CONSENT
283
CONSENT
'■•liioh the consccrator anoints the paten twice with
holy chrism, from rim to rim, in the form of a cross,
and rubs the oils over the whole upper side of it, recit-
ing at the same time the consecratory form. The
same ceremony with a special address, prayer, and
form, is performed over the chalice, except that the
consccrator anoints the inside of the chalice twice from
rim to rim, and rubs the oil all over the inside of the
cup. The consccrator then recites a prayer in which
allusion is made to the symbolical meaning of the
chalice and paten, the former of which, according to
Benedict XIV (De Sacrificio Missa>, Sect, i, n.- 31),
represents the tomb in which tlie Ijody of Christ was
laid, and the latter the stone with which the tomb was
closed. Finally, he sjirinkles both vessels with holy
water, saying nothing.
It is difficult to determine when the Church began to consecrate clialices and patens. Some liturgists are of opinion that the custom of doing so goes back to the time of St. Sixtus I (d. 127), who, by a decree, forbade any other than those constituted in Sacred orders to touch the sacred vessels (Rom. Breviarj', 16 April). Even if this decree is authentic, it would probably only prove that the prohibition was made out of respect due to the vessels which contained the Sacred Species. Others refer to a passage of St. Ambrose (d. 397) in which he says that the rnso Ecclcsia: initiata may be sold for the relief of the poor. Commentators inter- pret iy^iiiata to mean not coiisecrata, but rather tisa, or vessels which had been used for the sacred mysteries. The ancient canons and decrees decide the material of which chalices and patens must be made, but they do not say a word of the consecration, although they treat of the consecration of churches, altars, bishops, etc.; hence we may conclude that chalices and patens were not consecrated by a special form before the thirteenth century.
Loss of Consecration. — The chalice and paten lose their consecration (1) when they are regilt; (2) when they become battered or broken to such an extent that it would be unbecoming to use them; (3) when the slightest slit or break apjiears in the chalice near the bottom ; not so, however, if the break be near the up- per part, so that without fear of spilling its contents consecration can take place in it; (4) when a break appears in the paten so large that particles may fall through it.
Bona, Rerum Liltirm'carum libri duo (Turin, 17-17-53); Martkne, Dc anliquU Kcdrsia: ritibus (Venice, 1753); Ber- NARn. Conns (le Hl'iTnii- rnmninc — Ic Ponlifical (Paris, 1902). I II; Ambergkr, raxlnmllhcoloaw (Ratisbon, 1884), II; Van DER Stappen, Sacrn Liturgia (Mechlin, 1902), III; ScHrLTE, Consecranda (New York, 1907); Uttini, Cqtso di Scienza Litur- gica (Bologna, 1904); Stella, Instituliones LiturgicfB (Rome, 1895).
A. J. SCHULTE.
Consent (in Canon Law), the deliberate agreement re<|uired of those concerned in legal transactions in order to legalize such actions. Words, deeds, writing, or .silence bear witness to the existence of this consent. Completeness of consent is gauged not so much by the preliminaries of transactions as by their ratification, which is the psychological development of incipient consent, and gives consistency to legal transactions. The consent nece.s.sary to constitute contracts must be internal, external, mutual, and deliberate. Some authorities claim that contracts formed without any intention on the p.art of the contracting parties to oblige themselves are valid ; others more rightly main- tain the contrary, since the ver\' essence of contracts embodies obligation. Consequently, whoever is vm- prepared to admit this obligation is in no position to make a contract. Two possible suppositions here present themselves. In the first the promise and in- tention of not a.ssuming any obligation concern the Bame object imder the same respect. Promises made in this w.ay are utterly meaningless. In the second supposition the promise and intention of waiving the
obligation refer to the same object under different
respects. In such cases it is necessary to ascertain
which of these two contrary tendencies of the will is
dominant. If the intention of making a contract
possess greater efficacy, the obligation thereunto cor-
responding unquestionably holds good. On the con-
trary, if the intention of accepting no obligation
prevail, no contract can be formed. Finally, if one
intention is just as efficacious as another, the forma-
tion of a contract would then involve quest for an
unattainable result. Contracts made by individuals
having absolutely no intention of abiding by the obli-
gation connected therewith are altogether invalid,
and the parties thus fictitiously contracting are bound
to indemnify those whose interests thereby suffer.
The contract in question must always be capable of
begetting an obligation. It is not impossible to find
genuine consent which is worthless for giving consis-
tency to contracts either because it is nviUified
beforehand by positive law or because it is the result
of error, fraud, or fear (see Contract).
Error affecting the very nature of the contract, or concerning the substance of the object in question or a naturally substantial quality of the object, or one considered indispensable by the contracting parties, vitiates consent and invalidates contracts. Error re- garding an accidental quality of the contract, or per- taining to the motive underlying the contract, or to its material object, is insufficient to vitiate consent or nullify contracts. In like manner fraud, whether in- troduced by one of the contracting parties or by an extern, for the sake of provoking consent in the other party, coimteracts consent as often as such fraud cir- cumscribes the nature of the contract, the substance of the object at stake, or a quality naturally substan- tiated in that object or esteemed as substantial by the one upon whom the fraud is perpetrated. As often as accitlental fraud induces another, in some measure, to consent, he is at liberty to rescind the contract, provided it is naturally dissoluble. In general, grave fear lawfully superinduced does not militate against consent in the will, and therefore renders contracts neither invalid nor rescindable. On the other hand, while fear unlawfully superinduced to extort consent does not invalidate contracts, it gives the intimidated party the liberty of rescinding them. According to the civillaw of the United States, no contract is binding without the mutual assent of both parties. They must a.ssent at the same time and to the same thing. This mutual assent consists of an offer by one party and its acceptance by another. When the offer is verbal, and the time allowed for acceptance is not mentioned, the offer must be immediately accepted to constitute a con- tract. In case the offer and acceptance arc written and pass through the mail, the contract is complete when the acceptance is mailed, provided the party accepting ha.s received no notice of the withdrawal of the offer before mailing his letter. As far as the validity of matrimony is concerned, genuine, internal, personal consent of both parties, covering the present and indi- cated by external signs, is unquestionably required. While internal consent must be complemented by some external manifestation, words are by no means necessary. The Congregation of the Inquisition (22 August, 1800) decided that marriages are entirely valid when the ceremony takes place in the presence of witnesses and according to the custom of the coun- try in a manner which indicates that the contracting p.artics here and now mutually agree to enter wedlock. At the same time, if one or both contracting parties iiave no present intention of marrj'ing in circumstances such as those outlined, they can make no marriage contract. The required matrimonial con.sent signi- fieil by proxy does not militate against the validity of the marriage contract. This consent must include the material object of the matrimonial contract, which material object is the mutual right of one party to the
