Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v4.djvu/492

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476
Tariff.Hayne.
[1824,

to resort to theoretical speculations, as to the most convenient or profitable employments of industry, and that you can, by law, encourage certain pursuits and prohibit others, is to make this not merely a consolidated, but an unlimited government. If you can control and direct any, why not all the pursuits of your citizens? And if all, where is the limitation to your authority? Gentlemen surely forget that the supreme power is not in the government of the United States. They do not remember that the several states are free and independent sovereignties, and that all power not expressly granted to the federal government is reserved to the people of those sovereignties. When I say expressly delegated, I wish to be understood that no power can be exercised by Congress which is not expressly granted, or which is not clearly incident to such a grant. Now, when we call upon gentlemen to show their authority, they tell us it is derived from the authority to "regulate commerce." But are regulation and annihilation synonymous terms? Does one include the other? Or are they not rather opposites, and does not the very idea of regulation exclude that of destruction? I rejoice, sir, to find that gentlemen refer us to commerce; for the very clause which expressly confers the right to regulate commerce, by saying nothing of the regulation of manufactures, or of agriculture, or home industry, seems to demonstrate that they were intended to be put beyond our control, and to be reserved to the people of the states respectively.

But our opponents gravely inform us that this is a bill to levy imposts, and that it is, therefore, within the very letter of the Constitution. True sir, if imposts were the end and aim of the bill. But, surely, gentlemen will not attempt to justify a departure from the spirit, by an adherence to the letter, of the Constitution. Will they contend that we could, by law, adopt and enforce the Chinese policy, and, by virtue of our authority to regulate commerce, interdict all intercourse with foreign nations? And if you could not do that directly, can you accomplish the same thing indirectly, by levying such imposts as will produce the same result? It may be difficult to draw the exact line which divides the lawful exercise from the abuse of authority—where regulation ceases, and unconstitutional prohibition begins. But it is certain, if you have a right to prohibit the importation of cottons, and woolens, and cotton bagging, for the encouragement of domestic manufactures, you may, whenever you please, prohibit importations, and shut up your ports entirely. An embargo can only be justified as a branch of the war power, and I think no one will contend, at this day, that a general and perpetual embargo could be lawfully laid. If it be sufficient to adhere to the letter without regard to the spirit and intent of the Constitution, if we may use a power granted for one purpose for the accomplishment of another and very different purpose, it is easy to show that a constitution on parchment is worth nothing.

Orders of nobility, and a church establishment, might be created even under the power to raise armies. We are informed that in Russia military titles alone confer civil rank, and all the departments of the government are filled with generals and colonels, entitled to rank, and to pay, without actual command or liability to service. Now, suppose we were to follow the example of Russia, and should give rank and pay to a certain number of generals and chaplains, with total or qualified exemption from service; might we not easily build up orders of nobility, and a church establishment? Sir, this government was never established for the purpose of divesting the states of their sovereignty; and I fear it cannot long