burg, and advance to the open ground beyond Chancellorsville. He had already lost a day, and the day was very valuable to Lee. His troops moved forward, and Sykes and Hancock ran against and engaged McLaws and Anderson; and Slocum, commanding the Eleventh and Twelfth corps on the plank road, also engaged the Confederates. Sykes for a while drove McLaws back, but Anderson and Ramseur’s Carolinians came to his support and drove him back of Hancock, who advanced to strengthen the fight. Hancock and Slocum then both formed line. The position of each of these officers was good, being free from the undergrowth of the wilderness, and open enough for advantageous use of cavalry and artillery. "Suddenly," says Dodge, "every one concerned was surprised by an order from Hooker to withdraw again into the wilderness. Here may be said to have begun the certain loss of the campaign. The proceeding was absurd. . . . Hooker had come to the end of his mental tether. The march had taxed his powers to their limit."[1]
When the Federals retired, they were followed by the Confederate advance, but no more serious fighting took place that day. During the night the Federals in trenched themselves, as Hooker had, in spite of his numbers, resolved to fight a defensive battle. "It was evident," says General Lee in his report, "that a direct attack on the enemy would be attended with great difficulty and loss, in view of the strength of his position and his superiority of numbers. General Jackson was there fore sent with his corps, on the 2d, to assail the Federal right, held by General Howard with the Eleventh corps. Although Jackson’s men had just seen arduous service, they set out with great cheerfulness, and by 5 p. m. had reached the Federal right. "To cover Jackson s march, Lee at intervals during the day tapped at the lines in his front, principally where Hancock lay."
At 6 o clock, General Jackson advanced. D. H. Hill’s
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- ↑ Colonel Dodge: Boston Speech.
