In Convention.—On reconsideration of the vote rendering the executive reëligible a second time, Mr. MARTIN moved to reinstate the words, "to be ineligible a second time."
Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS. It is necessary to take into one view all that relates to the establishment of the executive, on the due formation of which must depend the efficacy and utility of the union among the present and future states. It has been a maxim in political science, that republican government is not adapted to a large extent of country, because the energy of the executive magistracy cannot reach the extreme parts of it. Our country is an extensive one. We must either, then, renounce the blessings of the union, or provide an executive with sufficient vigor to pervade every part of it. This subject was of so much importance that he hoped to be indulged in an extensive view of it. One great object of the executive is, to control the legislature. The legislature will continually seek to aggrandize and perpetuate themselves, and will seize those critical moments produced by war, invasion, or convulsion, for that purpose. It is necessary, then, that the executive magistrate should be the guardian of the people, even of the lower classes, against legislative tyranny; against the great and the wealthy, who, in the course of things, will necessarily compose the legislative body. Wealth tends to corrupt the mind; to nourish its love of power; and to stimulate it to oppression. History proves this to be the spirit of the opulent. The check provided in the second branch was not meant as a check on legislative usurpations of power, but on the abuse of lawful powers, on the propensity of the first branch to legislate too much, to run into projects of paper money, and similar expedients. It is no check on legislative tyranny. On the contrary, it may favor it, and, if the first branch can be seduced, may find the means of success. The executive, therefore, ought to be so constituted as to be the great protector of the mass of the people. It is the duty of the executive to appoint the officers, and to command the forces, of the republic—to appoint, first, ministerial officers for the administration of public affairs; secondly, officers for the dispensation of justice. Who will be the best judges whether these appointments be well made? The people at large, who will know, will see, will feel, the effects of them. Again, who can judge so well of the discharge of military duties, for the protection and security of the people, as the people themselves, who are to be protected and secured? He finds, too, that the executive is not to be reëligible. What effect will this have? In the first place, it will destroy the great incitement to merit, public esteem, by taking away the hope of being rewarded with a reappointment It may give a dangerous turn to one of the strongest passions in the human breast. The love of fame is the great spring to noble and illustrious actions. Shut the civil road to glory, and he may be compelled to seek it by the sword. In the second place, it will tempt him to make the most of the short space of time allotted him to ac-
