Virtue, of any kind, or in any sense; but must remain still horrid Depravity, notwithstanding any Fashion, Law, Custom or Religion, which may be ill and vitious it-self; but can never alter the eternal Measures, and immutable independent Nature of Worth and Virtue.
SECT. IV.
Upon the whole. As to those Creatures who are only capable of being mov'd by sensible Objects; they are accordingly good or vitious, as the sensible Affections stand with them. 'Tis otherwise in Creatures capable of framing rational Objects of moral Good. For in one of this kind, shou'd the sensible Affections stand ever so much amiss; yet if they prevail not, because of those other rational Affections spoken of; 'tis evident, the Temper still holds good in the main; and the Perfon is with justice esteem'd virtuous by all Men.
More than this. If by Temper any one is passionate, angry, fearful, amorous; yet resists these Passions, and notwithstanding the force of their Impression, adheres to Virtue; we say commonly in this case, that the Virtue is the greater: and we say well. Tho if that which restrains the Person, and holds him to a virtuous-like Behaviour, be no Affection towardsGoodness
