Page:China's national defense in the new era.pdf/18

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Figure 2: Operational Command Structure of the PLA


Building and improving the law-based supervision system. The Chinese military has established the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission (CMCDIC, also the CMC Supervision Commission, CMCSC) under the direct leadership of the CMC, and dispatched disciplinary inspection teams to the CMC functional organs and all TCs. It has set up the CMC Politics and Law Commission (CMCPLC) and established regional military courts and procuratorates. It has put into place the CMC Audit Office (CMCAO), reformed the audit-based oversight system, and implemented PLA-wide resident auditing. Thus, power is exercised in a way that decision-making, execution and supervision check each other and function in coordination.

Optimizing Size, Structure and Force Composition

Reform in size, structure and force composition is a pivotal step to optimizing military organizational structure and establishing a modern military force structure with Chinese characteristics. Following the instruction to optimize structures, develop new-type forces, adjust proportions and reduce sizes, the PLA is striving to transform from a quantity-and-scale model to that of quality and efficiency, as well as from being personnel-intensive to one that is S&T-intensive.

Adjusting scale and proportion, and restructuring force composition. 300,000 personnel have been cut to keep the total active force at 2 million. Reform measures have been taken to transfer more officer positions to non-commissioned officers and civilian staff, downsize the leading organs at all levels by reducing their subordinate sections, leadership hierarchies and staff, and streamline the institutions and personnel in arts, sports, press, publication, logistical support, medical facilities, depots, and educational and research institutes. Thus, the number of personnel in the leading organs at and above regiment level has been cut by about 25%, and that of non-combat units by almost 50%. The PLA has significantly downsized the active force of the PLAA, maintained that of the PLAAF at a steady number, moderately