strike out the whole of the clause proportioning direct taxation to representation. He had only meant it as a bridge[1] to assist us over a certain gulf: having passed the gulf, the bridge may be removed. He thought the principle laid down with so much strictness liable to strong objections.
On a ballot for a committee to report a constitution conformable to the resolutions passed by the Convention, the members chosen were—
Mr. Rutledge, Mr. Randolph, Mr. Gorham, Mr. Ellsworth, Mr. Wilson.
On motion to discharge the committee of the whole from the propositions submitted to the Convention by Mr. C. Pinckney as the basis of a constitution, and to refer them to the committee of detail just appointed, it was agreed to, nem. con.
A like motion was then made and agreed to, nem. con., with resent to the propositions of Mr. Patterson.
Adjourned.
In Convention.—The clause relating to the executive being again under consideration,—
Mr. ELLSWORTH moved, "that the executive be appointed by the legislature, except when the magistrate last chosen shall have continued in office the whole term for which he was chosen, and be reëligible; in which case the choice shall be by electors appointed by the legislatures of the states for that purpose." By this means a deserving magistrate may be reëlected without making him dependent on the legislature.
Mr. GERRY repeated his remark, that an election at all by the national legislature was radically and incurably wrong, and moved, "that the executive be appointed by the governors and presidents of the states, with advice of their councils; and where there are no councils, by electors chosen by the legislatures. The executives to vote in the following proportions, viz.: ———."
Mr. MADISON. There are objections against every mode that has been, or perhaps can be, proposed. The election must be made either by some existing authority under the national or state constitutions, or by some special authority derived from the people, or by the people themselves. The two existing authorities under the national Constitution would be the legislative and judiciary. The latter, he presumed, was out of the question. The former was, in his judgment, liable to insuperable objections. Besides the general influence of that mode on the independence of the executive, in the first place, the election of the chief magistrate would agitate and divide the legislature so much, that the public interest would materially suffer by it. Public bodies are always apt to be thrown into contentions,
- ↑ The object was to lessen the eagerness on one side for, and the opposition on the other to, the share of representation claimed by the Southern States on account of the negroes.
