pro(!lus. To show the difTerence between hypothesis and result no better example could be chosen than Eu- clid's fifth postulate of the first book. The postu- late says: ' When two straight fines are intersected by a third so as to make the inner adjacent angles on one side less than two right angles, the two lines, in- definitely prolonged, will intersect on the side of those lesser angles." By a mistake of Proclus (fifth century) the postulate was changed into a proposition. Innumerable attempts at proving the supposed proposition were made, until the error was recognized, only a century ago. The fifth postulate, or axiom of parallels as it is often called, proved to be a real hypothesis, distinct from all the other presuppositions. Non-euclidian geometries have been constructed by a simple change of the fifth postulate. All this shows that there is no geometry without presuppositions. And similarly, there is no algebra without presuppositions. Law starts from the existence of families and from their natural tendency towards association for common welfare. Medicine takes the human body as a living organism, subject to derangement, and the existence of reme- dies, before it constructs its science. History sup- poses human testimony to be, under certain condi- tions, a reliable source of knowledge, before it begins its researches. Linguistic sciences, likewise, take it for granted that human languages are not constructed arbitrarily but evolved logically from a variety of cir- cumstances. Theology takes from philosophy a num-
