Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v3.djvu/33

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Nicholas.]
VIRGINIA.
17

legislature successful. The House of Commons have succeeded also by withholding supplies; they can, by this power, put a stop to the operations of government, which they have been able to direct as they pleased. This power has enabled them to triumph over all obstacles; it is so important that it will in the end swallow up all others. Any branch of government that depends on the will of another for supplies of money, must be in a state of subordinate dependence, let it have what other powers it may. Our representatives, in this case, will be perfectly independent, being vested with this power fully. Another source of superiority is the power of impeachment. In England, very few ministers have dared to bring on themselves an accusation by the representatives of the people, by pursuing means contrary to their rights and liberties. Few ministers will ever run the risk of being impeached, when they know the king cannot protect them by a pardon. This power must have much greater force in America, where the President himself is personally amenable for his mal-administration; the power of impeachment must be a sufficient check on the President's power of pardoning before conviction. I think we may fairly conclude, that, if the House of Commons, in England, have been able to oppose, with success, a powerful hereditary nobility, and an hereditary monarch, with all the appendages of royalty, and immense powers and revenues, our federal House of Representatives will be able to oppose, with success, all attempts by a President, only chosen for four years, by the people, with a small revenue, and limited powers, sufficient only for his own support; and a Senate chosen only for six years, (one third of whom vacate their seats every two years,) accountable to the state legislatures, and having no separate interest from them or the people.

I now come to consider their responsibility to the people at large. The probability of their consulting most scrupulously the interests of their constituents must be self-evident; this probability will result from their biennial elections, whether they wish to be reëlected or not. If they wish to be reëlected, they will know that on their good conduct alone their reëlection will depend: if they wish not to be reëlected, they will not enter into a fixed combination against the people, because they return to the mass of the people, where they will participate in the disadvantages of bad laws.
vol. iii.3