New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, ay, 3; Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no, 7.
Mr. HOUSTON seconded the motion of Mr. Ellsworth, to add another elector to New Hampshire and Georgia.
On the question,—
Connecticut, South Carolina, Georgia, ay, 3; Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, no, 7.
Mr. WILLIAMSON moved as an amendment to Mr. Gerry's allotment of electors, in the first instance, that in future elections of the national executive, the number of electors to be appointed by the several states shall be regulated by their respective numbers of representatives in the first branch, pursuing, as nearly as may be, the present proportions.
On the question on Mr. Gerry's ratio of electors,—
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, ay, 6: New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Georgia, no, 4.
On the clause, "to be removable on impeachment and conviction for malpractice or neglect of duty," (see the ninth resolution,)—181
Mr. PINCKNEY and Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS moved to strike out this part of the resolution. Mr. PINCKNEY observed, he ought not to be impeachable whilst in office.
Mr. DAVIE. If he be not impeachable whilst in office, he will spare no efforts or means whatever, to get himself reëlected. He considered this as an essential security for the good behavior of the executive.
Mr. WILSON concurred in the necessity of making the executive impeachable whilst in office.
Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS. He can do no criminal act with out coadjutors, who may be punished. In case he should be reëlected, that will be a sufficient proof of his innocence. Besides, who is to impeach? Is the impeachment to suspend his functions? If it is not, the mischief will go on. If it is, the impeachment will be nearly equivalent to a displacement, and will render the executive dependent on those who are to impeach.
Col. MASON. No point is of more importance than that the right of impeachment should be continued. Shall any man be above justice? Above all, shall that man be above it who can commit the most extensive injustice? When great crimes were committed, he was for punishing the principal as well as the coadjutors. There had been much debate and difficulty as to the mode of choosing the executive. He approved of that which had been adopted at first, namely, of referring the appointment to the national legislature. One objection against electors was the danger of their being corrupted by the candidates, and this furnished a peculiar reason in favor of impeachments whilst in office. Shall the man who has practised corruption, and by that means procured his appointment in the first instance, be suffered to escape punishment by repeating his guilt?
Dr. FRANKLIN was for retaining the clause, as favorable to the
