afraid Lincoln would be anxious for peace, and I was afraid he would accept something that would be of advantage to the South, so I went to Washington and called upon him. I said to him, ’Mr. Lincoln, I come to know whether the public interest will permit you to explain to me what this Southern commission means. He went to his little secretary, and came out and handed me a little card as long as my finger and an inch wide, and on that was written, You will pass the bearer through the lines. A. LINCOLN.’ ’There,’ he said, ’that is all there is of it. Now, Blair thinks something can be done, but I don’t, but I have no objection to have him try his hand. He has no authority whatever but to go and see what he can do.’ "
All efforts to restrain Mr. Blair, or to prevent the Confederate President from making another attempt at negotiation, entirely failed. Notwithstanding all disadvantages he appointed a commission from which resulted the Hampton Roads conference, as history designates the informal conversation between the Confederate commissioners, as heretofore named, on the one part, and President Lincoln and Mr. Seward on the other part, which was held on board a United States steamer in Hampton Roads, February, 1865. It will be seen on review of the entire history of the event that the United States carefully and firmly held all advantages in the conference while admitting the commissioners to an interview. This is made evident by the following facts: It appears that Mr. Blair left Washington for Richmond without the privilege of a final conversation with the President which might give color to any rumor that he went by authority. Without credentials or instructions his visit to Richmond was to present his own plan, gain knowledge of the mind of Mr. Davis, ascertain the temper of Confederate leaders, and to close his work without committing Mr. Lincoln to anything whatever. The letters to himself which he procured from President Davis first, and next from President Lincoln, were dangerous
